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 While the migration of Abraham Lincoln’s family to the Northwest has often been 
documented as a significant event of his youth, historians have neglected the powerful 
repercussions this family decision had on Lincoln’s assessment of the South and the 
secession crisis in 1860 and 1861. Lincoln’s years living and working in the Northwest 
from 1831 to 1861 exposed him to the anti–slave system ethos of that region’s southern-
born migrants. Sensitive to the restraints they believed the social system of slavery placed 
upon their own liberties, these former southerners simultaneously despised the slave 
system, hated African Americans, and sympathized with white slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders who remained in the South. After building his initial sense of southern 
society from these migrants, Lincoln spent his years as a U.S. congressman learning the 
significance of the Northwest Ordinance in creating the free society in which they had 
thrived. Emphasizing Thomas Jefferson’s role in conceiving the Northwest Ordinance 
and utilizing statistical evidence to prove the superiority of free soil over slave, Lincoln’s 
colleagues further expanded Lincoln’s conception of the South. 
  All these influences combined to produce Lincoln’s uniquely northwestern 
approach to slavery, the South, and the secession crisis. Believing that the self-interest of 
white nonslaveholding southerners naturally propelled them away from the South and 
	  
	  
	  
toward free society, Lincoln perceived the slave South as a vastly unequal society 
controlled by a minority of aristocratic slaveholders who cajoled or chided their 
nonslaveholding neighbors into accepting a vision of the South’s proslavery, expansionist 
future. As president-elect, Lincoln therefore overestimated the Unionist sentiment of 
southerners before and during the secession crisis. He remained convinced that the 
majority of white nonslaveholders would not support a secessionist movement that he 
believed countered their own self-interest. With time, and through careful 
communications with the South, he remained convinced that he could settle secessionist 
passions and bring southerners to trust him and the Republican Party. This northwestern 
perception of the South therefore explains, in part, Lincoln’s silence and his refusal to 
compromise during the secession crisis.  
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Introduction 
 
“I see now, though I hadn’t considered the matter before, that there are two different 
ways of writing history: one is to persuade men to virtue and the other is to compel men 
to truth. The first is Livy’s way and the other is yours: and perhaps they are not 
irreconcilable.” 
Claudius to Pollio, I, Claudius, by Robert Graves 
 
 
 As the secession crisis loomed over the Union in the winter of 1860–1861, 
President-elect Lincoln remained in Springfield, Illinois, and pondered whether a 
majority of southerners supported separation. Turning to political acquaintance 
Alexander Stephens, among others, he asked: “Do the people of the South really entertain 
fears that a Republican administration would, directly, or indirectly, interfere with their 
slaves, or with them, about their slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you, as once a friend, 
and still, I hope, not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears.” Ultimately choosing 
to evade southern provocations with a “masterly silence” from his home in Springfield, 
Illinois, Lincoln enjoined Republicans to compromise on any issue but the extension of 
slavery. As historian William Cooper recently noted, the perception of the South that led 
Lincoln to pursue this policy remains “a key question…largely unanswered.” Cooper 
offers one reason for “Lincoln’s unbending posture” on the slavery extension issue: “his 
ignorance of the South.” Historians have largely agreed with Cooper, portraying the 
president-elect as a sympathetic observer of the South who believed most 
nonslaveholding southerners remained ardent Unionists. Through time and patient policy, 
he could dissuade them from the extremism of a slaveholding planter class whose 
political and economic interests opposed their own.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cooper further contends that throughout the secession crisis the Republican Party had the choice of 
compromising with the South on the issue of slavery extension. Since most southerners appeared to accept 
the terms offered in the Crittenden Compromise, Lincoln likely could have reunited the seceding states 
2	  
	  
	  
 Although these studies have explored the immediate context of the crisis, noting 
the information Lincoln received from or about the South in 1860 and 1861 and 
analyzing the extent to which he was willing to make to the region, historians have only 
briefly noted Lincoln’s perception of southerners before moving on to his pre-presidential 
policy and the South’s response. Despite the looming tower of Lincoln literature that 
shapes any discussion of this crucial period of our nation’s history, the roots of Lincoln’s 
conception of the South have been granted very limited attention. Nearly all these 
interpretations, which agree that Lincoln somehow miscalculated the South’s reaction 
with flawed expectations, rest their interpretations on statements Lincoln made in letters 
and speeches in 1860. Scholars highlight, for example, a letter the Republican nominee 
wrote on August 15 to Virginia supporter John M. Botts, asserting that “[t]he people of 
the South have too much of good sense, and good temper, to attempt the ruin of the 
government….At least, so I hope and believe.” Just days before his election to the 
presidency, Lincoln similarly referred to “the good men of the South—and I regard the 
majority of them as such,” as overwhelmingly Unionist but overshadowed by those “who 
are eager for something new upon which to base new misrepresentations.”2 
 Historians have long relied on such comments as proof that Lincoln 
misunderstood the strength of the South’s commitment to slavery and secession. Russell 
McClintock remarks on Lincoln’s “early blindness to the true danger of Southern 
disunionism.” Shearer Davis Bowman notes that he “seemed to believe that with time and 
calm, the majority of citizens in the slave states would feel a resurgence of their deep-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
under the banner of the Union. William J. Cooper, “The Critical Signpost on the Journey Toward 
Secession,” Journal of Southern History, 77 (February 2011): 13, 16.  
2 Roy P. Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1935–1955), VI: 50; IV: 134–35, (hereafter abbreviated CW). 
3	  
	  
	  
seated Unionist sympathies, temporarily repressed by the fear-mongering of fire-eating 
hotspurs. In this scenario, southern Unionism, like an incoming tide, would drown most 
of the ugly disunionism that had appeared when the waters receded.” David Donald 
similarly emphasizes Lincoln’s “deeply held conviction that Unionists were in a large 
majority throughout the South and that, given time for tempers to cool, they would be 
able to defeat the secessionist conspirators.” Time, historian Robert Johannsen argues, 
was crucial to the president-elect. He “had claimed on a number of occasions that his 
election would end the agitation over slavery,” and eventually, when “Southerners 
recognized that he was right, he believed they would cease their hostility toward the 
North.”3 
If time did not bring this calm, military pressure would. “As the Union army 
occupied more areas,” relates William Harris, “an increasing number of Southerners, he 
believed, would take the oath of allegiance and participate in their state and local 
governments.” While nearly all of these historians depict a Lincoln whose faith in 
southern Unionism remained unbroken through his inauguration, they do offer different 
timing for the shattering of this faith. Craig Symonds depicts the return of three scouts the 
president sent to South Carolina in March 1861 as an unsettling event. After learning 
from reports that South Carolina stood unanimously for secession, however, Lincoln’s 
faith appeared shaken but not yet broken. David Potter argues this sentiment remained 
intact at least as late as Lincoln’s appeal to Congress on July 4, 1861, when he “still 
insisted that there was much loyalty to the United States within the Confederacy.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Russell McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 10; Shearer Davis Bowman, At the Precipice: Americans 
North and South during the Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 272; 
David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 260; Robert W. Johannsen, 
Lincoln and the South in 1860 (Fort Wayne, Ind.: Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum, 1989), 3. 
4	  
	  
	  
Richard H. Abbott’s study of The Republican Party and the South concurs, asserting that 
Lincoln’s attempts to build Union support in the South after war had begun were based 
“on the presumed existence of a mass of Southerners who were basically pro-Union but 
who had been misled by secessionist leaders into supporting the Confederacy.”4 
 As many of these same historians have long noted, however, Lincoln’s faith in 
southern Unionism was not unique, and it was not entirely misplaced. Other Americans 
with ties to the border states and Upper South also underestimated secession, and they 
supported Lincoln’s sense that the crisis would pass with time.5 An entry from Edward 
Bates’s diary for November 22, 1860, exemplifies the widespread Republican assumption 
that secessionist sentiment was indeed more a façade than a mass movement by the 
southern people: “Still I think that (except with a few demented fanatics) it is all brag and 
bluster, hoping thus to make a better compromise with the timid patriotism of their 
opponents.” Although war might still result from this extremism, “letters and telegrams 
from the South, bear plain evidence of exagiration, and make a false shewing of the 
unanimity of the people, in support of the traitorous design. A very little time will show” 
their disapproval of such extreme sectionalism. Bates’s faith in southern Unionism 
mirrored the sentiments of many southerners, and Republicans, whom Lincoln had 
contact with in 1860 and 1861.6 Popular sovereignty Democrat John A. Logan, who won 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 William H. Harris, With Charity for All: Lincoln and the Restoration of the Union (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1997), 8–9; Craig L. Symonds, Lincoln and his admirals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 12–14; David Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1942), 375; Richard H. Abbott, The Republican Party and the South, 1855–1877: The 
First Southern Strategy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 20. 
5	  In particular, Lincoln largely relied on the opinions of southern unionists and their informants, such as 
Winfield Scott, George D. Prentice, and John Minor Botts, CW, IV: 95, 134–35, 137. 
6 Edward Bates in Brooks D. Simpson, Stephen W. Sears and Aaron Sheehan-Dean, eds., The Civil War: 
The First Year (New York: Penguin Group, Inc., 2011), 48. Historians continue to debate the extent of 
unionism in the South. David Potter believed “a majority in the South did not want disunion and that a 
majority in the North did not want to press the question of slavery in the territories.” Potter, Lincoln and his 
5	  
	  
	  
election to U.S. Congress in 1859 and whose Democratic sympathies reflected the 
heavily southern district he represented in Illinois, made the identical prediction that with 
time, “calm southerners would realize Lincoln was ‘harmless,’” and would refuse to heed 
the call of fire-eating secessionists to join a slaveholding Confederacy.7 
 Some scholars add greater context to Lincoln’s approach to the secession crisis in 
order to provide a more comprehensive assessment of his course. Eric Foner and William 
Baringer place Lincoln within the context of his informers, noting that he “was not a 
detached observer,” and his particular “sources of information”—often Upper South and 
border state Unionists—led him to believe the South was not in earnest.” In The Fiery 
Trial Foner also acknowledges the widespread Republican conviction, shared by Lincoln, 
that “the mass of white southerners did not share the interests of the Slave Power,” as 
well as the optimistic 1860 election returns that seemed to calm northern fears of 
southern disunion. “John Bell’s victories in Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee and near-
victories in Maryland and North Carolina, and Douglas’s capture of Missouri, 
strengthened Republicans’ conviction that the Upper South, at least, was strongly pro-
Union.” Michael Burlingame and David Potter likewise point out that “[t]ogether, Bell 
and Douglas, who opposed secession, won 110,000 more Southern votes than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Party, xlii. As Shearer Davis Bowman further points out, “Confederate leaders found much less support 
than they had hoped for in the big cities of the border slave states—Baltimore, Louisville, and St. Louis.” 
Bowman, At the Precipice, 285. Indeed, Lincoln’s faith in the South’s Unionism seems to hold true for the 
border states. William E. Gienapp, “Abraham Lincoln and the Border States,” Journal of the Abraham 
Lincoln Association 13, no. 1 (1992): 15; William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the 
Union (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 2, 11. Many recent studies have highlighted the 
prevalence of southern Unionism and its effects before and during the war. See Emory M. Thomas, The 
Confederate Nation, 1861–1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 234; Jon L. Wakelyn, Confederates 
against the Confederacy: Essays on Leadership and Loyalty (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 14, 33–34; 
William W. Freehling, The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of 
the Civil War (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), xiii. 
7 John A. Logan, “Freshman in Congress, 1859–1861,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 56 
(Spring 1963): 52–53. 
6	  
	  
	  
Breckinridge,” who was generally perceived as the pro-secession candidate.8 Robert 
Johannsen, meanwhile, ascribes Lincoln's faith in a southern Unionist majority to his 
vantage point from Springfield in 1860 and 1861, remarking that the president-elect 
remained “insulated from the crisis that threatened the Union. Indeed, the crisis appeared 
much less serious on the prairies of central Illinois than it did in the legislative halls and 
executive office of the national capital.” Even longtime foe Stephen Douglas wondered at 
Lincoln’s apparent oblivion to the seriousness of southern secessionism, remarking that 
he seemed defined more by the local events in Springfield than by his recent propulsion 
to national stature. As William Seward and other moderate Republicans scrambled to 
effect some compromise during the 1860–61 secession winter, Lincoln forbade any 
moderation on the slavery-extension issue9  
 This reliance on primary source material from the late 1850s through the 
secession crisis, however contextualized, leads only to superficial explanations for why 
Lincoln misunderstood the South in 1860. No studies of Lincoln and the secession crisis 
comprehensively address Lincoln’s conception of southerners from his youth and 
political rise in the northwestern state of Illinois.10 William Cooper’s short address notes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 William E. Baringer, A House Dividing: Lincoln as President Elect (Springfield: The Abraham Lincoln 
Association, 1945), 71; Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., 2010), 150–51. David Zarefsky agrees with Foner that Lincoln’s belief in the Slave 
Power led him to underappreciate the momentum of secession. The rattling of fire-eaters and frequent 
invocation of disunion “had become so common in the midcentury rhetorical culture that it was regarded as 
‘rhetorical bluster to coerce the North into accepting Southern demands.’ It was a campaign device” 
utilized by southern slaveholders, “and if ignored it would go away.” Zarefsky, Lincoln, Douglas, and 
Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 216; Michael 
Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln: A Life (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), I: 692; 
David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York and other cities: Harper and Row, 1976), 442. 
9 Johannsen, Lincoln and the South in 1860, 16, 22. 
10	  Some studies addressing Lincoln’s view of southern secession have stated the significance of Lincoln’s 
northwestern experiences without exploring them in detail. Emory Thomas, The Dogs of War: 1861 (New 
York and other cities: Oxford University Press, 2011), 18, claims Lincoln “believed that common white 
folk in the South were very much like the people with whom he had grown up in Indiana and Illinois,” and 
he therefore “did not take seriously support for secession in the South.” Allen C. Guelzo, Abraham Lincoln: 
7	  
	  
	  
that, beside his two flatboat trips to New Orleans as an adolescent, “he never traveled in 
the South beyond Kentucky. Aside from a few Kentuckians, he really did not know any 
southerners, certainly not any southern politicians….[f]undamentally, he had no friends 
who could educate him about the South and southern politics.” He therefore developed 
“no understanding of either the widespread ownership of slaves among whites or how 
deeply embedded slavery had become in southern society.”11 Many studies have 
highlighted particular southern interactions, relationships, and events that shaped 
Lincoln’s development, without addressing them holistically. Historians have often 
recounted “the interrelationship between Lincoln and Kentucky throughout his life.” 
Lowell Harrison contends it was Lincoln’s understanding of Kentucky and 
Kentuckians…[that]…kept the state of his birth in the Union” and notes the tendency of 
Kentuckians to migrate across the Ohio River. Stephen Berry explicates the inner Civil 
War that occurred within Mary Todd’s Kentucky family, dividing brothers and sisters on 
either side of the Union-Confederate line and offering Lincoln a microcosm of the 
secession crisis. A multitude of studies examine Lincoln’s friendship or personal 
acquaintance with Kentuckians like Joshua F. Speed, John Todd Stuart, Stephen T. 
Logan, William Herndon, Joseph Holt, Orlando Bell Ficklin, and Usher Linder.12 The 
two flatboat trips Lincoln took to New Orleans, meanwhile, have received attention in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Redeemer President (Grand Rapids, Mi.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 254, 230, similarly 
asserts the significance of these northwesterners to Lincoln’s decision-making in 1860. 
11 Cooper, “The Critical Signpost,” 14. 
12 Lowell H. Harrison, Lincoln of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), viii; William 
H. Townsend, Lincoln and the Bluegrass: Slavery and Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington, University of 
Kentucky Press, 1955), vii; Stephen Berry, House of Abraham: Lincoln and the Todds, A Family Divided 
by War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007); Elizabeth D. Leonard, Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge 
Advocate General Joseph Holt of Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); 
“Orlando Bell Ficklin and Usher Ferguson Linder,” in Charles H. Coleman, Abraham Lincoln and Coles 
County, Illinois (New Brunswick, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1955); David Herbert Donald, “We Are Lincoln 
Men”: Abraham Lincoln and His Friends (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003). 
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“nearly every book written about Lincoln, from children’s readers to scholarly tomes,” as 
a particularly significant incident in the development of Lincoln’s personal antislavery 
views.13 Additional studies highlight Lincoln’s congressional term in Washington, D.C. 
as a formative period, occasionally mentioning his relationship with southerners during 
those years.14 
 Adopting Cooper’s prescient observation that an examination of Lincoln's lifelong 
associations with the South—not just his interactions during the short period of the 
crisis—is absolutely necessary to any assessment of his policy decisions in 1860–61, this 
dissertation studies Lincoln’s perception of southerners from his arrival in Illinois in 1831 
to his presidential inauguration in March 1861. Besides extending the temporal focus, 
however, this dissertation also deviates from previous scholarship in its emphasis on 
Lincoln’s perspective as a southern-born migrant to the Northwest. It is a well-known 
fact that Lincoln twice piloted a flatboat to New Orleans, became a part of Mary Todd’s 
slaveholding Kentucky family, and interacted with southern politicians during his term in 
Congress. To encounter southern-born Americans, however, he did not even need to 
travel beyond the boundaries of Illinois. Since its earliest days as a section of the 
Northwest Territory, Illinois was settled by men, women, and children who migrated 
from the slaveholding South. These migrants often moved northward across the Ohio 
River to extricate themselves from the strictures of a slaveholding society they believed 
hindered the progress of nonslaveholders. As the offspring of such migrants, Lincoln 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Richard Campanella’s recent monograph is the only work that attempts to reconstruct the context 
surrounding Lincoln on these trips, detailing the extent and types of interactions with slavery he most likely 
had. Campanella, Lincoln in New Orleans: The 1828–1831 Flatboat Voyages and Their Place in History 
(Lafayette, La.: University of Louisiana at Lafayette Press, 2010), 1; Stephen B. Oates, With Malice 
Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York and other cities: Harper and Row, 1977), 60, 
quoted in James L. Huston, “The Experiential Basis of the Northern Antislavery Impulse,” Journal of 
Southern History 56 (November 1990), 624. 
14 Donald W. Riddle, Congressman Abraham Lincoln (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), 17, 73. 
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daily interacted with anti–slave system southern-born migrants who hated slavery, 
abolitionism, and blacks. Lincoln’s experiences in the Northwest from 1831 to 1860 
therefore endowed him with an acute sense of the importance of the Northwest 
Ordinance, and a particular understanding of the South. These ideological products of 
Lincoln’s experience matured after his term in U.S. Congress, when he was exposed to 
southerners and to arguments about the Northwest Ordinance, and spurred him back into 
political action after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854.15 
 The sixteenth president’s associations with his native state are often subsumed 
beneath a larger debate over whether Lincoln was a southerner or a westerner. Despite 
numerous attempts to settle the question, it continues to overshadow all historiography on 
Lincoln and the South, reflecting the difficulty of understanding Lincoln in the greater 
context of the shifting boundaries of North, South, and West from 1787 to 1860. James 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Since William C. Binkley’s call for studies on southern migration to the antebellum West, surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the impact of this major process on U.S. politics, ideology, society and 
culture. Binkley, “The South and the West,” Journal of Southern History 17 (February 1951). Peter D. 
McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser argue in Demographic Dimensions of the New Republic: American 
Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics and Manumissions, 1800–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 60, that during “the 1840–60 period, the New South became a region of major exodus,” while 
the Northwest remained a major region of southern influx. “In short, to the common view of an East-West 
flow must now be added the uncommon view of a major South-North flow throughout the entire 60-year 
period,” from 1800 to 1860. Histories of Illinois, like James E. Davis’s Frontier Illinois (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), 189, regularly highlight the influence of southern migration on the state. 
Paul M. Angle shifts the migration focus specifically to Lincoln, briefly questioning how much impact 
southern-born migrants had on his approach to the South. Paul M. Angle, “Here I have Lived”: A History 
of Lincoln’s Springfield, 1821–1865,” (Springfield, Ill.: The Abraham Lincoln Association, 1935), xiv. 
Other studies of Illinois and Lincoln mention southern migration as significant factor in the state’s or 
Lincoln’s development: Paul E. Stroble, High on the Okaw’s Western Bank: Vandalia, Illinois, 1819–39 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); Stephen B. Oates, “‘My Dissatisfied Fellow Countrymen’: 
Abraham Lincoln and the Slaveholding South” in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., Essays on Southern History: 
Written in honor of Barnes L. Lathrop (Austin: University of Texas, 1980), 95–116; Benjamin P. Thomas, 
Lincoln’s New Salem (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988); Kenneth J. Winkle, “The 
Voters of Lincoln’s Springfield,” Journal of Social History 25 (Spring 1992); Andrew R. L. Cayton, “The 
Peopling of the Old Northwest,” in Cayton and Peter S. Onuf, eds., The Midwest and the Nation: 
Rethinking the History of an American Region (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 26. Other 
works examine the hatred of slavery and/or African Americans espoused by southern migrants to the 
Northwest: James Simeone, Democracy and Slavery in Frontier Illinois: The Bottomland Republic 
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000); Don Harrison Doyle, The Social Order of a Frontier 
Community: Jacksonville, Illinois, 1825–70 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 51; William V. 
Pooley, “The Settlement of Illinois from 1830 to 1850” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1905). 
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G. Randall counted Lincoln's interactions with Mary Todd’s slaveholding family, the 
broader border South, and southerners in the Northwest as definitive evidence that he was 
born, raised, and remained a southerner. Nicole Etcheson, Orville Vernon Burton, and 
John J. Coelho argue that parts of the Northwest—particularly southern Illinois and 
southern Indiana—retained a southern cultural identity that continued to steer its 
inhabitants. Lincoln's life in Illinois therefore revolved around southern ideals, such as 
personal and family honor, and “manliness,” brought by southern-born migrants to the 
West.16 Rather than perceiving these migrants to the Northwest as ideologically and/or 
culturally distinct from other southerners by 1860, these scholars interpret the process of 
migration as an extension of the cultural South.17  
Etcheson and Coelho specifically focus on the honor culture of the South, arguing 
that “Upland Southern society…[was] transmitted into the southern reaches of Illinois 
territory by poor, white settlers from Maryland, piedmont Virginia, North Carolina, 
Kentucky, and Tennessee,” and migrant southerners “actively maintained this way of life 
even decades after their relocation to the Northwest.” Only Orville Vernon Burton, 
however, connects his interpretation of Lincoln as a southerner to the secession crisis in 
1860. He borrows David’s Moltke-Hansen’s definition of southerners as “people born or 
living in the Confederate states, the border states, and people of southern descent living in 
areas adjacent to the borders, such as the southern portions of Ohio, Indiana, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 John J. Coelho, “The Politics of Honor: Character, Slavery, and the Political Development of Abraham 
Lincoln, 1809–1854,” (Master’s Thesis, Providence College, 2006); Catherine Clinton, “Abraham Lincoln: 
The Family that Made him, the Family he Made” in Eric Foner, ed., Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on 
Lincoln and His World (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2008), 249–66; Orville Vernon Burton, The 
Age of Lincoln (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 104–133. 
17	  In his study of Upland Southerners in Indiana, Gregory A. Peek similarly finds that state defined by its 
direct connection with the South. However, he argues that despite the extension of the South into Indiana, 
“sectional extremism in the Deep South…alienated Upland Southerners” who had migrated to the state, 
prompting some to even vote Republican. Peek, “Upland Southerners, Indiana Political Culture, and the 
Coming of the Civil War, 1816–1861” (PhD diss., University of Houston, 2010), 2. 
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Illinois,” to assert that Lincoln did not severely misjudge the extent of southern 
Unionism. In Burton’s estimation, “Lincoln lived as a southern man, a southern husband, 
a southern father,” and “40 percent or more of all white southerners fought for the 
Union.”18 
 Burton’s work makes a prescient, though brief, connection between migration to 
the Northwest and Lincoln’s view of southerners in 1860, arguing, “Lincoln’s southern 
roots were also reflected in his belief that, despite the fiery rhetoric of their leaders, the 
majority of southern yeomen would not be persuaded. In the end, after all, the master 
class had little to offer the South’s common people….He knew that many southern whites 
opposed slavery even as they also opposed abolitionism.” Though I believe this statement 
accurately captures Lincoln's sentiments, Burton’s characterization of southern-born 
Illinoisans as virtual southerners in 1860 simply does not accord with the differences in 
voting patterns, ideology, and culture that had separated the Northwest from the South by 
1860. Though the two remained intimately connected through cultural traditions, family 
connections, and Mississippi River trade, an ideological evolution, on both sides, had 
exacerbated already existing differences between northwestern migrants and their family 
and friends who remained within the slaveholding South. Heeding historian David 
Blight's rearticulation of the warning that historians “not make too much of Lincoln’s 
personal ties to Kentucky or even of the influence of his ‘Southerness,’” this dissertation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Coelho, “The Politics of Honor,” 19; and Nicole Etcheson, “Manliness and the Political Culture of the 
Old Northwest, 1790–1860,” Journal of the Early Republic 15 (Spring 1995), 62; Burton, Age of Lincoln, 
129. 
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accepts that “the Illinois of his adulthood was far different from the Kentucky of his 
youth.”19  
 Richard Current supports this interpretation, explaining that “[i]n peopling the 
lower counties of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the large numbers of Virginians, 
Carolinians, and Kentuckians did not create an extension of the South. They did not, of 
course, take slaves with them; indeed, many of them made the move in order to get away 
from slavery.” Nicole Etcheson’s study of the Emerging Midwest, though stressing the 
continuing significance of northern and southern cultural identity in the West, also points 
out that by 1860, southern-born Illinoisans “were forced to articulate the simple truth that 
they were no longer Southerners.” As one of these Illinoisans, Lincoln “recognized his 
roots as an Upland Southerner, believed he understood southerners better than Douglas, 
and attempted to employ that background to his political benefit” during the Lincoln-
Douglas debates and beyond. Though her reference to Lincoln within this context is brief, 
Etcheson later makes the same crucial connection asserted in this dissertation: that 
southern-born Illinoisans’ sympathy for the South “was offset” by their “distrust for the 
planter aristocracy. The idea of a ‘slave power conspiracy’ had meaning for Upland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Burton, Age of Lincoln, 128; David W. Blight, “Hating and Loving the ‘Real’ Abe Lincolns: Lincoln and 
the American South” in Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton, eds., The Global Lincoln (New York and 
other cities: Oxford University Press, 2011), 273. Robert Johannsen reiterated David Blight’s warning. 
Although it seems Lincoln “should have been exceptionally well-informed about Southern attitudes, 
concerns, and convictions” because he read southern newspapers, “he became increasingly indifferent 
toward Southern sentiments.” In Illinois, where he was physically separated from the South, Lincoln 
“appeared to be unaware of the extent to which the institution [of slavery] was woven through the fabric of 
Southern civilization…Where the South was concerned, Lincoln’s vision was myopic.” Robert W. 
Johannsen, Lincoln, the South and Slavery: The Political Dimension (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1991), 5.  
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Southern Midwesterners who had personal experiences of a planter class that they felt 
attempted to oppress white nonslaveholders.”20  
 Kenneth J. Winkle’s The Young Eagle: The Rise of Abraham Lincoln addresses 
the influence of migration on Abraham Lincoln more pointedly than any other study, 
providing a uniquely detailed and apt description of the different cultural influences 
acting upon Lincoln. Like Current, Winkle designates Lincoln a westerner. By focusing 
on Lincoln’s family and the Northwest, however, he characterizes that region as the only 
real option for nonslaveholding southerners seeking available land, despite the abundance 
of Southwest lands that beckoned potential migrants—particularly those already living in 
the South. This is what makes the decision of Abraham Lincoln’s father, Thomas, to 
migrate to the Northwest rather than to nearby slave states like Missouri a crucial factor 
in shaping Lincoln’s understanding of nonslaveholding southerners. Because Thomas 
Lincoln “left a southern slave state for a region of free labor, where yeoman families such 
as theirs could support themselves in dignity and aspire to reach the top of the social scale 
without resorting to the ownership of slaves,”21 Lincoln developed an early conception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Richard Nelson Current, Speaking of Abraham Lincoln: The Man and His Meaning for our Times 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 162; Nicole Etcheson, Emerging Midwest: Upland 
Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1787–1861 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), 127, 13, 109.  
21 John V. H. Dippel, Race to the Frontier: ‘White Flight’ and Westward Expansion (New York: Algora 
Publishing, 2005), 114 emphasizes this choice that lay before migrants in antebellum America, noting that 
the “’plain folk’ from the Upper South could have moved elsewhere,” besides Illinois and the other 
Northwest states. David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly’s study Bound Away: Virginia and the 
Westward Movement (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2000), xi, asserts that “The 
movement west always began with a decision”—where to move to, and why. While the migration patterns 
of family and friends resulted in chain migrations, many chose their new states and homes on their own. 
Examining the great migration of 1 million Virginians from the state in the antebellum period, these 
scholars point to migration as key process that changed not only the political, social, and cultural 
geography of the West, but that of Virginia as well. 
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southern nonslaveholders as downtrodden folk who, if they had the means to migrate, 
would escape from under the thumb of the slaveholding aristocracy.22  
 Lincoln’s campaign autobiography, written for Scripps in 1860, indicates the 
significance that southern migrations to the Northwest held for the presidential nominee. 
The quote most often mentioned by historians, that Lincoln’s father decided to leave 
behind the South for the Northwest “partly on account of slavery,” did not precede a 
discussion of the nominee’s antislavery ideology and his reasons for espousing 
Republicanism, although historians have often placed it within that context, or in 
description of Lincoln’s youth. Rather, this statement in the 1860 autobiography appears 
at the end of a detailed history Lincoln wrote about his own family’s migration from the 
South. Nearly one-seventh of this entire autobiography is spent recounting this migration 
story, which includes the Lincolns’ relocation from the state of Virginia to the border 
state of Kentucky and their resettlement in the northwestern states of Indiana and Illinois. 
Many Lincoln scholars have used the quote and context to reconstruct Abraham 
Lincoln’s ancestry and early childhood, tracing the impact of the migration on his 
upbringing. However, this full page of text in Lincoln’s 1860 autobiography suggests that 
both migration and antislavery, together, occupied his thoughts in 1860. Extracting his 
antislavery statement, alone, misses the crucial element of migration to which it is tied, 
while portraying the migration story as an early component of Lincoln’s life neglects its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Richard Current argues our focus should turn to the question: What did Lincoln view himself as? Current 
believes Lincoln considered himself an Illinoisan, but also “thought of himself as, more broadly, a 
Westerner.” Current, Speaking of Abraham Lincoln, 157; Kenneth J. Winkle, The Young Eagle: The Rise of 
Abraham Lincoln (Dallas, Texas: Taylor Publishing Co., 2001), 12. Although Winkle’s study significantly 
explicates the context surrounding Lincoln in Springfield and central Illinois, it does not place the ideology 
of these fellow southern migrants within a national context; nor does it extend all these influences to 
explain how Lincoln approached the secession crisis in 1860. His study ends in 1859, before Lincoln is 
elected or even nominated. 
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continuing significance to the Republican nominee in 1860. Releasing a crucial piece of 
literature he hoped would both attract a positive reception from voters and adequately 
represent him, Lincoln chose to highlight both migration and antislavery as crucial 
factors in his life. By combining the migration story with the simple statement that his 
father moved to the Northwest to get away from slavery, Lincoln recalled a large-scale 
process that had delivered thousands of southern nonslaveholders to the state of Illinois 
from 1820-1860.23 
Through his experiences in the Northwest, Lincoln developed a keen 
understanding of the motivations that spurred many southerners to live in free territory 
over slave, yet he extended this awareness into conjecture when he supposed white 
nonslaveholders of the South shared the same ideology and the same attachment to the 
Union. While the Unionism of particular areas—the border states and upcountry areas in 
the upper South—proved his conviction partially true, most of the nonslaveholding South 
ultimately fought for the Confederacy. Without his experiences as a northwesterner in 
central Illinois, Lincoln never would have understood, better than most, the similarities 
between northerners and southerners. He also never would have developed such an 
optimistic projection of southern Unionism in 1860. 
By acknowledging that Lincoln’s northwestern experiences lay at the root of his 
antislavery ideology, his conception of the South, and his approach to the secession crisis, 
this dissertation more broadly emphasizes the role that “experience,” defined as “the 
name for everything that arises out of the interaction of the human organism with its 
environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies, prejudices,” plays in human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 CW, IV: 60–68.  
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thought, perspective, and belief.24 Too often, portrayals of Lincoln depict an intellectually 
gifted man who rose from the common experiences of his youth and entered an 
intellectual and political sphere totally divorced from that earlier life. These studies seem 
to accept Lincoln’s remarks about his early life as “a great piece of folly,” represented 
best by the sentence from Gray’s Elegy concerning “The short and simple annals of the 
poor,” as evidence that he gained nothing from these experiences. Careful examination of 
Lincoln’s own attention to his family history and to his invocation of the Northwest 
Ordinance as the best proof that the Founding Fathers desired slavery to be eventually 
extinguished form the Union, however, reveals a man whose experiences affected him 
greatly. Far from developing his approach to slavery and the secession crisis from cold 
reason and careful study of the nation’s laws, alone, Lincoln’s decisions during the 
secession crisis remained centered on the evidence he had gathered from his experiences 
as a southern-born migrant to the Northwest.25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  This particular definition is taken from Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in 
America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 341–42, in his explanation of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ approach to experience. 
25	  Donald, Lincoln, 19. John C. Waugh depicts Lincoln “logging time in the state library, combing duty 
volumes of congressional proceedings and digging into political history” before his Cooper Institute 
address, to find evidence that the Founders had been opposed to slavery. Although Lincoln pored over this 
written material, his conviction that slavery was both morally and socially evil and that the Founders had 
set it upon a course of ultimate extinction came from his experiences in the Northwest. Waugh, One Man 
Great Enough: Abraham Lincoln’s Road to Civil War (New York: Harcourt, 2007), 297. 
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Chapter One 
The Southern Antislavery Movement to the Northwest 
 
 A half century after the Civil War, Illinoisan Tillman Manus reminisced to the 
Cairo Evening Citizen and Cairo Bulletin about his experiences in the conflict. Born in 
Cannon County, Tennessee, in 1835, Manus had left behind the slave state of his birth for 
the free state of Illinois. As a new resident, Manus listened intently to the speeches that 
Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas gave in Jonesboro. A Lincoln supporter, he chose 
not to fight on behalf of his former, now secessionist, state of Tennessee but rather with 
Illinois and the Union. He thus “joined up on the northern side in the Civil War, as did his 
uncle. But his father down in Tennessee thought differently and openly disowned Tillman 
until the day he received from him, by a traveler going south, pictures taken in his 
uniform just before he left camp.” Manus’s decision to leave behind his southern family 
and slave state for a new society in the Northwest exemplifies the experience of many 
southern migrants to Illinois.1  
 Charles Asbury and George McCarty, like Manus, understood the widening 
ideological divisions that often followed the physical separation of southern migrants 
from their former homes and families. Born in Uniontown, Ohio, to parents who had left 
Virginia for the Northwest, McCarty migrated to Illinois and became a member of the 
Republican Party. When the war began, his Virginia uncles fought not for the Union but 
for the Confederacy. 2  Charles Asbury similarly moved his family away from Virginia, 
travelling to Kentucky before finally settling in Sangamon County, Illinois, in 1825. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The region of the United States that includes Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, though 
often considered today as part of the Midwest, was actually considered the Northwest, “after the famous 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,” until the late nineteenth century. James R. Shortridge, “The Emergence of 
‘Middle West’ as an American Regional Label,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74 
(March 1984): 210.	  
2 Mrs. Edward Joseph Filbey, comp., Illinois Genealogical Records, III (Urbana, Ill., 1938/39), 285, 287. 
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Thirty-five years later, Charles’s Illinois family fought for the Union in the Civil War, 
while the Asbury “that lived in the State of Virginia, when the War begun,” joined the 
Confederacy’s 11th Virginia Volunteer’s Regiment.3 
 These few instances entail quite literal depictions of the Civil War pitting “brother 
against brother.” The phrase itself has resonated more with the general populace than 
with historians of the war, serving as a simple way to describe the social, emotional, and 
psychological depths of the North-South division. In this widespread usage, “brother 
against brother” does not typically describe a literal separation between family members, 
but rather, as Stephanie McCurry describes, functions as an apt metaphor meant “to 
equate ‘national fracture’” with fratricide.4 Therefore, few historical studies have 
connected the cliché to actual divisions among relatives that separated fathers, uncles, 
mothers, sons, and daughters from one another. Those who have addressed the 
phenomenon focus largely on the Border Slave South, where Unionist sentiment most 
visibly clashed with secessionism. Amy Murrell Taylor’s The Divided Family in Civil 
War America and John C. Inscoe and Robert C. Kenzer’s edited collection of essays, 
Enemies of the Country, represent two examples of such scholarship. In these and many 
other works, the “brother against brother” phenomenon characterizes the opposing 
viewpoints of relatives, neighbors, and friends within a defined territorial unit—either a 
particular state, the Border South, or the Confederacy. None of these studies point to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Descendants of Charles Asbury modified the family name from “Asbury” to “Alsbury.” Helen Ruth 
Renner, comp., Alsbury Gleanings from the Midwest (Montgomery City, Mo., 1988), 1–2, 43–45. The 
Genealogy and Memorial Record in Renner’s account was written by Brice William Alsbury in 1925.	  
4 Stephanie McCurry, “The Sisters’ War?” Women’s Review of Books 17 (September 2000): 21–23. 
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role of migration in creating or deepening ideological divisions that eventually pitted 
family, neighbors, and friends against one another in the Civil War.5 
As the stories of Manus, McCarty, and Asbury illustrate, Unionist and 
Confederate sentiments did clash at a distance. The migration of thousands of southerners 
to Illinois and other northwestern territories separated them from their old homes and 
acquaintances. By 1860 northwestern southerners and citizens of the South existed so far 
apart from one another, both geographically and ideologically, that they chose to engage 
in civil conflict against each other. Historians have failed to adequately connect this 
single greatest social movement in antebellum America—westward migration—to 
changes in slavery politics before the Civil War. The political, social, and cultural 
repercussions of migration from the South to the West resulted in very real “brother 
against brother” divisions that pit Illinois migrants against their southern families. As 
Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles have established, “it is reasonable to infer that a 
demographic experience of such magnitude would have profound implications for social 
mobility and political institutions.”6 As early as 1943, William O. Lynch noted in his 
brief analysis of “The Westward Flow of Southern Colonists before 1861” that a full-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Stephen Berry, House of Abraham, represents Mary Todd’s family as a singular case that uniquely 
explains the metaphor of  “the Civil War…[as] a family crisis in a larger, more symbolic, sense.”	  See also 
John C. Inscoe and Robert C. Kenzer, eds., Enemies of the Country: New Perspectives on Unionists in the 
Civil War South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001); and Amy Murrell Taylor, The Divided 
Family in Civil War America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Studies often define 
the “border South” in different ways. Basing her geographical designation in part on the prevalence of 
divided loyalties in particular states, Taylor identifies Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware as the Border South. William O. Lynch, “The Westward Flow of 
Southern Colonists before 1861,” Journal of Southern History 9 (August 1943): 303–27, identifies 
Missouri, populated by both northern and southern streams of migrants, as the infamous setting of the 
“Brothers’ War”. Other studies do not focus exclusively on border state families, but rather highlight 
particular cases of North/South, Union/Confederate family divisions, such as J. Tracy Power, “‘Brother 
against Brother’: Alexander and James Campbell’s Civil War,” in The South Carolina Historical Magazine 
95 (April 1994): 130–41. 
6 Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, “‘Restless in the Midst of their Prosperity’: New Evidence on the 
Internal Migration of Americans, 1850–2000,” Journal of American History 91 (December 2004): 845. 
20	  
	  
	  
length study of Virginians’ migrations to the West was necessary. William C. Binkley 
echoed this call in 1951, when he urged historians to consider “a systematic study of the 
part which the South may have played in determining the character of that West.”7 
Yet while historians such as Philip Schwartz and David Hackett Fischer have 
begun to analyze the repercussions of nineteenth-century migrations from Virginia, 
Nicole Etcheson’s much more recent claim that the ideology of northerners and 
southerners has been “little studied” still remains true today.8 The full consequences of 
southern migrations to the Northwest—especially in connection with antislavery politics 
in the 1850s—have not received the attention they deserve. This oversight stems, in part, 
from lack of source material. As Kenneth J. Winkle laments, “the political effects of 
migration appeared only fleetingly in the sources that represent the mainstay of 
nineteenth-century political history—aggregate voting returns, newspapers, and private 
letters—and therefore remain hidden from view.”9 Historians have yet to devise histories 
that adequately describe not only the direct impact of these Great Migrations on 
antislavery politics in nineteenth-century Illinois but also the increasing cultural 
separation between migrants and their southern ancestry, as well as Lincoln’s 
participation in these developments. Because southern-born migrants did not leave 
behind many written records and moved out across both main regions of the West, 
historians have too hastily lumped them all together, depicting those who migrated to the 
northwest as identical to southwestern-bound settlers.10 Finding themselves with so little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 William C. Binkley, “The South and the West,” Journal of Southern History 17 (February 1951): 6. 
8 Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old 
Northwest, 1787–1861 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), xii. 
9 Kenneth J. Winkle, The Politics of Community: Migration and Politics in Antebellum Ohio (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), xii. 
10 “The migration to southern Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana was a northward push from the same Carolina 
and Tennessee regions that also sent large numbers of people to Arkansas and east Texas.” John C. 
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source material on which to depend, historians have instead relied upon northerners and 
foreign-born settlers—who typically looked down upon their southern-born neighbors as 
illiterate, indigent, and backwards-looking—to make up for the voices of southerners, 
themselves. These observers, witnessing the racist inclinations of the nonslaveholding 
populace and exaggerating the prevalence of illegal slaveholding in southern Illinois, tend 
to mischaracterize southern-born Illinoisans as either blatantly proslavery or proslavery-
leaning. Since histories of Illinois have depended on these sources, historians have 
continued to misunderstand the anti–slave system ethos that actually drove these southern 
men, women, and children to seek new lives in free territory.11 
 When southerners chose to uproot from their homes and move westward, they 
based their planned destinations on a combination of federal land policy, previous 
migrants’ stories, and travelers’ accounts. Most importantly, each potential migrant had 
the choice to settle either in territory set aside for nonslaveholders—the Northwest—or 
on Southwestern lands where slavery would endure. Therefore, the migrations from 
southern slave states to Illinois were not simply geographical but also laden with 
profound social, cultural, and political assumptions and implications. As Illinois-bound 
families bid goodbye to relatives and friends in Virginia and North Carolina, or even to 
those in Kentucky and Tennessee, they made a conscious decision to leave behind a 
society based upon the institution of slavery for new futures on the frontier of a free state. 
The most important legislation guaranteeing these southern migrants the choice between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hudson, “North American Origins of Middlewestern Frontier Populations,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 78 (September 1988): 401. 
11 As James E. Davis explains, “Yankees berated Southerners and others from pulpits, schools, public 
offices, and the press.” Their prejudices, not southerners’ attachment to slavery, played a major role in the 
cultural clashes that continued between the two groups in Illinois throughout the antebellum period. Davis, 
Frontier Illinois (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 251. 
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free territory and slave was the Southwest Ordinance, deliberately passed in 1790 without 
any mention of slavery. Thus, while the Northwest Ordinance prohibited slavery in 
Article VI, the Southwest Ordinance left a huge swath of territory open to slaveholding 
farmers. Southern migrants, therefore, exercised their freedom to move either to free 
territory in the Northwest or to the slaveholding region of the Southwest. That choice 
grew in clarity and distinction over time as, one by one, northwestern states adopted 
constitutions prohibiting slavery, while southwestern states sanctioned the institution 
within their borders. 
 Since both the Northwest and the Southwest received hordes of this southern-born 
nonslaveholding population, historians have often characterized the motivations of each 
to be the same—namely, land. Scott Philyaw notes that Virginians’ “choices of 
destination were almost evenly split between free states and territories and those where 
slavery still ruled.”12 Those who did not move to the Northwest went to Missouri or 
Southwest territories like Arkansas, which gained statehood in 1836 and received most of 
its inhabitants from the states of Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Pushing out of 
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, and North and South Carolina, these families “carried with 
them their ideas and ideals, habits and social customs, the plantation-slavery agrarian 
economy.”13 As James Woods explains, “more than 80 percent of the white population” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Scott Philyaw, Virginia’s Western Visions: Political and Cultural Expansion on an Early American 
Frontier (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004), 147. 
13 Fletcher M. Green, ed., The Lides go South…And West: The Record of a Planter Migration in 1835 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), iii. Joan E. Cashin studies the aspirations of a group 
outside the bounds of this study—proslavery southern planters who moved from the Southeast into the 
Southwest in search of soil not exhausted by over-planting. Cashin, A Family Venture: Men and Women on 
the Southern Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 33. 
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in Arkansas “were not slaveowners or members of slaveowning families,”14 but 
nonslaveholders seeking independent livelihoods on their individual farms. 
In seeking to answer “what prompted several thousand small, independent 
farmers to relocate to a territory where slavery was becoming firmly entrenched,” 
historians have emphasized the similarities between northwestern- and southwestern-
bound settlers. Lands in the Southwest, they explain, were often more attractive than 
those in the Northwest. As the Northwest filled with settlers, land in Southwestern states 
like Arkansas occasionally offered a cheaper alternative to migrants struggling for 
subsistence. In that particular state, a Land Donation Act and homestead law offered 
greater opportunities for landownership than most states in the Union. Southerners 
therefore often travelled to future states like Arkansas “to get more and richer land than 
they had and build better lives for themselves and their families,” much as Lincoln’s 
father, Thomas Lincoln, left Kentucky to attain greater lands available in the Northwest.15 
Frank Owsley, furthermore, contends that similarities between the climate and geography 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 James Woods, Rebellion and Realignment: Arkansas’s Road to Secession (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1987), 30. Any statements like that by South Carolinian Congressman Robert Goodloe 
Harper, who claimed migrants to the Northwest “were from parts where slavery did not prevail,” while 
southwestern settlers were by nature in favor of slavery, grossly misrepresents the distinct nature of the two 
separate migrations. John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom and Expansion in the Early American West 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 24. 
15 As S. Charles Bolton qualifies, “Americans did not want equality but rather the opportunity to improve 
their own relative standing.” In Arkansas, that motive was, for the most part, achieved. While the gap 
between the wealth of the planter class and that of the poor white and yeoman widened greatly by 1860, 
Arkansans believed the southwestern frontier had offered them a chance to improve their livelihoods that 
had not existed for them in the southeast. Bolton, Territorial Ambition: Land and Society in Arkansas: 
1800–1840 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1993), 5, 123; Abraham Lincoln, The 
Autobiography of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Francis D. Tandy Company, 1918), 7. Richard Current 
urges that “[w]hether because of religious conviction or because of resentment against the pretensions of 
wealthy slaveowners, Thomas Lincoln clearly disliked the institution when he chose to resettle in Indiana 
which was about the [sic] enter the Union as a free state.” Richard Nelson Current, Speaking of Abraham 
Lincoln: The Man and His Meaning for Our Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 162. 
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of southeastern states like Virginia and southwestern states like Arkansas enticed 
nonslaveholders to slaveholding territory rather than free land in Illinois.16 
While the above factors certainly affected where southerners specifically chose to 
migrate, most southerners were driven by the determination to escape the grasp of an 
aristocratic planter class that stifled their opportunities to rise socially, economically, and 
politically. Nonslaveholders in the Northwest and Southwest, alike, sought land free of 
this slaveholding aristocracy.17 Malcolm Rohrbough explains how these aims were often 
fulfilled in states like Arkansas, where a “planter class slowly emerged in the south and 
east, with large-scale cotton cultivation and slavery its foundations,” while a much 
different type of society “emerged in north and west Arkansas. This was a region of small 
independent farmers, cultivating corn and grains, grazing large herds of livestock, 
isolated by geography and economy from the cotton interests to the east.”18 This section 
resembled areas of the Northwest like “Little Egypt,” the southernmost section of Illinois 
wherein many southern-born migrants resided. Other scholars have noted this particular 
motivation, explaining that “the experience of continued economic and political 
inequalities in these planter-dominated counties” of their home states “shaped common 
white migration and settlement in the Old Southwest.” McNeilly’s depiction of the 
Arkansas highland as “a society with slaves” much like the northern colonies prior to 
abolition, bears some similarities to territorial Illinois during the early migration period, 
when some slaveholders settled with their slave property. In this section of Arkansas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Frank Lawrence Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1949), 74–75. 
17 John V. Dippel, Race to the Frontier; ‘White Flight’ and Westward Expansion (New York: Algora 
Publishing, 2005), 184–85; Woods, Rebellion and Realignment, 21. 
18	  Malcolm Rohrbough, Trans-Appalachian Frontier: People, Societies, and Institutions, 1775—1850  
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 407–08.	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McNeilly explains, “[y]eomen would not tolerate the legendary supercilious manner of 
the planter class and thus forced the ‘high-toned’ to yield.”19  
Southern historians have frequently debated over the rigidity of class in the South, 
but rarely connected their arguments to the massive migrations bringing thousands to the 
West. Marc Egnal contends the slave system “created a pervasive hierarchy that placed 
some whites far above others.” Most political leaders—governors, legislators, judges—in 
southern states were slaveholders. “‘When the yeoman farmer voted, and most did, there 
was little for him to decide. Both candidates were more likely than not to represent 
slaveholding interests.’”20 
This depiction of a white nonslaveholding class escaping from planter domination 
did, indeed, resonate with both northwestern and southwestern migrants. Therefore, to a 
certain extent, “sectionalism defied political boundaries,” and reasons for moving to the 
Southwest often mirrored those for migrating to Illinois.21 To emphasize this similarity 
among all southern migrants to the West, however, is to ignore the important distinction 
between those who attempted a fresh start in another slaveholding area, and others who 
left slave territory behind for the free lands of the Northwest. Recent demographic 
statistics provided by Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser show the “total 
influx of people into the New South was less than 15 percent of the influx into the 
Northwest in the years 1800–60.” These statistics, combined with findings that the New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Donald P. McNeilly, The Old South Frontier: Cotton Plantations and the Formation of Arkansas Society 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), 2–3, 6. 
20	  Marc Egnal, Divergent Paths: How Culture and Institutions Have Shaped North American Growth (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61. 
21 Rohrbough, Trans-Appalachian Frontier, 417. Edward E. Baptist offers a significant contrast to this 
process of western migrations in the nineteenth century. Highlighting the role of migration in changing the 
history of the South, he focuses not on the typical Southwest, but on Florida, where some Chesapeake- and 
Carolina-born nonslaveholders chose to settle instead of the western frontier. Baptist, Creating an Old 
South: Middle Florida’s Plantation Frontier before the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002), 38. 
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South experienced a “major exodus” from 1840 to 1860, prompts the authors to perceive 
not just an East-West flow to antebellum migration, but also a “major South-North flow 
throughout the entire 60-year period.”22 
Though the difference may appear slight, it held lasting implications: 
northwesterners would almost certainly have no opportunity for slave ownership, while 
southwesterners were guaranteed the chance to own slaves. Therefore, when Tillman 
Manus, Charles Asbury, and George McCarty left behind southern family members for 
the Northwest, their choices to live in explicitly free territory separated them from the 
slaveholding society of the South. Although the Northwest Ordinance was not 
systematically enforced in states like Illinois, where some slaveholders managed to keep 
their slaves after statehood and others indentured blacks for lifelong terms, southern 
nonslaveholders knew that Illinois guaranteed them protection from the development of a 
slave-based aristocracy, like that which continued to dominate their old home states in the 
South. They therefore chose to accept life in new, free territory over continued existence 
among slaves and slaveholders.  
This crucial decision increasingly separated free-state bound southern migrants 
from their brethren in the slave states, as most southerners remained attached to the 
opportunities slavery provided them with, while northwestern newcomers often 
developed a more entrenched position against slavery. The gap between Illinoisans and 
those southerners who remained in slave territory widened so extensively and 
imperceptibly between 1800 and 1860 that even Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  These authors similarly question whether slavery or economic opportunity played a greater role in the 
migrations. Peter D. McClelland and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Demographic Dimensions of the New 
Republic: American Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics, and Manumissions, 1800–1860 (Cambridge 
and other cities: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6. 
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two Illinoisan politicians who understood so much about the Northwest migration, could 
not calculate its effects until the onset of Civil War.23 
Historians have been reluctant to portray these southern-born Illinoisans as 
antislavery, and a general perception of southern-born immigrants as proslavery-leaning 
bigots has persisted despite multiple counter-characterizations. Certain events in the early 
history of Illinois remain largely to blame for this misperception. The efforts of Illinois’s 
own citizens to introduce slavery into the state, evidenced in petitions to Congress, the 
convention debate of 1823–1824, and the illegal slaveholding practiced by a small 
percentage of the population after statehood made it appear as though southern-born 
migrants pushed for slavery until the masses of northeastern-born settlers to Illinois 
overwhelmed their voices and votes. This general story is supported by the letters and 
journals of northern-born migrants who wrote more extensively than the southern-born, 
and who exuded a moral antislavery ethos that could not see beyond southern migrants’ 
hatred of blacks, to their hatred of slavery.24  
Examples abound of historians characterizing southern migrants as “sympathetic 
toward the institution” of slavery. “As late as 1845,” David Zarefsky admits, “there were 
still slaves in Illinois,” and any candidates who wished to be elected for statewide office 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Born in Vermont, Douglas moved to Illinois in his adolescence, and his connections to the South grew 
when his marriage to Martha Martin of North Carolina made him the technical manager of a large 
Mississippi cotton plantation and its 150 slaves. Egerton, Year of Meteors, 7. 
24	  Though not common, there were, of course, southerners bearing a great moral antipathy to slavery who 
migrated northwestward to rid themselves of all affiliation with the institution. Stacey M. Robertson, 
Hearts Beating for Liberty: Women Abolitionists in the Old Northwest (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), 61, highlights migrants such as Mary Brown Davis, who “used her memories of 
Virginia” in Illinois “to pen real-life stories about slaves who proved themselves more fully of humanity 
and determination than their owners.” Merton L. Dillon, “The Antislavery Movement in Illinois: 1824–
1835,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 47 (Summer 1954), 152, lists Methodist antislavery 
preachers who came to Illinois to escape slavery’s moral evils. In other instances, slaveholders like Levi 
Compton, one of the delegates to the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1818, moved from the South to 
the Northwest with their slaves, freeing them upon arrival. Illinois State Historical Society, The Illinois 
Constitutional Convention of 1818 (Springfield, Ill., 1894), 344.	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had to contend with southern-born voters in the southernmost portion of Illinois “who 
were basically sympathetic toward the institution and hostile to any type of government 
interference” of slavery.25 John Craig Hammond and Robert Taylor similarly conclude 
that since the government did not actively enforce Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, 
settlers in the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois excluded slavery in their state 
constitutions “[o]nly with great difficulty.” Allan G. Bogue argues “[r]evulsion against 
the southern institution of slavery probably played little part in the thinking of the settlers 
of Illinois,” since southern-born settlers “showed so much attachment for the South and 
its institutions later.”	  Despite the increasing numbers of northern and southern 
nonslaveholders drawn to free territory by Article VI, these historians claim, the federal 
government’s refusal to accept a proslavery Illinois state constitution was the only thing 
standing between southerners and their proslavery desires.26 
To claim that all nonslaveholding migrants to the Northwest firmly rejected 
slavery would, of course, be false. Indeed, arguments in favor of introducing slavery into 
Illinois had been in place since the very beginning of the westward migration, and most 
often stemmed from southerners.27 Although the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance 
successfully convinced most slaveholders to remain in slave territories, the prohibition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Zarefsky, Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery, 29. 
26 Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion, 122. Taylor follows the alluring, but false, assumption that 
mid-Atlantic and New England migrants the Northwest opposed slavery, while “settlers from Virginia and 
Kentucky wanted to use slave labor to bring their heavily forested lands into agricultural use.” Robert M. 
Taylor, The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A Bicentennial Handbook (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Society, 1987), 100; William O. Lynch, “The South and its History,” Journal of Southern History 8 
(November 1942): 465–82. Allan G. Bogue cites Theodore Calvin Pease, The Frontier State, 1818–1848 
(Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1922), 70–91, on the convention debates in Bogue, From Prairie to 
Corn Belt: Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), 18. 
27 One exception to accounts blaming southerners is contemporary Joseph Larwill’s claim: “what is very 
surprising is that a large portion of Eastern Emigrants from N England States are favourable to the 
admission of Slavery in this State.” Joseph H. Larwill Journal, Feb. 3, 1823, Joseph H. Larwill Papers, 
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, (hereafter abbreviated ALPL). 
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was “continuously violated” not by nonslaveholders who accumulated slaves, but rather 
by slaveholders who disregarded the law and brought their slaves with them to Illinois. 
Many men who held high political stations in the state were slaveholders: “Pierre 
Menard, Thomas Ferguson, and Samuel Judy;…Alexander Wilson and Jacob Short, who 
were members of the House of Representatives; Benjamin Stephenson and Shadrach 
Bond, who represented the Territory in Congress; and Governor Edwards, Secretary [of 
the Illinois Territory Nathaniel] Pope, and Judge [Jesse B.] Thomas.”28 Some of these 
men, such as Governor Edwards, actively opposed a convention to reconsider the slavery 
question. Others, like the speculators, witnessed “the migration of planters through these 
territories on their way to Missouri with their slaves and wealth,” and supported the 
opening of Illinois to slaveholders and their slaves. As New Englander Horatio Newhall 
remarked to his family in 1821, “many of our most influential…officers are dear lovers 
of slavery and would gladly introduce into this state the same system which prevails at 
the South.”29 
From the late 1790s to 1824, there persisted instances not only of slaveholding, 
but of attempts to introduce slavery to Illinois with written legal consent. During this 
period, citizens petitioned the federal government to allow slavery in Illinois territory, 
applied for statehood with slavery written into Illinois’s constitution, and, when all else 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 John D. Barnhart, “The Southern Influence in the Formation of Illinois,” Journal of the Illinois State 
Historical Society 32 (September 1939): 362. 
29 John D. Barnhart, Valley of Democracy: The Frontier versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley, 1775-
1818 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1953), 200; Horatio Newhall to brothers, October 1821, 
Horatio Newhall Papers in Greenville and Galena, 1821–1846 Abolition Collection, ALPL. At this time, 
most of the migrants to Illinois were southerners. Therefore, when Newhall repeatedly describes to his 
brothers in New England that “a good majority are opposed to slavery,” and the “slave party” intends to 
alter the constitution through “their real, tho’ not their avowed object…to allow of the introduction of 
slaves into the State,” he pinpoints the exaggerated representation of southern-born Illinoisans as 
proslavery. In his view, the “slave party” is comprised of large slaveowners and has dubiously convinced 
some of the southern-born migrants to vote for a convention.  
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failed, called for a vote on a convention, ostensibly to re-consider the status of slavery in 
the state. As historian John Dippel explains, some settlers to the Northwest considered 
the opportunity of selling their land and moving again, and thus “a large percentage of 
Illinoisans wanted to see the slave system take hold in their state because of the economic 
gain they felt this would bring them…by selling their land at a higher price.”30 Before the 
U.S. acquired the territory, French settlers held slaves there and some continued to do so 
into the 1800s. Recognizing the significance of this history to settlement on the frontier, 
Illinois settlers from the South like John McFerron argued that “owning slaves as 
property was a natural right that had been recognized since the mid-1700s in Illinois; 
therefore, those who previously owned slaves could not be made to give them up, while 
those who needed labor should be allowed to indenture blacks under voluntary 
servitude.” Assuring his fellow settlers that “slavery in Illinois had never and would 
never take on the characteristics of ‘the southern slave State, with all its horrible 
consequences,’” McFerron offered a convincing argument to yeoman slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders.31 When Illinois applied for statehood in the late 1810s, and then as her 
population grew only slowly throughout the first half of the 1820s, the arguments in favor 
of slavery grew more frequent and more popular. As Peter Onuf notes in his work on the 
Northwest Territory, “the short-run material advantages of legalizing slavery” were 
difficult for antislavery advocates to combat. In the early years, “the production of slaves 
had a more obvious and direct relationship to the commercial prosperity of the territory 
than did the growth of a free farming population still primarily concerned with eking out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Dippel, Race to the Frontier, 132. “The proslavery party promised that the influx of slaveowners would 
drive up land prices and stimulate a local economy that had been devastated by the depression of 1819.” 
Andrew R. L. Cayton and Peter S. Onuf, “The Significance of the Northwest Ordinance,” in Cayton and 
Onuf, eds., The Midwest and the Nation, 17. 
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its own subsistence.”32 Land speculators particularly welcomed calls for slavery, after 
unsuccessfully petitioning Congress to repeal Article 6 and legalize slavery in Illinois at 
the beginning of the 19th century.33 Prominent southern men in Illinois, such as Governor 
Shadrach Bond, Representative John McLean, and editor Henry Eddy, pointed to 
Illinois’s ban on slavery as the cause of economic depression following the panic of 
1819. Thus, immediately after Illinois was accepted into the Union as a free state, some 
men “supported projects to transform Illinois in a slave state.”34  
The convention debate of 1823-24, certainly a significant moment in Illinois’s 
history, has too conveniently been used to depict southern-born settlers as ardently 
proslavery, and eager to aid the proslavery cause whenever possible. Though 
anticonventionists ultimately defeated the convention to re-consider the state’s 
constitution with 6,822 votes, 4,950 Illinoisans ultimately voted in favor of holding an 
official forum to discuss state issues. Forced to analyze this period in Illinois’s history 
with few primary sources, historians have often generalized the vote by classifying 
conventionists as proslavery southerners, and anticonventionists as largely antislavery 
northerners, joined by a few southern migrants. Written evidence provided by northerners 
or Englishmen like William Newnham Blane, who claimed that “Those who have been 
the cause of this convention, are the men who have come from the slave-holding States,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Peter Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), 122. 
33 Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the Slavery 
Extension Controversy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 8–9. As Berwanger explains, John 
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corroborate this view.35 The ideology of the white southern nonslaveholding migrants, 
themselves, has been held captive by such assertions, and historians rarely produce a 
portrayal of white southern nonslaveholding migrants that reflects their own convictions. 
While most acknowledge that the convention vote itself did not prove southern 
nonslaveholders favored the introduction of slavery to Illinois, the idea that southern-born 
migrants favored slavery still persists in the historiography of antebellum Illinois—
particularly in works detailing the later history of antebellum Illinois. In many of these 
studies, brief sentences describing the proslavery sympathizers as southerners are 
extracted from outdated works, second-hand sources, or more nuanced arguments, and 
applied by historians studying Lincoln and 1850s Illinois as proof that areas like Little 
Egypt remained proslavery. These historians make the mistake of concluding that, 
because northern Illinois became so visibly antislavery, southern Illinois was in 
comparison proslavery and pro-southern.36 
The problem with relying upon statements made by foreign or northern migrants 
to Illinois is that they often did not distinguish between slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders, simply characterizing all pro-conventionists as “southern,” then 
describing southerners generally as proslavery sympathizers. Few, if any, direct records 
from southerners survive to corroborate these claims. Northern and foreign settlers and 
travelers, who typically provided source material for proslavery characterizations, often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 William Newnham Blane, An Excursion through the United States and Canada during the years 1822–
23 (London, England: C. Baldwin, 1924), 171. 
36 Zarefsky, Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery, 25; Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln and Douglas: The Debates that 
Defined America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 71; Henry Clyde Hubbart, The Older Middle 
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considered southerners and southern culture inferior to their own, and typically 
generalized these individuals as lazy, racist, indigent, and proslavery.37 Although John 
Dippel correctly points out that many of the convention supporters were nonslaveholders, 
the calls for a convention in 1824 were most vehemently vocalized by a specific group of 
wealthy Illinoisans—slaveholders, speculators, and large landowners seeking increased 
land values through the introduction of slavery. The interests of this elite group propelled 
much of the convention hype. Furthermore, while most proslavery advocates in Illinois 
were probably southerners, there were definite exceptions. A few speculating Englishmen 
wrote to their associates of their hopes that a convention would be allowed, and that 
Illinois would open its lands to slaveholders. Echoing the argument that land sales and 
migration had slowed due to slaveholders’ inability to carry their slave property into this 
free state, David Robson supported the idea of a proslavery Illinois. If a convention did 
make Illinois a slave state, he argued, “it will make lands sell much better than they do at 
present.”38 English traveler Elias Fordham, though avowedly antislavery upon his arrival 
to the United States, declared that, while “I would not have upon my conscience the 
moral guilt of extending Slavery over countries now free from it…if it should take place, 
I do not see why I should not make use of it. If I do not have servants I cannot farm; and 
there are no free labourers here, except a few so worthless, and yet so haughty, than an 
English Gentleman can do nothing with them.”39 Perceiving the benefits that may be 
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1823, James and John Dunlop Papers, ALPL. 
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derived from land sales to large slaveholders, these men backed other interested 
gentleman in their proslavery endeavors.  
These authoritative or wealthy figures often presented arguments in favor of a 
convention that did not explicitly mention slavery, or else justified the convention on the 
grounds of democratic freedom. While some state authorities, like Edward Coles, sought 
to convince nonslaveholders that the convention had been devised by designing, wealthy 
men seeking slaves for their personal fortune, others asserted the convention as an 
exercise of Illinois’s rights as a state coequal with all other states within the Union. James 
Simeone interprets southern nonslaveholders’ support for the convention as a democratic 
show of force rooted in the very republican values that had spurred them to leave their 
southern homes. Adopting the explanation of John Mason Peck in the 1850s, “The whole 
controversy…had been caused by congressional meddling. Had the Missouri 
Compromise not aroused ‘the jealousy of the people to resist this encroachment on their 
rights from abroad,’ the struggle may very well have never taken place.”40 Thus, rather 
than seeking to introduce slavery into their state, many of the 4,950 voters who supported 
the convention most likely used their vote to send a message that the people of each 
state—not the federal government—held the right to decide that state’s laws and policies. 
To hold up these pro-convention votes as proof of nonslaveholding southerners’ 
proslavery bias therefore misrepresents their most precious values. 
As Paul E. Stroble notes, “[a] topic not usually considered by historians of this 
campaign is whether many convention supporters sincerely wanted equal representation 
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and democratic participation in the drafting of the constitution.”41	  Indeed, James 
Simeone, John D. Barnhart, Eugene Berwanger, and Don Harrison Doyle argue the 
convention issue of 1824 did not revolve primarily around the issue of slavery, but rather, 
constituted a forum of debate over the very freedom and prosperity that Illinois was 
meant to offer its settlers. They generally argue that southern-born nonslaveholding 
migrants to Illinois were either firm “anticonventionists,” or conventionists who 
supported the convention because it displayed the right of citizens in a democracy to 
choose the laws of their state for themselves. These pro-democratic motivations—rather 
than any desire to introduce full-fledged slavery into Illinois—dominated 
nonslaveholding southerners’ concerns as they voted in 1824. As Simeone explains, “It 
was democracy—not slavery—that the majority sought so insistently and, in the end, so 
violently.” T. Walter Johnston similarly asserts that the war “between the pro-slavery and 
anti-slavery forces was largely a struggle among southerners.”42 John C. Hudson 
corroborated the fact that many southern-born Illinoisans were indeed anticonventionists. 
He points out that the “strongest margin against calling a convention that would have re-
opened the slavery question was provided by the future Corn Belt: the Wabash Valley, 
the Sangamon country, the lower Illinois Valley, and the good uplands east of St. 
Louis”—all areas dominated by southern-born migrants.43  
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Although Simeone believes these nonslaveholders would have voted for any 
argument that convinced them it reserved freedom for the white man—even if it opened 
up the territory to slaveholders—migratory patterns and primary sources clearly show 
that more than just an “anti-big folks” abhorrence of aristocrats motivated Illinoisans’ 
voting decisions, whether for or against the convention. Rather, this “anti-big folks” 
mentality was intertwined with a dislike for the slave system’s effects on their own 
livelihood. Therefore, while many nonslaveholding, southern-born settlers voted in favor 
of a convention, many did not. In regard to those who voted in favor, there is no reason to 
believe they would have supported the convention’s unqualified endorsement of slavery. 
When the issue had been discussed in 1818 before statehood, “Most of the antislavery 
arguments appear to have come from small farmers who had economic and social 
objections to the institution,” and after statehood, ever more emigrants from the South 
arrived “whose objections to remaining in a slave society impelled them to leave their 
homes and migrate to a region which they believed would remain free from slavery’s 
direct influence.”44 Freedom, to these men, meant exercising power to consider a 
question fully and fairly—not ensuring Illinois’s future as a slave state. Thus, even had 
the supporters of the convention overwhelmed the dissenters, the likelihood that slavery 
would actually have been written into the state constitution remains miniscule. 
Edward Coles, the southern-born antislavery governor at the time of the 
convention debate, understood the complexity of this issue for southern nonslaveholders 
and attempted to defeat the proslavery faction without treading on Illinoisans’ right to 
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hold a convention. He especially feared that accusations flung against southerners by 
eastern newspapers “held language which is used here in a way calculated to do much 
mischief,” and would only ignite nonslaveholders’ indignation at other states’ attempts to 
interfere with a state affair. As Coles explained, “Whether we have the Constitutional 
right to make this a Slave holding State or not…to restrain the people of this State…is 
certainly bad policy.” To urge these settlers too strongly to support one position or the 
other would only “arouse the feelings of State pride, and State rights, and that natural 
love of unrestrained liberty and independence, which is common to our Countrymen, and 
especially to our frontier settlers, who of all men in the world have the strongest jealousy 
of authority and aversion to restraint.”45  
The inability of historians to translate this democratic sentiment stemming from 
southern nonslaveholding experiences with the slave system—which I call “anti–slave 
system” ideology—remains a significant issue in current historiography of the antebellum 
Northwest, and lies at the root of persistent mischaracterizations of southern-born 
migrants. This ethos that governed southern white nonslaveholders’ motivations to 
migrate to the Northwest from 1800 to 1860 has received partial explanation by 
historians of the South, some of whom assert that southern society’s separation of those 
who did not own slaves from those who did created a class barrier that reduced 
opportunities for nonslaveholding whites.46 These works on the southern slave system, 
however, do not address the mass movement of southerners to the Northwest. 
Northwestern historians, meanwhile, tend to either accuse southern-born migrants of 
proslavery intentions, or else misleadingly characterize them as “antislavery.” Many 
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historians of the Northwest, focusing on this southern migrant population neglected in 
historiography of the South, trace the migrants’ disdain for the slave system from their 
former southern homes to their new lives on the northwestern frontier. John Dippel 
describes Virginia and North Carolina nonslaveholders’ increasing discontent with the 
slave system over time. Although “slave labor stimulated and sustained the plantation 
economy, bringing greater prosperity to the region as a whole,” it also “created an 
unmistakable fault line in colonial society, dividing rich from poor and thwarting the 
hopes for social mobility that had originally motivated thousand of settlers to cross the 
Atlantic as bonded servant.” By the nineteenth century, Virginians and North Carolinians 
unable or unwilling to accumulate slaves found themselves without a rung to climb up the 
ladder of economic progress. As the planter class consolidated power over the region, 
nonslaveholders grew ever more resentful at their successes. Meanwhile, the growing 
“predominance of blacks on the plantations effectively lowered the status of white 
agricultural day laborers and servants by—in the eyes of higher class whites—degrading 
the social value of their work.” Whether planters noticeably cast a scornful gaze upon the 
lower classes, or nonslaveholders simply imagined a denigrating attitude directed towards 
them, their resentment towards the planter aristocracy, and their hatred of blacks, 
propelled many into the Northwest. A few, including some Quakers, held a moral 
antipathy to slavery as an abomination force upon the black race. Most, however, fled 
from the degradation the system wrought upon supposedly “free” whites.47 
Since the dichotomy of antislavery and proslavery insufficiently describes the 
anti-aristocratic, anti-black ethos embodied by migrants, historians have found it difficult 
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to characterize the general southern-born Illinoisan migrant as anything but pro-southern 
and proslavery. The tendency to view racism as a mere step away from advocating 
slavery further obscures the more nuanced position held by migrants escaping the slave 
South for the Northwest has consistently escaped our grasp. Merton Dillon, in his work 
on “Early Antislavery Thought in Illinois,” wrestled with this ambiguous stance of 
southern migrants. Defining antislavery sentiment in moral terms, Dillon finds only “a 
tiny group of church members to whom slavery was repugnant because of its 
inconsistency with their humanitarian and religious principles.” Since the other settlers 
did not explicitly display a moral conviction against slavery, Dillon concludes that 
although “some had left that area in order to escape from the plantation economy which 
had already begun its spread across the South, only a handful opposed slavery itself.”48 
In their studies of northwestern migrants, John Dippel and Emma Lou 
Thornbrough focus on the racial views of these former southerners.  Pinpointing 
Indianans’ position as “neither proslavery nor antislavery,” Thornbrough concludes that 
“anti-Negro” best describes their attitude. “There were few persons who wanted to see 
slavery introduced into the state,” she explains, “but there was widespread and intense 
race prejudice and fear of the competition of Negro labor.”49 John Dippel provides the 
history of this anti-black prejudice. Nonslaveholding whites in Virginia and North 
Carolina, he explains, gradually pushed out into the frontier of their own states as 
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slaveholders consolidated their lands and accumulated increasing numbers of slaves. 
Soon, however, slaveholders also began filling up the Piedmont, crowding out 
nonslaveholders as they brought ever larger numbers of slaves with them. Taking the best 
tobacco-growing lands and surrounding nonslaveholders with a black population they had 
sought to leave behind them, many white southerners “came to conclude that a thriving 
economy and the absence of blacks were closely linked. By moving in large numbers to 
free territories and state in the Ohio Valley early in the 19th century, ‘plain folk’ whites 
were acknowledging that living in a slave society had served them poorly.”50 In Illinois, 
their racist dispositions emerged in resistance to black migration, acceptance of incidents 
of slaveholding (as long as the number of these incidents remained low), and eagerness 
for indentureship of free blacks.51  
 Clearly, “antislavery” does not seem to capture this particular ideology. As John 
C. Hudson explains, these migrants held a position between the two extremes of 
proslavery and abolitionism. “Slavery was opposed by many in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois because they wanted no African-Americans in their midst; slavery should be kept 
south of the Ohio River and their states ought not to serve as refuges for runaways or 
even freed slaves from the South.”52 Furthermore, as James Simeone describes, white 
nonslaveholders despised the power that had been consolidated by land-owners in their 
home states.53 Devoid of any moral justification and uniquely southern in its orientation, 
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southerner nonslaveholders’ ideology shared little with traditional definitions of 
antislavery. Finding no better term to express the complexity of this viewpoint, I believe 
“anti–slave system” sufficiently characterizes these migrants. Following the lead of John 
Mack Faragher, who studied the motivations of southern settlers to Sugar Creek, Illinois, 
I concur with his observation that migrants’ “objections were to the system of slavery, 
for, as a system, slavery offered a powerful symbol of the negative effects of economic 
progress in the South.”54   
Despising the system of slavery primarily because it pushed nonslaveholders off 
their land, forcing them to become laborers just a step away from black slaves while a 
slaveholding planter aristocracy increased its power, these migrants held simultaneous 
deep-rooted antipathies to slavery, African Americans, and aristocracy. Rather than 
developing an anti-southern vendetta, however, they typically sympathized with the vast 
number of nonslaveholders and yeomen who continued to live under the system’s 
domineering effects in the South. Dippel, Simeone, and a few other historians have 
described this anti–slave system mentality that comprised these southerners’ ideology. 
Born in the South or in the West to southern parents, Illinoisans like Abraham Lincoln 
held a singular antipathy to slavery so different from northern views that many of them 
consciously separated themselves from northern migrants physically, socially, and 
ideologically. After witnessing firsthand the debilitating effects of slavery on whites, 
these southerners chose to leave everything behind for a new society that promised to 
fulfill their republican ideals. Far from seeking to impose slavery on the Northwest, they 
often vehemently denounced efforts by wealthy, powerful men to introduce the system 
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into their free territory. Too often, historians have de-emphasized the overwhelming 
debilitation nonslaveholders had felt in slave territory and have presented their subjects as 
either proslavery or pro-slavery leaning. Or, they have correctly labeled them “pro-
southern” for the wrong reasons. 
The greatest impediment to resolving any and all misconceptions regarding white, 
nonslaveholding migrants to the Northwest remains the lack of sources from the migrants 
themselves. Admittedly, pinning down southerners’ antislavery motivations for migration 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, whether to the Northwest or the Southwest, 
remains extremely difficult. Two hundred years later, few records from southern migrants 
exist, and those that state explicit reasons for moving to the Northwest are extremely 
scarce. Richard Lyle Power openly laments this in Planting Corn Belt Culture, remarking 
that “[c]ompared with the handwritten materials left by the Yankee a silence hangs over 
the feelings of the Uplanders as they grubbed, chopped, and hewed in the Northwest.” He 
points out that historians of the antebellum South have likewise “reported an almost 
complete lack of personal letters of the nonslaveholder, the small slaveholder, and even 
the small planter.”55 Philip Schwarz, who faced this problem while studying Virginia 
migrants, decided that under the circumstances, the best methodology would be to “tell 
some of their stories,” and use “census data and publications from the time” to “set the 
stage for displaying the dramatic and significant choices some people made, or made for 
them, to leave the slave Commonwealth of Virginia.”56  
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However, those studies on migration to Illinois and the Northwest that depict 
nonslaveholding, southern-born settlers as anti–slave system corroborate many 
contemporary and later reports from southerners, their families, and foreign observers. 
Their work thus provides a foundation upon which present-day historians might build a 
more accurate portrait of this often mischaracterized group.57 This anti–slave system 
mentality that propelled southerners northwestward may be gleaned from a combination 
of contemporary accounts and the statistical geography of the nineteenth century “great 
migration.”58 Rather than moving to Southwestern lands available to them, over 150,000 
migrants born in the Upland South (Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas) chose to migrate to 
Illinois. Comprising 35 percent of the native-born population in 1850, these Upland 
Southern settlers made a distinct impact on Illinois’s culture and society, particularly in 
the southern and central portions of the state. Migration rates to Illinois remained high 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, with an increasing number of 
northerners and foreign immigrants filling the state by 1860.59 
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Though scholars have disagreed on the actual power the two federal ordinances 
exercised in restricting or admitting slavery, it seems clear from antebellum demographic 
shifts to the northwest and southwest that “the discouraging effect which the Ordinance 
of 1787 had on the prospects for slavery in the Old Northwest has to be credited with 
setting a clear geography of alternatives,” and providing a haven for anti–slave system 
nonslaveholders. John C. Hudson applies this assertion directly to Lincoln’s political 
birthplace. “The rapid growth of the Sangamon country and the lower Illinois Valley,” 
where Lincoln often lived from 1831 to 1861, “was based on the same population source 
(mainly, the Bluegrass of Kentucky) that fed Missouri.” Whereas Missouri’s total 
population was 18 percent slave by 1830, however, Illinois had a comparatively tiny 
proportion of slaves, and in Sangamon County, Illinois, only 13 of the 12,960 inhabitants 
were slaves in 1830. These statistics clearly show the effectiveness of the Ordinance of 
1787 in guiding antislavery settlers towards the Northwest, while proslavery 
southeasterners moved on to other lands permitting slavery under the Southwest 
Ordinance or the Missouri Compromise. Thus “Kentuckians seeking to avoid slavery 
moved to the Sangamon country and the Wabash Valley” much like Lincoln, while “their 
Bluegrass neighbors who wished to extend the territorial scope of slavery went to Little 
Dixie,” Missouri.60 Similarly, while Matthew Mason explains that upper South migrants 
to the Northwest often settled there “precisely to escape the plantation system,” he also 
notes that “slaveholders and would-be slaveholders among them wanted to burst these 
confines” of antislavery legislation. Much more careful than previous historians to 
distinguish between the masses of nonslaveholding, antislavery southerners and a smaller 
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proslavery contingent, Mason explains that most northwesterners “hated slavery, but 
principally because it made slaveholder aristocratic tyrants and limited opportunities for 
neighboring nonslaveholders.”61 
Many other scholars further corroborate that the Northwest Territory “attracted, 
disproportionately, those migrants who objected to slavery. Some had moral objections. 
Others refused to compete with slave labor.”62 John D. Barnhart emphasizes Upland 
Southerners as “small farmers, many of whom had moved out of the South to escape the 
social and economic consequences of the expansion of the plantation and slavery.”63 
Nicole Etcheson, despite her insistence that southern-born migrants retained a sectional 
culture apart from northern-born settlers, asserts that “Upland Southerners who migrated 
to the Midwest removed themselves from the primary determinants of Southern culture, 
slavery and the planter elite,” in rejection of the plantation system of slavery. That 
system’s “aristocratic, unrepublican aspects, its tendency toward luxury, its devaluation 
of white free labor,” instilled in them a deep resistance to the institution of slavery.64 
Richard Lyle Power highlights the significance of this movement to the creation of the 
Northwest, pointing out that for those “who migrated to escape the presence of slavery, 
Indiana and Illinois remained for several decades the nearest free soil.”65 As evidence he 
reprints a letter John Humpries mailed from Indiana to family and friends in Virginia 
during this period, in which Humphries declares that Indiana “is not old VA.—the curse 
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of slavery does not exist here—it is literally true every Man sets under his own Vine and 
Fig Tree and none to make them afraid People here go ahead.” Power relates the 
sentiments of another settler, who proclaimed, “Let fools remain [in Virginia] to breed 
fools…I don’t wish myself back you may depend on it to be a slave.”66	   
At the very least, Philip Schwartz argues, scholars of the Virginia migration must 
acknowledge that migrants’ flight to free states “was at least somewhat intentional when 
the migrants knew they were separating themselves from slave ownership and slavery. 
But what were their intentions? A person who had never lived with slaves could decide 
he or she would never do so in the future. That might have been an economic rather than 
ethical choice. It was still a choice against a slave society.”67 Genealogical records and 
family histories from the states of Illinois and Kentucky contain some references to this 
flight by settlers, their children, and their grandchildren. As Karen Stein Daniel explains, 
“Southerners began moving into Illinois” after 1815 “to a great extent because of the 
expanding plantation system in the South. There is evidence to support this being at least 
a partial cause for John Munday Burke,” who had been born in Virginia, “and most of his 
grown children and their families to make that move from Kentucky to Illinois.”68 Ethel 
Marion Smith remarks that “[m]any Virginians who had come over the mountains and 
settled in Kentucky had gone on, after a time, to Illinois.” Her forbears, the Pattesons, 
were one such family. “In the minds of both Patteson brothers, moreover, as I learn from 
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a letter written by Uncle Marion at the time, was the thought that it would be better to 
bring up their children in a free State.” Their settlement in Sangamon County, Illinois, 
commenced in 1856.69 
Peter Smith and his wife Catharine moved from New Jersey to Virginia at the end 
of the eighteenth century. Their exposure to slavery convinced them “not to raise a family 
in a slave state, and the North West Territory being dedicated to freedom, Peter Smith 
decided to take his wife and children and seek a home in the wilderness.” After first 
stopping in Kentucky, the Smith family moved to the Northwest in 1794.70 Brice William 
Alsbury reminisced on his parents’ story, remarking, that “When they arrived each family 
had to be a self-sufficing unit, but liberty and equality did flourish.” Unlike 
nonslaveholders living in slave states, Illinois “settlers saw the chance to break the 
bondage of social rank, and rise to a higher plane of existence.”71 In 1795, South 
Carolinian John Craig married North Carolina native Elizabeth Andrews. The family 
moved to Tennessee, then northern Alabama in 1811. Craig’s second wife, Nancy, 
however, was born in Pennsylvania, and her abolitionist philosophy convinced her 
husband to settle, at least intermittently, in Illinois.72 J. L. Hosick depicted his 
grandfather’s story in a letter written in 1843. Born in Virginia on June 9, 1812, Joseph 
Turner lived with his parents in Lexington, Ky. Until “on account of the slavery question 
they (and others) came in their own wagons, (prairie schooners), to Illinois in 1816.” 
Another relative in the family, John Chism, owned slaves in Tennessee and set them all 
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free when he moved to Illinois.73 Claiborne Pitzer’s migration, according to his 
descendants, was spurred by both antislavery fervor and the unavailability of land. 
“Kentucky was getting to be too thickly populated,” and in his adolescence, Pitzer 
“became, through the violent emotionalism of the great revival, a deeply religious man 
and a convinced abolitionist. With Sarah and six children,” in 1834 “he emigrated from 
Kentucky with some of their relatives to the ‘free state’ of Illinois.”74 
These family histories corroborate contemporary reports by the settlers, especially 
in their letters to family members and friends who remained in the South. Lucinda 
Casteen, born in Kentucky and married to a Virginian, moved to Illinois during the 
1830s. Writing from Versailles, Illinois, to her mother and sister in Kentucky, she 
compared the ease of living in a free state to that of living in a slave state, where whites 
found they had to work harder to achieve less. “[I]t would not do well for people in Slave 
States to take things as easy as we do,” she explained. “[I]f they did they would have but 
little done.” Casteen explained how happy it made her that Illinois was “a free state,” and 
“people that have their own work to do are happier and healthier.”75 James Smith wrote 
of his troubles and joys in 1840, after moving to western Illinois from Maryland. 
“Although we are oppressed here by the hard times and scarcety of money still the 
ritchness of our soil, the low price at which it can be purchased, and the ease with which 
it can be improved and cultivated all conspire to entitle it to the appellation of the western 
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paradice which it was received—a garden of delights greatly to be desired by the 
agricultural community of all sections who desire to make a livelihood by their 
occupation.” Smith concluded that “where the farmer can live no class need starve.” Six 
years later, O. H. Wallace composed a similar letter to those back home in the South, 
declaring that “I don’t wish myself back you may depend on it to be a slave—I am in a 
free State and a plenty of wirke and good wages I can get more for my family by wirking 
2 days in the week than you can and wirk 6.”76 A Carthage, Illinois, settler wrote to her 
brother in 1855 that she liked “the people here very much. The better class…verry free 
and social. No aristocracy comparatively at least none of that contemtable quality that is 
dayly exhibited in our city, yet.”77 
Wesley Williams, a Kentuckian-born migrant residing in Carthage, Illinois, hints 
at slavery as an impetus to migration in an 1849 letter to his son in Lexington, Kentucky. 
“There is one thing I ardently wish and that is to see you and your Aunt Sarah at my 
house in Illinois…I know she would be pleased with the Country, and should you get 
married you could do better here than you could in Ky. I confess myself greatly 
disappointed in relation to emancipation in Kentucky and truly sorry am I for it.”78 Rev. 
Gideon Blackburn, seeking a missionary position, wrote to Rev. Absolom Peters in 1833: 
“I have fixed my resolution in consequence of my feelings respecting slavery to settle my 
family in the state of Illinois, and therefore, an agency in Tennessee or Alabama would 
be impracticable.” The desire to leave lands of slavery behind for free territory was 
echoed by D. G. McBride, who wrote from Wesley, Tennessee, in 1846 to an uncle in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 James Smith, January 28, 1840, and O. H. Wallace, Nov. 23, 1846, James H. and Sarah A. Smith Papers, 
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77 Angelina Hatch to Sylvanus Hatch, July 1st, 1855, Hatch and Fessenden Family Papers, ALPL. 
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  Wesley Williams to John W. Williams, Sept. 6, 1849, Wesley Williams Letters Collection, University of 
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Henderson, Kentucky. “Dear uncle, you profess to be opposed to slavery. In this I rejoice 
to find that your sentiments corresponds so well with my own. I have ever been opposed 
to slavery. It is probably that I have saw more of the Evil of slavery for the time than you 
have as I live in a country thickly populated by large planters owning say from 50 to 200 
slaves.” Because of his feelings against the institution, McBride concludes he is “tierd of 
the Retched sound of Slavery & I am Resolved as soon as we can sell out our possessions 
here out for a free country.”79 
These sentiments echoed the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, who after his trip to 
the United States in 1831 compared the degrading labor of whites in Kentucky to the free 
labor in the old Northwest, where slavery did not attach a stigma to white labor.80 Two 
other foreign observers of American events, Englishmen William Oliver and Elias P. 
Fordham, also commented directly on the differences separating free territory from slave. 
Listing the many places, both in the U.S. and abroad, from which Illinois had 
accumulated her population by 1841, Oliver paid particular attention to those “from the 
more southern states; the latter, as I understood, having immigrated to this part of the 
country, owing to the dislike they had to slavery.” Throwing together the very different 
ideologies of anti–slave system, antislavery, and abolitionism, Oliver claimed these 
migrants were, “at all events, very generally abolitionists. Another reason might be their 
want of means to become slaveholders, a man’s respectability being, in a great measure, 
proportioned to the number of slaves in his possession.” A traveler whom Oliver met 
returning to his home in Vandalia, Illinois, from a trip to the St. Louis markets confirmed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Rev. Gideon Blackburn to Rev. Absolom Peters, May 22, 1833, Edward C. Thurman Collection, Filson 
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his speculation that southern-born Illinoisans dislike the institution of slavery. “On asking 
him why he had removed from the South, we got the old story, that a man who had not a 
number of slaves and a large estate was despised by the planters, and was, in fact, almost 
deprived of society; as those who considered themselves above him, would hold no 
intercourse with him, and those of his own class were comparatively few in number.” 
Though absent of any sympathy for the enslaved, this man’s antipathy toward slavery 
was no less vehement.81  
Visiting Shawneetown in 1817, Elias Fordham asserted that migrants so eagerly 
settled in that section of Illinois due its suitability in farming, proximity to trade routes, 
and it contained “freedom from slavery.” Most astonishing, he found, was “the perfect 
equality that exists among these republicans. A Judge leaves the Court house, shakes 
hands with his fellow citizens and retires to his loghouse. The next day you will find him 
holding his own plough. The Lawyer has the title of Captain, and serves in his Military 
capacity under his neighbor, who is a farmer and a Colonel. The shop keeper sells a yard 
of tape, and sends shiploads of produce to Orleans; he travels 2000 miles in a year; he is a 
good hunter, and has been a solder [sic]; he dresses and talk as well as a London 
Merchant, and probably has a more extensive range of ideas; at least he has fewer 
prejudices.”82 
Other settlers, meanwhile, indicated that the presence of blacks had directly 
spurred them to leave the South. As the record shows, the desire to remove themselves 
from any close proximity to African Americans, free or slave, often propelled southerners 
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to the Northwest in the hope that free blacks could be kept out of their new states. In one 
depiction of an Ohioan’s family history, Samuel Miles brought his family to 
Germantown, Ohio, from Kentucky in 1799 because “he would not rear his children 
among slaves.”83	  James Hall noted in his Letters to the West an incident in which a free 
black man demanded the money owed him by a white Englishman. Muttering about his 
inability to obtain the funds, the black man termed the white man “‘a mighty poor white 
man;’ an expression which, in the mouth of a negro, indicates the most sovereign 
contempt. The blacks entertain a high respect for those whom they term ‘gentlemen,’ and 
apply that title with a good deal of discrimination; but ‘poor white folks’ they cordially 
despise.” This ability of free blacks to operate on the same economic level of 
nonslaveholding whites propelled many away from their former homelands in the South, 
and led them to expect freedom from free blacks in the Northwest.84  As historian of free 
blacks Stephen A. Vincent describes, “tens of thousands of southern pioneers…migrated 
north of the Ohio to escape they system of slavery. Having found it difficult and 
degrading to compete against slave labor in their former homes, most arrived at the 
northern frontier with extremely negative perceptions of blacks and an ardent belief that 
the Northwest should be preserved for whites only.”85  
Thus, although nonslaveholding Illinoisans fled from slavery, their antipathy for 
the slave system stemmed from reasons so far removed from the abolitionist and moral 
antislavery movements that contemporaries and historians alike have mislabeled them as 
proslavery sympathizers. For these reasons, the convention vote of 1823–1824, incidents 
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of slaveholding, and southern ancestry have all left the impression that southern 
Illinoisans retained the proslavery culture of their former homes despite evidence to the 
contrary. The most compelling testament refuting this misguided conclusion stems from 
Illinoisans’ reactions to the convention vote itself. As Gershom Flagg noted with relief, it 
now seemed that “a majority of the people are opposed to the introduction of Slavery.” 
More importantly, since the convention issue had been decided, he believed “the question 
is now at rest forever.”86 Meanwhile, Morgan County, comprised of  “Southerners, for 
the most part from Kentucky and Tennessee,” expressed their “class antagonism toward 
the planters and their racial animosity toward blacks” by forming their own antislavery 
Morganian Society.87 The typical nonslaveholding southern-born migrant to Illinois, 
whether he cheered the outcome or not, accepted the results of this fair democratic 
process and continued working to improve his condition on the Illinois prairie. 
Southerners voted for whichever side of the issue seemed best calculated to secure the 
rights of the democratic majority against an aristocratic minority and contentedly settled 
down once the votes had been tallied. 
Over time, as Lincoln and other southern settlers forged new lives on the frontier 
of their choice, the society in which they had staked their claim grew around them, 
drawing them in to a new western culture. In southwestern states such as Arkansas, 
southern settlement “involved the transmission—virtually intact—of a culture, a set of 
values, and an economic and social system” that included slavery.88 These families chose 
to become part of a newer slaveholding society, which eventually drew them into “a 
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united planter-yeoman front that ultimately and perversely defined slavery as liberty and 
justified its defense on the field of battle” during the Civil War. Over time, the distance 
between southwestern migrants and northwestern migrant from the South widened, 
separating these former family members, neighbors, and friends from one another not just 
geographically, but ideologically as well.89 
Fletcher M. Green’s assertion that “[w]hen sectional divergence split the Union in 
1860 the upper southern states would not permit their offspring to be coerced, and 
Alabamians and Texans were only going back home when they went to Virginia to 
engage the northern troops in armed combat,” takes on new meaning within this context. 
Southern-descended and southern-born northwesterners like Manus, McCarty, and 
Asbury were also southern offspring, yet they did not return home to the South to fight 
for the Confederacy. By 1860 their section of the country had severed itself from the 
South. Northwest-bound migrants had embraced free soil as their new home, surrounding 
themselves with others of like mind. When war came in 1861, their separate political 
identities as Democrats or Republicans mattered little. Nearly all were for the Union.90 
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Chapter Two 
Anti-slavery and Anti-black: Building a Political Culture in Central Illinois 
 
In 1824 Illinoisans had decided against holding a convention to readdress the state 
constitution, and thereby, the question of slavery. In August 1824 the immediate issues of 
democratic freedom and slavery subsided from the political arena. The emotions, ideals, 
and convictions that the 1824 debate had stirred up among the people of Illinois, 
however, would never disappear. Instead, they would infuse themselves into partisan 
politics and pervade the northwestern culture created by southern- and northern-born 
migrants in the state, contained there until these passions re-emerged again in full force 
during the turbulent decade of 1850s. Meanwhile, between 1824 and 1850, Illinois 
boomed. Only 18,000 settlers had arrived between 1820 and 1824, when the state’s free 
soil status suffered frequent challenges by slaveholders and speculators. Prior to the 
convention decision, David Robson had worried that “One reason for times being so bad 
in the State of Illinois is on account of wishing to bring in Slavery which has been in 
Agitation this two years past—the Slave holders could not come in—and those who 
wished to live in a free State would not—for these reasons we have had almost no 
Emigration this two or three years past.” In less than a decade, Robson’s concerns had 
been lifted.1 From 1825 to 1830 nearly 85,000 new settlers reached Illinois. By 1850, 
southerners still comprised the largest percentage of residents in central Illinois, 
outnumbering northerners by a small margin.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robson wrote to an acquaintance in Virginia, prior to the convention vote. David Robson to Shepherd V. 
Leslie, Sept. 21, 1824, James and John Dunlop Papers, ALPL. 
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The anti–slave state convictions driving many of these southerners to settle on 
free soil shaped Abraham Lincoln’s perception of the southern nonslaveholder and 
generated within him a sense that slave societies restricted the freedom of the white 
nonslaveholder. Debates and statements of central Illinoisans revolving around the issues 
of African American freedom, antislavery, and abolitionism composed a crucial part of 
the political culture in which Lincoln matured from 1831 to 1860. The opinions 
southerners expressed in their words and actions evoked a hatred toward African 
Americans, abolitionism, and slavery that contributed to Lincoln’s sense in 1860 that the 
South did not solidly support secession. It also shaped his assumption that the 
southernness northwesterners retained up to the Civil War mirrored the culture of the 
nonslaveholding South, reflecting the ideals of those southerners who had chosen not to 
migrate to the Northwest. Thirty years of residing in central Illinois, with rare visits to 
southern Illinois and Kentucky, imparted to Lincoln a very limited sense of the actual 
nonslaveholding southern mind of the 1831–1860 era, while his exposure to southern-
migrants convinced him that he nevertheless understood the typical southern 
nonslaveholder. From his vantage point as a northwesterner, Lincoln did not perceive the 
transformations central Illinoisans underwent to form their new society; nor did he 
witness the increasing attachment of white southerners—whether they owned slaves or 
not—to slavery in much of the South. 
Lincoln and his family became part of the accelerated migrations to Illinois after 
1824. He himself described to biographer John L. Scripps in June 1860 that his parents 
had been born into “second families” in Virginia who moved them to Kentucky, where 
Lincoln was born in 1809. His father, Thomas, made the momentous decision to bring 
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them across the Ohio River to Spencer County, Indiana, in 1816, “partly on account of 
slavery; but chiefly on account of the difficulty in land titles in Ky.”3 This account 
Lincoln gave in 1860 tellingly connects slavery, land, and migration, reflecting the very 
process of development he had personally witnessed in Illinois for nearly thirty years. As 
he watched southerners pour into the free Northwest, leaving behind their homes, 
families, and neighbors in the slave South, he associated slavery (and anti–slavery) with 
migration. Kenneth Winkle is one of the few scholars who have contextualized the 
Lincoln family’s migration within this broader movement, noting that “a growing 
disillusionment with slavery” was “one of his father’s motives for leaving Kentucky.” 
This move marked them as participants in the first Great Migration that “carried 
thousands of other Upland Southerners farther north and west.”4 Winkle thus depicts the 
Lincolns’ migration as part of a much larger movement of people from the South, many 
of whom “carried with them an aversion to slavery.” Andrew Cayton and Susan Gray 
similarly note that “the first settlers were Upland Southern ‘cracker’ squatters,” who 
came to Indiana and Illinois just like “Thomas Lincoln (father of Abe), who illegally 
crossed the Ohio to carve out a meager subsistence on land guaranteed by our laws and 
treaties to be Indian County ‘forever.’” Yet these scholars do not apply Lincoln’s 
autobiography to his later association of slavery with migration in 1860. The creation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 CW, IV: 61–62. 
4 Kenneth J. Winkle, The Young Eagle: The Rise of Abraham Lincoln (Dallas: Taylor, 2001), 25, 11. 
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response to southern secession. 
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central Illinoisan political culture Lincoln witnessed in the 1830s and 1840s, however, 
taught him valuable lessons he would carry with him to the presidency in 1860.5  
Although Lincoln would share a history with these migrating southerners, moral 
conviction would always separate him from many of his fellow southerners who removed 
to Illinois, especially those who settled in southern Illinois. His family, and those of many 
other figures, including Governor Richard Yates and Peter Cartwright, the Methodist 
preacher who ran against Lincoln in his campaign for Congress in 1846, moved to the 
Northwest due at least in part to a moral antipathy to slavery. Most southern migrants, 
however, “viewed slavery less as a moral problem than as an institution that degraded 
white labor, created an unequal distribution of wealth and power, and made it impossible 
for nonslaveholding farmers to advance.”6 Thus, while Lincoln would find common 
ground on which to agree with these southerners who were opposed the slave system, 
there always remained a distance between those who believed slavery morally wrong and 
those who perceived it as detrimental to their own well-being. This separation between 
the two groups actually grew over time, as Lincoln became more devoted to the idea that 
slavery was immoral. 
Sangamon County and the rest of central Illinois, where Lincoln spent the most 
time from 1831 to 1860, welcomed many southerners. Established on January 30, 1821, 
Sangamon County “lay at the extreme northern edge of the Upland South region and 
therefore straddled the boundary” between the region of Illinois that contained a majority 
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of southerners, and that which contained a variety of migrants from Pennsylvania and 
other states just south of New England. John Carroll Power lists some of the residents 
who settled there in his 1876 record of the “early settlers” of Sangamon County, and from 
his listing can be derived a general sense of the ratio between northern and southern 
migrants. The great majority of Power’s settlers arrived there between 1825 and 1840.7 
Out of the 999 native-born heads of families or single individuals he lists, 670 had been 
born in southern slave states, including 227 in Kentucky, the state of Lincoln’s birth, and 
237 in Virginia, where his parents had been born.8 Southerners thus comprised a large 
portion of migrants to the county in which Lincoln lived from 1831 to 1860. According to 
census data in 1860, Kentucky was the state that contributed the most residents to the 
county—so many that Sangamon actually retained “the largest number of Kentuckians in 
the state,” compared to every other county.9 New Salem, which during Lincoln’s years 
there remained a part of Sangamon County, grew largely from southern families who had 
“intermarried in Tennessee, Kentucky and southern Illinois as they gradually trekked 
north.”10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As Power explains, Springfield had been named the temporary county seat in April 1821, and by the mid-
1830s had transformed into a bustling city in the center of the state—so much so that Lincoln and the rest 
of the “Long Nine” representatives of Sangamon County in the state legislature were able to successfully 
engineer the removal of the state capital from Vandalia to Springfield. John Carroll Power, History of the 
Early Settlers of Sangamon County, Illinois (Springfield, Ill.: Edwin A. Wilson and Co., 1876), 43, 57, 59. 
8 Though Power lists more families and individuals than the 999, the 999 represent the number of families 
or persons for whom place of birth and date of settlement are also listed. These numbers were derived from 
taking the heads of families and independent individuals listed by Power, who moved their family, or 
moved with their family, to Illinois from 1818 to 1847. Only those settlers whose place of birth and date of 
settlement were included by Power have been extracted to form the 999. Power, History of the Early 
Settlers, passim.  
9 Douglas K. Meyer, Making the Heartland Quilt, 144. See Figs. 6.8, 7.9, 8.9, 9.11, 10.2, 10.3 for migrant 
populations in Illinois. 
10 Richard Lyle Power further drew on remarks made by previous historians to characterize the entire 
region as “peculiarly the child of the South,” up to at least 1850. Power, Planting Corn Belt Culture, 1. 
Benjamin P. Thomas claimed southerners formed the “backbone of the community” of New Salem, and 
John Mack Faragher noted the prevalence of “‘white folks’ from the South” in central Illinois. Thomas, 
Lincoln’s New Salem, 7, 25; Faragher, Sugar Creek, 45. 
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Although this ratio shifted over time, with more northeasterners than southerners 
having arrived by 1860, southern migration remained steady up to 1860 as slave state 
residents fled to free states. These southern transplants and their families remained 
Lincoln’s most accessible source of information about the South and southerners, from 
whom he must have gathered a great deal of information. Whatever these men and 
women may have conferred to him in unrecorded conversations remains unknown. 
However, their diaries, letters, and other recorded statements express the elements of 
slavery and freedom that dominated their political culture, and Lincoln would doubtless 
have heard these views expressed in New Salem, Vandalia, Springfield, and other towns 
and cities of central Illinois. 
Because southerners often voiced aspects of their anti–slave system ethos but 
rarely offered a summary of their views on the issues of slavery and freedom, white and 
black, historians frequently mistake their statements as evidence that they sympathized 
with the South—and,  therefore, with slavery itself. Southern remarks on these issues 
often appear markedly different from those made by many northern-born migrants, and 
these differences obscure the common thread of antipathy to the slave system underlying 
many southerners’ comments. Frequently voicing anti-black and anti-abolitionist 
statements simultaneously, southern migrants often revealed not an attachment to slavery 
and the South, but a very real antipathy for both radicalism and slavery. Many white 
nonslaveholders believed slavery detrimental to their own and their families’ economic, 
social, and moral well-being. They fled from the South to the Northwest, castigating the 
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system they had left behind while retaining sympathy for those fellow southerners who 
remained in slave territory.11  
Anti-black sentiments prevailed among white southern-born migrants to the 
Northwest before the Civil War. John M. Palmer, an active political figure in central 
Illinois, explained in 1861 that he and his family “expected to be ride [sic] of negroes and 
slaves alike” in Illinois. Palmer resented the nonchalant attitude assumed by the state 
government, which would not take direct action to prevent slaveholders from moving into 
Illinois with their slave property before statehood.12 White southerners occasionally 
revealed such deep resentment toward the in-migration of blacks that resulted when either 
their more wealthy fellow transplants from the slave South implanted slavery on Illinois 
soil, or when elites like Edward Coles used Illinois as a platform to free their slaves.13 
Some migrants directly petitioned state officials to get rid of free blacks in their midst, as 
Hervey Heth did in Indiana. Heth obtained the signatures of other white neighbors and 
asked Thomas Posey to “use your influence, to have removed from this Neighbourhood a 
hoard of free Negroes, that has latly [sic] made a Settlement among us.” Heth threatened 
that whites might resort to violent force, or else “Remove from the Territory, and Leave a 
Lawless Bandellia [sic] of Free Negroes in their place” if nothing were done. Heth’s 
racist inclinations appeared most evidently in his assertion that the white settlers who aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In James E. Davis’s explication of frontier Illinois, he alleges that southern settlers “detested and feared 
slavery,” yet remained unfriendly toward blacks and abolitionists. Davis, Frontier Illinois, 190. 
12 Autobiography Notes, 1817–1873, Box 1, John M. Palmer Papers, ALPL. 
13	  Some elites, perhaps to prevent social envy and distrust, followed the example of Ninian Edwards. Both 
an Illinoisan and a slaveholder, Edwards served as Governor of Illinois Territory but kept his twenty-two 
slaves in Missouri, which “would have been the fourth-highest number listed in the 1820 Illinois Census.” 
Simeone, Democracy and Slavery in Frontier Illinois, 83. 
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these blacks are naught but “White Negroes,” representing a “base and contemptable” 
portion of the population.14  
From the first days of statehood, the residents of Illinois legislated to prevent the 
immigration of blacks. The entire Northwest, due partly to the influx of southerners, “was 
the region most firmly committed to white supremacy” outside the South, and most 
northwestern states passed legislation restricting either the immigration or rights of 
blacks. Illinois passed laws to limit both.15 The Illinois Constitution drawn up in 1818 
dictated that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereafter be introduced 
into this state,” and no “male person arrived at the age of twenty one years, nor female 
person arrived at the age of eighteen years,” may be held “as a servant under any 
indenture hereafter made, unless such person shall enter into such indenture while in a 
state of perfect freedom.” The framers were careful to protect the rights of whites who 
held slaves or indentured servants under the previous laws of the territory, as well as 
whites who came to the Northwest seeking a haven for whites. Slavery had first been 
sanctioned and introduced in Illinois by the French, then continued under the English 
before the United States acquired the territory. The Northwest Ordinance prohibited 
slavery, but also guaranteed the right of current inhabitants to retain their slaves. 
Therefore, by decreeing that slavery should not be “introduced,” the Illinois Constitution 
ensured that any slaveholders who had entered the Illinois territory previous to statehood 
could legally retain their slaves. Nevertheless, the Ordinance’s protection of Illinois and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hervey Heth to Thomas Posey, March 3, 1814, [William H. English Collection], Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library, (hereafter abbreviated UC). Accessed via The First 
American West, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/award99/icuhtml/fawhome.html. 
15 Voegeli, Free but not Equal, 1. Malcolm J. Rohrbough, “Diversity and Unity in the Old Northwest, 
1790–1850: Several Peoples Fashion a Single Region,” in Lloyd H. Hunter, ed., Pathways to the Old 
Northwest: An Observance of the Bicentennial of the Northwest Ordinance (Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Society, 1988). 
63	  
	  
	  
the rest of the Northwest Territory from slavery led most slaveholders to move to the 
Southwest or continue onward to Missouri for a more secure guarantee of the right to 
hold slaves. Few took the risk of moving to the Illinois Territory with their slaves, despite 
protection provided in the Constitution of 1818 for those who had violated the Northwest 
Ordinance and migrated to Illinois with their slaves between 1787 and 1818. However, 
the Illinois Constitution permitted hired slaves to work in the Shawneetown salt works 
for a brief time (until 1825), further blurring the line between slavery and freedom.16 
Besides these provisions, the Constitution also created the foundation of a unique 
practice that gained wide acceptance among Illinoisans, though it was largely phased out 
by 1850: indenturing young blacks. Article 6, Section 1, further stated that no indenture 
“where the term of service exceeds one year” shall “be of the least validity except those 
given in cases of apprenticeship.” Though this section did not specifically state the length 
of these indentures, the laws of the Illinois Territory had stated that children “born of 
such person, negros or mulattos, shall become free, the males at the age of twenty one 
years, the females at the age of eighteen years.” Furthermore, black freemen currently 
residing in the state or entering Illinois in the future could enjoy but limited rights. 
Denied the full benefits of white citizenship, blacks could not vote, serve as jurors, or join 
the state militia. From the very beginning, whites in Illinois, both northern and southern, 
made it clear that free soil was meant for free whites.17  
Since the Constitution of 1818 did not take any measures to explicitly exclude 
blacks from the state, Illinoisans enacted a series of Black Codes to prevent their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Constitution of the State of Illinois, 1818, Art. 6, Sec. 1, 2, Illinois Digital Archives, 
http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/isl2/id/12600/show/12572; Norman Dwight Harris, The 
History of Negro Servitude in Illinois, and of the Slavery Agitation in that State, 1719–1864 (Chicago, Ill.: 
A. C. McClurg and Co., 1904), 6–7. 
17 Constitution of the State of Illinois, 1818, Art. 6, Sec. 3, Illinois Digital Archives. 
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immigration.18 Passed just one year after Illinois ratified its constitution, the Black Code 
of 1819 attempted to prevent free blacks from either migrating to the state or enjoying the 
benefits of citizenship. The code prohibited slaveholders from bringing their slaves to 
Illinois to emancipate them, and mandated that any free blacks entering the state must 
provide a certificate of freedom and register themselves and their families with the state. 
Punishment for violating the laws held whites as accountable as blacks. Any slaveholders 
arriving with slaves after 1819 could be fined, and white employers who hired African 
Americans without a certificate of freedom would be subject to penalties as well. 
Although the Black Code of 1819 also held masters accountable before the Circuit Court 
for any severe punishment resulting in servants’ or slaves’ injury or death, its main 
purpose was to reserve Illinois for white citizens. Servants and slaves were to be 
punished by whipping for any violation of these laws, and if charged with laziness or 
wrongdoing, they could also be lawfully whipped by their masters.19 The Black Code of 
1829, meant to buttress the provisions of the 1819 code, reiterated that “‘no black or 
mulatto person, not being a citizen of some one of the United States, shall be permitted to 
reside in this state, until such person shall produce to the county commissioners’ court 
where he or she is desirous of settling, a certificate of his or her freedom, which 
certificate shall be duly authenticated.’” This revised code also stipulated that black 
freedmen post a $1,000 bond, in addition to providing the necessary certifications.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Berwanger, The Frontier against Slavery, 32, 25. 
19 Zebina Eastman, Black Code of Illinois (Chicago, Ill., 1883), 32–26; Carol Pirtle, Escape Betwixt Two 
Suns: A True Tale of the Underground Railroad in Illinois (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2000), 8; Juliet E. K. Walker, Free Frank: A Black Pioneer on the Antebellum Frontier 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 76. 
20 Black Code language reprinted in Walker, Free Frank, 77; see also Berwanger, The Frontier against 
Slavery, 32. 
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Although the number of indentured servants and slaves in Illinois decreased from 
1825 to 1850, white efforts to exclude African Americans from both citizenship and the 
state never abated. The Black Codes of 1819 and 1829 had passed the state legislature but 
remained entirely separate from the Illinois Constitution until 1847, when delegates met 
in Springfield to revise the 1818 constitution. The assembly, comprised of at least 
seventy-six southerners, decided to include a clause in this updated constitution 
restricting the immigration of African Americans to the state.21 Perhaps due to the 
controversial nature of such a provision, legislators decided to remove the clause and 
have their constituents vote on each—the Constitution and the prohibition article—
separately. Astonishingly, in the election held March 6, 1848, over 70 percent of the 
voters approved the clause, with 50,261 voting in favor of the clause, alone, and 21,297 
voting against it.22 As Kenneth J. Winkle notes, “[t]wo-thirds of northeastern natives” 
and “nine-tenths of native southerners” voted in favor of the clause. The desire to 
preserve Illinois’s free soil for white settlers clearly attracted the support of many 
northerners as well as many anti–slave system southerners.23  
Despite these findings, scholars often persist in characterizing these laws and the 
continuation of indentures and slaveholding in Illinois as evidence that “[m]any of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “The Constitutional Convention…included only 7 native Illinoisans. There were 26 New Englanders, 38 
from the middle states, 35 from the South Atlantic seaboard, 41 from Kentucky and Tennessee, and 10 
from Ohio and Indiana…the farmers with 75 were most numerous, but there were 54 lawyers, besides 12 
physicians, 9 merchants, 5 mechanics, and 7 others.” Arthur Charles Cole, The Constitutional Debates of 
1847, in Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library 14 (Springfield, 1919), xvi–xvii. 
22 Illinoisans decided handily in favor of the constitution, with 60,585 votes for it, and 15,903 against. Cole, 
Constitutional Debates, xxx. 
23 With this decision, Winkle noted, “Illinois joined Indiana and Oregon as the only states in the Union that 
restricted African American immigration in their constitutions.” Winkle, Young Eagle, 261. Nichole 
Etcheson had previously argued that the northern section of Illinois unanimous opposed the clause, and the 
central Illinois split its votes. Etcheson, Emerging Midwest, 101. 
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non-slaveholding settlers also favored the institution [of slavery].”24 White Illinoisans 
certainly embraced the opportunity to apprentice blacks and to exploit their labor for their 
own gain. Records from Gallatin County, Illinois, show that thirteen new indentures were 
arranged between 1813 and 1837, while only three slaves were manumitted during that 
period. Similar records for New Salem and Springfield prove that entering into indentures 
remained a common practice with which Lincoln would have been well familiar. The 
evidence provided in these indenture records, however, indicated that these agreements 
followed the codified laws of Illinois, which only allowed female and male youths up to 
the age of eighteen and twenty-one, respectively, to be apprenticed. In 1830, just a year 
before Lincoln arrived in New Salem, George Spears made an indentured agreement with 
“Sary…a girl of colour” aged six, who had been orphaned. The document declared that 
“Sary by and with the approbation of Elihu Bone, Abram Bergen, Justices of the peace in 
and for the county aforesaid [Sangamon] hath this day hereby bound herself to George 
Spears as a servant, him to faithfully serve, until she arrives at the age of eighteen 
years.”25  
Additional records of indentures from Sangamon County provide some 
explanation of the nature of “faithful service” rendered by these young apprentices. An 
indenture made between Richard E. Bennett and “Sarah Miller a mulatto girl aged ten 
years” in 1836 “bound herself apprentice…to learn the art and mystery of common 
domestic labor.” She “shall serve his lawful secrets and commands shall keep and obey” 
until the age of eighteen. Charles Edwin Reed and Shelby, as male apprentices, were 
bound to learn “the art & mystery of farming” and “the arts and mysteries of domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Paul Finkelman, “Evading the Ordinance: The Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois,” Journal 
of the Early Republic 9 (Spring 1989): 21. 
25 Folder 1, Gallatin County, Ill. Legal Documents; Folder 2, New Salem, Ill. Records, 1827–1838, ALPL. 
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employment,” respectively, until the age of twenty-one. These contracts suggest that 
black apprentices, though they may have received useful training for future employment, 
worked primarily as servants for the benefit of their white employers.26  
Many white settlers in central Illinois unquestionably took advantage of the laws 
prescribed in the 1818 Constitution and black codes to acquire servants who might labor 
for them in return for simple food, clothing, shelter, and experience. Very few instances 
survive depicting incidents in which whites actively assisted or defended blacks in their 
midst. The laws merely upheld many Illinoisans’ white supremacist belief that blacks 
were, and would always be, inferior to whites and therefore not deserving of full 
citizenship on the free soil of Illinois. Abraham Scholl, formerly of Kentucky, 
exemplified a very small percentage of southerners “known to have ‘loathed slavery’” but 
who also proved willing to help neighboring free blacks in their own “struggle to free the 
family from the galling yoke of southern slavery.” Some “manumission settlements,” 
where former slaveholders had settled their freed slaves prior to Illinois statehood, also 
persisted in their protection of free blacks. However, most white settlers sought to 
subjugate blacks through servitude or restrictions on citizenship.27 As Winkle points out, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This agreement was made with the consent of Isabella Thornton, her mother, and Charles Thornton, her 
stepfather. Folder 1, New Salem, Ill. Records, 1827–1838; Sangamon Co., Ill. Indentures of 
Apprenticeship, 1834–1854, ALPL. 
27 Walker, Free Frank, 114. John Lockart of Hamilton County, Ill., whose place of birth (North or South) is 
unknown, called forth the “Humanity and philanthropic feelings” of Henry Eddy in his letter written May 
4, 1830 concerning a woman held in servitude in his county. Her master, Mr. John Forrester, “did by force 
and violence remove said woman out of the state, or in her words run her into a Slave state, and is supposed 
he done so for the purpose of enslaving her for life.” Lockart was approached by the woman’s husband, and 
wrote to Eddy hoping that he could secure the woman’s freedom. He made sure to emphasize, however, 
that “I don’t want my name mentioned in the matter, as I don’t have no interest in the case, farther than the 
cause of humanity.” John Lockart to Henry Eddy, May 4, 1830, Henry Eddy Papers, UIUC. 
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only thirty-eight African Americans lived in Sangamon County when Lincoln arrived 
there in 1831. Of those thirty-eight, over two-thirds were free.28  
It is imperative that these indentures, the Black Codes, and acceptance of rare 
incidents of slaveholding be understood for what they were—a “manifestation of racism, 
not an endorsement of slavery.”29 David Brion Davis usefully places the number of slaves 
in Illinois in national perspective, comparing the situation there to the persistence of 
slavery elsewhere in the “free” North. By 1820, for example, “there were still over 
10,000 slaves in New York and more than 7,500 in New Jersey; in Illinois there were 
only 917.” After that date the presence of slaves decreased rapidly, and by 1840 only 331 
slaves remained in Illinois. Given this comparison, it appears almost astonishing that 
Illinois, composed of such reputedly productive, enterprising lands, and inhabited by 
droves of southerners, contained so few slaves within its borders. Coupling these 
statistics with the statements of southerners opposing the system of slavery and the 
absence of wide-scale slavery or indentures in the state, it becomes ever more clear that 
most southern-born migrants despised slavery as equally as they despised blacks. Those 
white southerners who had fled from slavery typically accepted isolated cases of 
slaveholding or indentured servitude as exceptions that did not disrupt the free soil 
opportunities available to them.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Walker, Free Frank, 79; Winkle, Young Eagle, 251. Winkle’s statistics accounting for 1/3 of the African 
American population in Sangamon County being unfree include indentured servants. 
29 Hudson, Making the Corn Belt, 124. 
30 David Brion Davis, “The Significance of Excluding Slavery from the Old Northwest,” Indiana Magazine 
of History 84 (March 1988): 87. Davis disagrees with Finkelman’s assertions that the Northwest Ordinance 
was comparatively insignificant, arguing that Finkelman’s view “ignore[s] the extraordinary power of 
antislavery ideology.” Ibid., 78. As John Mack Faragher, Sugar Creek, 48–49, relates regarding Sugar 
Creek, “[n]o one…seemed to object to the presence of these few blacks as household servants.” Rather, the 
southern farmers held them “in the utmost contempt; not allowing them to be of the same species of 
themselves.” Winkle explains that anti-black attitudes in Springfield amounted to “endorsement of the 
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From the very beginning, a political culture developed in the northwestern state of 
Illinois that emphasized freedom for white men and their families. In central Illinois a 
more moderate set of political principles predominated, as southerners and northerners 
encountered one another’s convictions and negotiated among themselves. From Lincoln’s 
arrival in New Salem, Sangamon County, central Illinois in 1831, he inevitably became 
privy to these opinions about free blacks, especially as his involvement in politics and the 
legal profession increased. His public statements often reflected these attitudes and point 
to his own grasp of the political culture dominating central Illinois.31  
Lincoln’s exposure to these issues began with his 1832 campaign for a seat in the 
state legislature, in which he managed to gain the strong support of his largely Jacksonian 
neighborhood, securing 277 out of the 300 New Salem votes cast in the August 6, 1832, 
election.32 Though he lost the election, Lincoln remained active in local politics, being 
appointed secretary at a bipartisan meeting held May 1, 1834, “for the purpose of 
nominating a suitable person to fill the office of Governor of this State,” and serving as a 
clerk in the election of 1834. Though Lincoln would highlight the freedom of African 
Americans as a major political tenet in the 1850s, it was in the court of law that he most 
directly faced the ambiguity of Illinois’s position on free and enslaved blacks. In 1841 
Lincoln argued before the Illinois Supreme Court that a black girl had been enslaved by a 
white man in Illinois—an action illegal under the Illinois Constitution and Black codes—
and was therefore “free under the provisions prohibiting slavery in both the Ordinance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Black Laws that reduce African Americans to the status of second-class citizens.” Winkle, The Young 
Eagle, 252. 
31 Arvarh E. Strickland, “The Illinois Background of Lincoln’s Attitude Toward Slavery and the Negro,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 56 (Autumn 1963), 475, notes that Lincoln “by and large, 
reflected the sentiment of the mid-section of the state, centering around Springfield, wher the extreme 
views of the northern and southern sections met and were moderated.” 
32 CW, I: 9 (see footnote 1). 
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1787 and the state constitution.” In Lincoln’s second, most infamous case, he represented 
a Kentucky slave owner who brought his slaves to work on his Illinois lands. Lincoln 
argued that since “the slaves had not been brought into the state to stay permanently,” 
they therefore “were not freed by Illinois law.” The arguments Lincoln devised in these 
cases reflected those made by his fellow Illinoisans. Nearly all believed slavery received 
no sanction in the state—whether from the terms of the Northwest Ordinance or the laws 
set down in the Illinois Constitution. The ability of slaveholders to temporarily transport 
their slaves into or across free territory, however, had been upheld by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in the 1843 Willard decision. As Lincoln would have been well aware, 
Illinois’s position aligned with most southern courts, which had ruled “that slaves 
brought into free states on a transitory basis remained slaves and only those who took up 
permanent residence were freed.”33  
Though central Illinoisans remained divided over their opinions of slaves and 
freed blacks, the section overwhelmingly rejected abolitionism, which seemed the very 
pinnacle of radicalism—a perpetual evil—to many southern nonslaveholders.  As John 
Russell explained to his friend, journalist Thomas Gregg, in 1839, he could write 
anything in his Illinois newspaper, “except on Abolition.”34 Settlers resisted abolition, in 
part, because abolitionists’ solution for freed slaves often involved shuffling them to free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 CW, I: 21–24; Strickland, “The Illinois Background of Lincoln’s Attitude,” 476–77; Charles Robert 
McKirdy, Lincoln Apostate: The Matson Slave Trial (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 21, 
82. As Winkle elaborates in Young Eagle, 259, “the two slave cases say little about Lincoln’s attitude 
toward slavery and race.” They do provide an indication that Lincoln understood the laws and political 
culture of the state, however. 
34 John Russell to Thomas Gregg, Jan. 10, 1839, in John T. Flanagan and John Russell, “Six Letters by 
John Russell,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 44 (Spring 1951): 33. The charge of 
abolitionism also served as a potent political weapon, as in the case of a Pike County sheriff candidate 
whose campaign deflated when opponents claimed he was an abolitionist. To overcome the damage 
wreaked upon his campaign, supporters released a signed statement declaring: ‘from our personal 
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for slanderous purposes.” Walker, The Young Eagle, 152. 
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states like Illinois and Indiana. Alabama slaveholder Eli H. Lide described an incident in 
1840 when “one of the vice Presidents of the foreign missionary Board has sent his 
circular on abolition to all the Baptist ministers of Alabama…requiring them to use their 
influence in favor of Abolition and to take their negroes and go to Ohio or some of the 
non-slave holding states.”35 Fearing “that the lack of restrictions  
on Negro immigration would cause their states to become a dumping ground for southern 
free Negroes and manumitted slaves who were forced by the laws of the slave states to 
emigrate,” northwesterners bolstered their black codes.36 Though they became citizens of 
the free West, southerners often felt more sympathy for slaveholders than abolitionists. 
While some beheld in the abolition movement the very anti-democratic pretensions they 
had fled from, others perceived a more egregious corruption of their democratic rights. 
Abolitionists, they believed, abused freedom of expression to create division in society 
and impose their vision upon others. Many white southern-born Illinoisans feared the 
overthrow of majority and states’ rights in favor of a minority’s moral convictions.37 
Abolitionism also violated the moderate Unionist principles upon which, 
southern-born settlers believed, the Northwest had been founded. Thus, from the 
beginning of the convention debates in 1824 to the onset of Civil War, antislavery and 
anti-abolitionism existed in constant tension. Merton Dillon explains that despite the 
apparent lack of a “crusading drive against slavery” from 1824 to the mid 1830s, the 
issue never disappeared, because “[t]he nature of the population made that impossible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 As Eli Lide further illustrated, Alabama Baptists formed a committee that denounced the foreign 
missionary Board, determined not to contribute any funds towards their missions, cancelled their magazine 
subscriptions, and considered the establishment of a separate Southern Board. Green, ed., The Lides go 
South, 32. 
36 Berwanger, The Frontier against Slavery, 36. 
37	  Nicole Etcheson reiterates in Emerging Midwest, 112: “That Upland Southern Midwesterners abjured the 
abolitionist movement did not mean that they harbored any love for slavery.” 
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Many persons had come to Illinois even before 1854 specifically because they wished to 
escape from a slave society.” The anti-slavery societies of central Illinoisan counties 
proved this point. Morgan County’s society, founded to “promote the public good, by 
using all honorable means to prevent the introduction of slavery into this state,” also 
sought to uphold its principles without restricting the peoples’ democratic rights, and by 
“cherishing political harmony.” The Sangamon County Anti-Slavery Society adopted a 
surprisingly more radical position, hoping to “enlighten & rectify public sentiment on the 
subject of slavery & to convince our fellow citizens by arguments addressed to their 
understanding & consciences…” then further asserting “that the system of slavery is a 
great sin in the sight of God, & that the duty, safety & best interests of all concerned 
require its immediate abandonment.” The Constitution of the local Springfield Anti-
Slavery Society chapter, an auxiliary to the Sangamon society, did not include that 
crucial phrase “immediate abandonment.”38 
While some southern-born settlers actively participated in such societies, many 
others avoided them despite their own private opposition to slavery. Preachers in Illinois 
seeking to establish antislavery congregations and members of their congregation 
frequently refer to the difficulties of navigating the peoples’ conflicted sentiments 
regarding slavery. One letter to the editor of the Western Citizen discussed the Chicago 
journal’s charge that Mr. Williams, a candidate for the ministry in Batavia, Illinois, did 
not consider it his duty and obligation to condemn slavery from the pulpit. The writer 
first described the charge as entirely false, since Williams had explicitly announced his 
own belief that slavery was a sin, and he held a duty to preach against it as such. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Dillon, “The Antislavery Movement in Illinois: 1824–1835,” 151; Morganian Society, Morgan Co., Ill.; 
Anti-slavery society constitution, Springfield, Ill., Sangamon County Anti Slavery Society, ALPL. 
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assuring the editor that the candidate was indeed against slavery and deserving the 
position based on his principled opposition to the institution, the anonymous citizen then 
went on to explain Illinoisans’ need to accept those who were antislavery, but not 
necessarily abolitionist, into the religious and political community. “There are doubtless 
many candid persons whose feelings and views are opposed to slavery,” he explained, 
“but whose minds are prejudiced against the movements and measures of abolitionists.” 
Due to this indivisible association many Illinoisans made between abolitionism and 
radicalism, “[a]n impression perhaps has fastened itself on their minds unfavorable not 
only to the measures but to the motives of the leaders of the antislavery enterprise.” The 
writer sought to correct the false claims printed in the Western Citizen in case such wary 
antislavery-leaning “persons were present during the transactions,” since “the 
representation which you have given, though desired for good, would tend to confirm 
them in their prejudices and keep them from the antislavery ranks, because they would 
know it to be incorrect.” By correcting this misleading portrait of an antislavery man, the 
journal could prevent the masses of those who held antislavery sentiment—but avoided 
asserting their convictions publicly—from turning away from antislavery principles 
altogether.39  
Reverend Albert Hale explained the root of this mentality to Asa Turner, a newly 
arrived immigrant on Illinois soil who aspired to preach for the Home Missionary Society 
there in 1838. Hale explained that many of the southern-born migrants had once been 
slaveholders, making it difficult to preach antislavery doctrines. “Every prospect of the 
final triumph of anti slavery principle makes them feel as did the chief priests under the 
first proclamation of the gospel, when they cried out—‘you intend to bring that man’s 
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blood upon us.’” Feeling the oppressive weight of slavery laid upon them by morally 
inspired abolitionist activists, particularly those from the North who had never been 
burdened with the decision to free their slaves or retain the wealthy enterprise of slavery, 
many southerners rebuked the cause out of shame or spite.40 Then, “[t]housands more 
who never owned slaves are desperately opposed to anti slavery movements—because 
their relatives hold slaves or have held them.” As John Regan corroborated, “the general 
convictions of the people are in favour of freedom to all,” yet there is “a large portion 
who…consider it a duty they owe to slaveholders, and to the integrity and peace of the 
Union, to let things remain as they are.” A difficult task, therefore, confronted any man 
attempting to preach the gospel of antislavery. “The truth is,” Reverend Hale advised 
Turner, “we need a man of peculiar qualifications,” capable of speaking to southern-born 
men who opposed slavery, without offending them or their relatives.41 
Elihu Springer, a Methodist preacher born in Illinois, intimated that the actions 
and statements of abolitionists made even an antislavery devotee question the very cause 
he pursued. In 1838 he wrote, “I first became acquainted with Modern Abolitionists, And 
I must confess that such was the extent to which they went in their misrepresentations” of 
the Methodist Church “that it required all the grace that I could master to maintain my 
original Antislavery views.” On August 2, 1840, Springer recorded in his diary the usual 
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difference in sentiment than a difference in approach: “[e]ven Southerners who opposed slavery wearied of 
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41 The man whom Hale recommended for the position, Dr. Nelson, is presumably Rev. David Nelson, noted 
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occurrences in a preacher’s life, with the exception that in Georgetown, he “went to hear 
a sermon from Wm Smith a Presbyterian minister. But to my utter disappointment & 
mortification what should I see upon the sacred desk but a lot of Abolition papers from 
which the Minister was making copious extracts & commentary at large.” Springer 
angrily remarked that “instead of being fed by the wholesome truths of the gospel, the 
congregation were annoyed by hearing exaggerated accounts of southern slavery by those 
mad Abolition fanaticks still exaggerated by the speaker.” Despite Springer’s moral 
distress that in the United States “we find but one spot to darken & disgrace the scene. 
And O how dark it is! I refer to the accoursed [sic] sin of slavery in existence amongst 
us,” he perceived abolitionism as almost a greater evil than slavery itself. Though he 
decried “the great curse, & evil of Slavery,” even this minister grew frustrated by the 
abolitionists, those “[p]oor erring m[e]n,” so “prone to make good, evil & evil, good.”42 
These observations indicated the power the mere hint of abolitionism had in 
stifling antislavery fervor in Illinois, as people grew to fear that antislavery too often led 
to radical abolitionism. When Kentuckian Ben Brink squared off in a debate against 
Missouri slaveholder Arkley Horner, who had travelled to the town of Ellisville, Illinois, 
just west of Peoria, to give speeches defending slavery, the whole town gathered to 
witness the spectacle. A simple but arduously antislavery farmer from a slave state, Brink 
countered Horner’s claim that slavery was sanctioned by the Bible, and he distinguished 
slaveholding from other forms of servitude: “‘What is slavery? It ain’t holdin’ a man as a 
servant, an’ usin’ him well…slavers separate families…forbid their niggers to learn 
readin’ and writin’…larrup your niggers almost to death, or cut their ears, fingers, and 
toes off, as I’ve seen in Kentucky, whar the slavers are a mighty heap better men than any 
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in Missouri….You steal men away out of their own country, and steal away free niggers 
in this country too—I’ve seen it.’”43 His sentiments echoed those expressed by Peter 
Cartwright, the Methodist “backwoods preacher” who challenged Lincoln for a 
congressional seat in 1846. Born in Virginia and raised in Kentucky, Cartwright worked 
for years to spread the Gospel and antislavery doctrines in the latter state. In his 
autobiography of 1856, Cartwright asserted that “Slavery is certainly a domestic, political 
and moral evil…you not only see the dreadful evils growing out of the system in the 
almost universal licentiousness which prevails among the slaves themselves, but their 
young masters are often tempted and seduced from the paths of virtue, from the 
associations in which they are placed.” Surprised at hearing Methodist preachers 
condoning the practice and outlawing the spread of the Gospel to slaves, he sorrowfully 
noted that “our preachers” in the slave states, “by marriage and other ways, became more 
and more entangled with this dark question, and were more and more disposed to palliate 
and justify the traffic and ownership of human beings.”44 
Believing it his especial duty to work for the eventual abolition of slavery, 
Cartwright nonetheless perceived abolitionism as the second most dangerous 
development, behind the rise of a proslavery religion, in preventing the antislavery 
movement from succeeding. Looking back upon his work in Kentucky, he remarked that 
he had served as “the agent or instrument of freeing scores of the poor slaves, and not 
only of their emancipation, but also of the colonization of many of them, returning them 
to their own country free and happy.” Due to a trend in the slave states to legislate against 
emancipation, however, Cartwright eventually found his antislavery goal—even when 
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approached slowly and carefully—impossible to achieve. “These stringent laws of the 
legislatures of slave states,” he claims, “were passed chiefly from two causes: first, their 
inherent love of oppression; and, second, from the extreme and violent manner of 
intermeddling with the legal rights of slaveholders in the South by rabid abolitionists of 
the North.” Meanwhile, he lamented, slavery becomes ever more entrenched in southern 
society.45 
 Cartwright’s desire to “get entirely clear of the evil of slavery,” his fear that his 
“young and growing family of children…might marry into slave families,” and his 
increasing impotence in working against the system of slavery in Kentucky, spurred him 
to move his family to Sangamon County in 1824. There, however, his anti-abolitionist 
stance remained just as strong as his moral repugnance toward slavery. “I have never 
seen a rabid abolition or free-soil society that I could join,” he claimed in 1856, “because 
they resort to unjustifiable agitation, and the means they employ are generally, 
unchristian. They condemn and confound the innocent with the guilty; the means they 
employ are not truthful, at all times; and I am perfectly satisfied that if force is resorted 
to, this glorious Union will be dissolved, a civil war will follow, death and carnage will 
ensue, and the only free nation on the earth will be destroyed.” Though he had always 
actively opposed slavery, “I did not meddle with it politically…I felt it my duty to bear 
my testimony against the moral wrong of slavery.” Cartwright did not appear to make 
antislavery doctrines a central tenet of his political career; yet, he did serve two terms as a 
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member of the Illinois General Assembly and made his unsuccessful run for Congress as 
the Democratic candidate against Lincoln in 1846.46 
 The stigma of abolitionism consistently detracted from any efforts made by 
antislavery individuals and groups in Illinois from 1825 to 1850. Abolitionism, the desire 
to immediately abolish slavery, was vehemently denounced by most southern-born 
migrants to Illinois. At times, men drew upon the violence or vigilantism of southern or 
frontier culture to combat it, even going to such lengths as murdering professed leaders of 
abolition. The doctrine of antislavery, however, offended them not at all, as long as it 
asserted its dogma without placing blame on southerners or the South for slavery and 
thereby denigrating their forebears and friends for the evils of an entire institution. Thus, 
not two but three positions on the slavery issue coexisted in the United States until the 
Civil War: “There were radical abolitionists who opposed slavery on moral grounds,” and 
“proslavery citizenry, who contrived various economic and social justifications for its 
continuation and growth.” Then “between those two extremes were many others who 
advanced more qualified arguments.” Settlers in Illinois despised the lack of 
opportunities they believe slavery societies gave them, and they also “wanted no African-
Americans in their midst.”47 
While the root of these anti-abolitionist and anti-black expressions stemmed from 
the anti–slave system ideology southerners embodied, they were also a consequence of 
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the arduous process of forming a new northwestern identity.  Immediately after 
Illinoisans had decided against holding a convention in 1824, they together embraced a 
new future as free state residents in the Northwest, particularly in the central region of the 
state in which Lincoln resided. Here, the intermixture and mingling of immigrants from 
different regions resulted in a melting pot of cultures. Power’s early historical record 
usefully, though incompletely, provides some indication of this admixture in Lincoln’s 
adopted county of Sangamon and city of Springfield. Though the 670 southerners 
composed a majority of Power’s 999 documented native white settlers, a significant 
majority, 339, arrived from New England and the Mid-Atlantic free states.48  
Historian Douglas K. Meyer has more recently remarked on the prevalence of 
southern migrants and intermingling of northerners and southerners in central Illinois. 
Drawing on census records to more accurately analyze each county of Illinois, he 
provides a series of maps depicting the relative dominance of immigrant groups in each. 
Grouping the migrants by region of birth, Meyer creates the several categories: Midland-
Midwest, Upland South, New England, and Foreign-born to determine the distribution of 
Illinoisan settlers by birthplace. According to these categories, upland southerners formed 
the dominant migrant group in the area of Illinois where Lincoln lived. More importantly, 
however, “the northward thrust of an Upland South impress and the southward thrust of a 
New England impress in Illinois were actually greater and more complex than previously 
posited.” Despite the prevalence of Kentuckians, Tennesseans, and Virginians in central 
Illinois, “a quintessential cultural mixing zone formed that included Upland Southerners, 
Yankees and Europeans” in many counties, including Sangamon.49 Settlement in 
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Sangamon and other counties in central Illinois stand apart from the rest, due to the 
absence of any “core” group of settlers from one single region. Rather than being 
dominated by any one of the regions Meyer lists, Sangamon County was settled by large 
numbers of migrants from both the mid-Atlantic region and the South, as well as a 
secondary but significant number of settlers from New England. The influx of many more 
foreign-born migrants during the 1850s boosted that section of the population on the eve 
of the Civil War, further contributing to the variegated culture of the county.50 
Because Lincoln’s county never attracted an overwhelming number of migrants 
from one particular region, a unique cultural heterogeneity prevented the immigrants of 
one particular state or region from imposing their cultural norms or traditions on the 
others. This varied and variable mix of people, societies, and cultures prompted the 
formation of a northwestern identity very early in Illinois statehood and ensured that 
central Illinoisans would temper the more extreme positions of northern and southern 
Illinois. By the time Lincoln had arrived in 1831, northern- and southern-born migrants in 
central Illinois had already begun this process of building a shared political identity. 
Lincoln and other southerners lived beside northern and northwestern neighbors with 
whom they attended school, church services, and political meetings. In a particular sense, 
Lincoln already embodied all these cultures in 1831. Though born a Kentuckian, his 
family had for generations “followed well-worn trails from New England through the 
Upper South and on westward into the Ohio Country.” Thus, when Lincoln decided to 
settle alone in New Salem at the age of 22, he “inherited an ancestry that prepared him 
fully for the cultural ambiguity that awaited him on the prairies of Illinois.”51  
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Although from the very beginning, the anti–slave system ideology of southern-
born Illinois migrants created a distance between them and southerners who remained in 
the South, that distance became significantly greater over this period, especially in central 
Illinois. As Henry Clyde Hubbart points out, “southern born men and women living in the 
free West in the forties and fifties could not be called southerners,”52 even if the very men 
and women who engaged in this process, often could not or would not realize just how 
similar they had become to their fellow migrants from different regions. Too often, this 
simple fact is obscured behind the rhetoric and reactions of northerners. When southern 
migrants arrived in Illinois and met with New Englanders and other northern-born 
settlers, the differences between the two cultures often resulted in disputes, accusations, 
and mischaracterizations built upon former prejudice or perceived inferiority. Richard 
Lyle Power places particular influence on the role of northerners in fomenting 
disagreements, referring to their movements out West as an attempt at “cultural 
imperialism.” Believing themselves superior to southerners, New Englanders sought 
either to form isolated communities away from their corrupt influences, or to reform their 
new neighbors. John Mack Faragher and Nicole Etcheson provide numerous examples of 
both northerners and southerners making deprecating comments about each other’s habits 
and customs, ranging from cooking methods to religious morals.53 
These statements often make it appear as though northerners and southerners 
remained permanently divided in their new home state of Illinois. However, when given 
more attention and placed within the context of Illinois politics, the evidence points to the 
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contrary. Western culture did not mask sectional differences in central Illinois; rather, the 
accusations and vitriol created an escalating political discourse that often blinds us, as 
historians, to the very real commonalities these particular westerners shared despite their 
differences. Nicole Etcheson’s assertion that “the sectional crisis strengthened 
Westernness by forcing Upland Southerners in the Midwest to search for the middle 
ground that lay between the extremes of abolitionism and secession” particularly applies 
to the region of central Illinois Lincoln knew so well. Meanwhile, her contention that 
during the 1850s upland southerners’ “own sense of Southernness was reinvigorated, 
weakening the bond with other settlement groups,” more accurately applies to areas of 
southern Illinois where Lincoln spent much less time.54  
These families, when they placed roots in Illinois’s free soil, changed. The 
southerners whom Lincoln came to know began negotiating a new political culture with 
northerners from the very beginning. Encountering migrants from the North, these 
“mutating cultures blended, and then frontier conditions changed the hybrids.”55 The 
formation of “Old Settlers” associations across Illinois and other parts of the Northwest 
just prior to the Civil War indicated the significance that settlers, themselves, attributed to 
early events in creating a combined northwestern identity. While these associations 
became much more widespread and effectively organized after the Civil War, a few 
initially formed in the 1850s, when the sectional crisis threatened to break apart the 
nation. The associations, in the 1850s and afterwards, often recorded tales of two notable 
events in Illinois’s early history: the “deep snow” of 1830–31 and the Black Hawk War. 
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When Sangamon County residents formed an “Old Settlers’ Society” in June 1859, they 
cited settlement prior to the deep snow as a necessary qualification for entrance into the 
society, and they highlighted the efforts of early settlers in creating the county.  
Lincoln missed the deep snow, arriving in New Salem in July 1831, at the young 
age of twenty-two. He did participate, however, in a second event often noted by old 
settlers associations in their records of early settlement: the Black Hawk War. By 
granting significance to these early post-convention events in Illinois’s history, settlers 
engaged in a shared heritage with their fellow neighbors who had come from different 
regions, cultures, and backgrounds to form one single society in the Northwest. The 
Black Hawk War, especially, had spurred settlers to gather arms together against Native 
Americans that threatened their claims to the land. As a letter from Rushville, dated June 
20, 1831, and published in the Illinois Advocate explained, “[t]he prompt manner in 
which the call of the Governor [for troops] has been met in this instance, and the facility 
with which the supplies were obtained, shows that Illinois is quite able to defend 
herself…and that she is no longer in a state of supplicant minority. The counties of 
Sangamon and Morgan, alone, are able to raise and support an army sufficient to punish 
the Indians near our northern frontier.” Men from all sections of the country had gathered 
to fight a common enemy, and officers from the 2nd Regiment, which was composed by 
Sangamon County volunteers, hailed from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., 
and Kentucky.56 
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These early events about which the oldest settlers reminisced worked to create a 
more unified political culture in central Illinois, which very soon became a point of pride 
among citizens of the Northwest, who claimed to “shed the habits and prejudices of their 
natal states.”57 When migrants posted in the Boston Patriot a notice that they would be 
leaving for Illinois as a group in 1834, the Illinois Advocate and State Register responded 
that they welcomed any settlers who wished to embrace Illinois culture. However, the 
newspaper also issued a strong warning to those “so strongly imbued with the peculiar 
manners, notions and ways of thought of that home, as to be unable to shake them off and 
adopt those of his adopted country,” and advised these men to remain in their native 
region.58 Due to this identification of northwestern culture with truly American values, 
Illinoisans attached pride to national political candidates who hailed from the West, 
regardless of party, such as Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay. Many of the upland 
southerners, especially Kentuckians, in Lincoln’s region voted Whig beginning in the 
mid-1830s. Even though his New Salem neighbors supported Jackson and would often 
vote Democrat, overall “the Sangamon country voted Whig, just like that great center of 
Whiggism, the Bluegrass of Kentucky,” The focus of Whig doctrines on a western 
conception of Unionism attracted many central Illinoisans from Kentucky to that 
platform.59 As Ayers et al. explain, “Westerners…portrayed themselves as quintessential 
Americans, and their ‘section’ as a place where sectional distinctions were resolved and 
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transcended. In this self-congratulatory rhetoric, sectional identity merged with a vaulting 
sense of the nation’s glorious future and a patriotic devotion to the union.”60 
“The high point of this political identification with rural values,” Malcolm 
Rohrbough explains, “was the presidential election of 1840, when the ‘hard cider and log 
cabin’ campaign that William Henry Harrison rode to the White House demonstrated that 
the values of the Old Northwest had become the values of the nation.”61 This attention to 
a national culture created in the Northwest greatly affected Lincoln’s own political 
thought and, as one historian has argued, his attachment to the concept of “a ‘perpetual 
union’ that transcended regional differences under the aegis of a strong national 
government” actually derived from “undercurrents of regionalism…that helped shape 
both his nationalism and his commitment to anti-slavery as a transcendent national ideal.” 
As Lincoln developed into a prominent political figure in central Illinois, he exuded the 
very values of antislavery and Union he had learned as a northwestern migrant. 
Though they may have maintained southern manners and traditions in their 
everyday way of life, southern families worked with other migrants, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, to create a northwestern political culture built, in part, from a common set of 
ideals centered on both Unionist principles and antipathy to the system of slavery. By 
1860 most southern-born and southern-descended Illinoisans living in central Illinois 
participated in this distinctly different political culture that increased the geographical 
divide separating them from their forbears, friends, and families in the South. This 
northwestern process not only shaped the future president’s own position on crucial 
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issues but also imbued him with a particular set of assumptions regarding the fellow 
southerners residing in his midst. 
There forever remained a political divide among Illinoisans, however, extending 
directly from the issues of 1824. In 1824, the convention had most clearly divided what 
would become central Illinois from southern Illinois. Lincoln had not witnessed the 
events of the 1820s and had little sense of the opinions, issues, and happenings of the 
state as the convention debate raged. However, the vote count of Sangamon County 
inhabitants provides some indication of the sentiments enveloping the region in which 
Lincoln resided for so long. Though largely composed of settlers of southern descent in 
1824, residents cast 722 votes against the convention and a meager 153 in its favor.62 
When word reached them of the statewide vote count, these Sangamon settlers cheered in 
honor of the Northwest Ordinance, alternatively toasting “‘The Tree of Liberty, planted 
by the Ordinance of 1787…May Illinois never cut it down,’” and “‘the Ordinance of 
’87—Illinois has pledged her faith to support it.’”63 As Peter Onuf has described, the 
Northwest Ordinance became to many Illinoisans an almost mythical provision handed 
down by the Founding Fathers. It had stood the test of American democracy in 1824 and 
now, through the will of the people, served as a foundation of government in the 
Northwest. In the 1850s, when former governor Edward Coles recalled Illinois’s early 
statehood, he “sketched the history of the ‘marvellous’ Ordinance which had preserved 
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freedom in the states north of the Ohio River,” and “had won more popular sanction than 
the Constitution.”64  
This providential reading of the founding document of the Northwest territory, 
however, did not extend to all new members of the state. In local and state politics, there 
existed a barrier between those who emphasized the power of the Northwest Ordinance in 
securing the state’s freedom from slavery, and those who lauded her democratic 
sovereignty as a state—one that always was, and continued to be, equal in power and 
independence to every single other state of the Union. One writer to the Illinois 
Intelligencer, one of the major newspapers in early Illinois statehood, had argued against 
the comments of a local anti-convention leader written in the Edwardsville Spectator. 
“Pro Bono Publico” opposed the leader’s use of Thomas Jefferson to justify voting 
against a convention, lamenting having to witness “the name of our venerable statesman 
in such company…I am sure that if the old gentleman were near, he would expostulate 
against having any part of his valuable works made subservient to the support of 
principles so hideous as those protected by the few in the legislature, and I seriously hope 
that his name will never again be taken in vain.” Invoking Jefferson proved a common 
tactic on both sides of the convention debate, as Illinoisans discussed the rights of their 
state in relation to the Northwest Ordinance. Many like “Pro Bono” wielded Jefferson’s 
conviction that “a preceding generation cannot bind a succeeding generation,” and thus 
the state could not be limited by the Ordinance of 1787.65  “Truth” likened the transition 
of Illinois Territory into a state to the maturation  of a young man’s relationship with his 
father. Just as the youth asked “his father at the age of eighteen, for privilege to go and 
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provide for and govern himself,” so too did Congress grant to Illinois “the privilege to 
alter or amend” their constitution “whenever it might be deemed proper.” As the Illinois 
Gazette reminded its readers, “it must always be borne in mind, that, with regard to the 
United States, we stand, and have stood, from the moment of our admission into the 
Union, upon an equal footing with the original states.”66 
Others, however, asserted that “[t]hose who settled in the Illinois before it became 
a state, saw the ordinance of 1787, and they chose their residence under the constitution 
that slavery could not be introduced.” That “solemn pledge” had secured Illinois the clear 
benefits of free territory, which could already be seen if one only cared to look “at all the 
states which have emancipated themselves, and compare them with the slave states. Here 
are experiements on a large scale, so decisive and so uniform in their result against 
slavery, that if it were an affair of simple calculation, a question merely of political 
arithmetic, common sense would teach us to reject it.”67 
This split between those who trumpeted Illinois’s state sovereignty first and 
foremost, and those who believed the Ordinance of 1787 crucial and necessary to 
preserving the state against slavery, persisted as an undercurrent in the political culture of 
antebellum Illinois. With the sectionalization of American politics in the 1850s, the 
popular sovereignty portion of the Democratic Party united around the more developed 
creed of popular sovereignty, while the Republican Party adopted the extension of the 
Northwest Ordinance as their party’s pledge. Therefore, as Coles, Lincoln, and other 
citizens praised the Ordinance of 1787 as the single barrier between slavery and freedom 
in their state’s early history, Douglas and his Democrats instead trumpeted popular 
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sovereignty as the agent of freedom, pointing to the votes cast against the convention as 
proof that the people—not the Founders or U.S. Congress—had decided Illinois’s fate. In 
his speech on the compromise resolutions of 1850, Douglas alleged that “notwithstanding 
the ordinance of 1787, the Missouri compromise, and all the kindred measures, under 
whatever name,” enacted in the halls of the U.S. capital, “all the new States which have 
been admitted into the Union, with clauses in their constitutions prohibiting slavery, 
became free States by virtue of their own choice, and not in obedience to any 
congressional dictation.” Freedom in Illinois and the rest of the Northwest had been 
assured by the early settlers, who would not have “tolerated the institution of slavery 
within its limits, even if it had been peremptorily required to have done so by an act of 
Congress.” To claim that these settlers had been proslavery and had suffered the 
suppression of their democratic right to choose the state’s fate, Douglas declared, “is a 
libel upon the character of those people…I will never blacken the character of my own 
State by such an admission.” The decision early settlers made to prevent a convention 
had not, itself, stifled freedom—it had secured it. The vote had upheld the right of the 
people—not Congress or the Founders—to decide Illinois’s future.68 
 The idea of popular sovereignty as an avenue to democratic freedom would never 
captivate Lincoln. He and many of his constituents held the nationally legislated 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 responsible for assuring that Illinois became a free soil 
state. Though Lincoln well knew and understood the anti–slave system mentality around 
him—southerners’ anti-black attitudes, disgust with abolitionism, and their social 
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antipathy to slavery—he would never understand popular sovereignty as anything more 
than a misguided doctrine that deceived Americans into believing they could painlessly 
halt the spread of slavery. Regardless of this distance between them, the ideology of 
southern-born popular sovereignty advocates further imbued in Lincoln the conviction 
that white southern nonslaveholders opposed the institution of slavery. In the state 
legislature, he would repeatedly face these issues of slavery and democracy and become 
better acquainted with the positions of southern-born representatives and their 
constituents in Illinois. 
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Chapter Three  
Lincoln and Illinois, 1831–1847 
 
 
 From his 1831 arrival in New Salem, Illinois, to his entrance into national politics 
in 1847, Abraham Lincoln developed from a Kentucky-born adolescent into the 30th 
Congress’s “Lone Whig Star of Illinois.” During these crucial preparatory years before 
serving as a congressman, he immersed himself in the political culture of central Illinois. 
Working as a surveyor, postmaster, storekeeper, and circuit court rider exposed him to 
the views of his fellow migrants. Most importantly, his terms in the state legislature 
during a period in which mob violence and sectional bickering over slavery often rose to 
the surface, taught him that extremes must be met with moderation and thoughtful policy. 
Lincoln’s association with Illinois constituents and legislators, familiarity with 
communications from southern states, and yet few experiences actually visiting the 
South, all contributed both to his sense that slavery was “bad policy” and to his 
understanding of Illinois and southern opinions on slavery. From this large set of 
experiences, Lincoln learned about the anti–slave system views of his neighbors and 
constituents; the views of southern states on slavery and on its relation to the free and 
slave states; and, most importantly, that his own position on slavery differed from that of 
most fellow Illinoisans. As a northwesterner with roots in the slaveholding states of 
Virginia and Kentucky, Lincoln largely reflected the position held by many of his fellow 
southern migrants regarding abolitionism, but he emphasized the “injustice” or 
immorality of slavery in a way that few publicly acceded to and always upheld 
Congress’s right to restrict slavery in the territories. Since Lincoln learned that most 
Illinoisans disagreed with him on these two points in the state legislature, from his 
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vantage point, most Illinoisans (certainly those born in the South) held much in common 
with their brethren who remained in the slave states.  
 When Lincoln travelled to New Salem, in central Illinois, he left behind his own 
family and an almost certain future in agriculture for the alternative opportunities of a 
burgeoning town. For six years he lived and worked in New Salem, first as a storekeeper, 
then as a surveyor and postmaster.1 Entering the New Salem community brought Lincoln 
into direct contact with both northern- and southern-born migrants, and his work as a 
storekeeper facilitated his engagement with families, whether “old settlers” or new 
residents. In this profession, as in his subsequent occupations, Lincoln was surrounded by 
fellow southerners. Of the nine merchants who remained in central Illinois for an 
extended number of years, six arrived from the southern states of Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee. As a merchant, then as a postmaster from 1833 to 1836, Lincoln enjoyed a 
unique opportunity to, as Kenneth Winkle explains, “become acquainted with virtually 
every resident in the neighborhood.” With access to newspapers from all over the 
country, he became apprised of a variety of opinions, but he also came into direct contact 
with the multitude of settlers who reached Illinois from the North and South. Meanwhile, 
his work as a surveyor and, later, as a lawyer in the Eighth Judicial Circuit brought him 
greater contact with the people of central Illinois beyond his small circle in New Salem 
and Springfield.2 
Lincoln’s work as both surveyor and, later, lawyer in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, 
also brought him into extensive contact with the people of central Illinois who resided 
beyond New Salem and Springfield. Riding the circuit for weeks each Spring and Fall, 
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Lincoln covered Sangamon and seven other counties, encountering a variety of northern-, 
southern- and foreign-born migrants and boarding in their homes. He befriended 
Sangamon County’s surveyor John Calhoun, a Democrat and distant relative to John C. 
Calhoun, as well as John Todd Stuart, a Kentuckian married to Robert S. Todd’s sister, 
with whom Lincoln roomed and served as junior law partner. Stuart served in the Illinois 
state legislature with Lincoln as one of the “Long Nine” members, named for their height, 
representing Sangamon County, and the two joined in a partnership in law when Lincoln 
moved to Springfield in 1837.3 Although southern-born migrants no longer constituted a 
majority of settlers after 1840, those who remained seem to have exercised an undue 
influence in the area in proportion to their numbers. As a surveyor during this 1830s 
period of high southern migration, Lincoln must have been acutely aware of their exodus 
from the South. Though he often colluded with northerners as well as southerners, 
Lincoln’s closest friends, like Joshua Fry Speed, were often southerners, and the number 
of southerners with whom Lincoln chose to live, work, and spend time provides some 
indication that he trusted and understood southern members of the central Illinois 
community. His remark to fellow Kentuckian John T. Stuart in December 1839 that a 
“d—d hawk billed yankee is here, besetting me at every turn I take” for an outstanding 
debt he still owed provides some indication of Lincoln’s natural ease around fellow 
southern-born northwesterners.4 In another instance, while in the midst of a legal battle 
on behalf of a widow, Lincoln “put the question to every reflecting man” whether or not 
they believed “Benjamin Talbott, Charles R. Matheny, William Butler and Stephen T. 
Logan, all sustaining high and spotless characters,” were trustworthy men in vouching for 
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4	  CW, I: 158. 
94	  
	  
	  
Lincoln’s character. All four were southerners—two from Virginia and two from 
Kentucky. Lincoln knew them well, and each played a prominent role in Sangamon 
County government.5 
Lincoln’s efforts to gather support for Whig candidate William Henry Harrison in 
1840 brought him into frequent contact with the many southerners from Kentucky, 
Virginia, and other slave states residing in his district.6 In a March 1840 letter to 
Kentuckian John T. Stuart, Lincoln listed some of the southerners with whom he 
conversed, including Kentuckians Thomas Hunter, Greenbury Smith, Solomon Miller, 
Samuel Harper, and William Fagan and his two sons, as well as Virginian John Cartmel. 
These formerly Van Buren men had decided to vote for Harrison in 1840. The rest of the 
list also reveals the geographical diversity that surrounded Lincoln in central Illinois. 
While he interacted with these several southerners, he also spoke with northerners from 
New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. The geographical diversity he encountered 
living and working in the region, furthermore, reflected the composition of the state 
legislature. The 1850 census reveals that the state legislators who served during Lincoln’s 
terms arrived from Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, with lesser numbers from 
Maryland, New York and New England. Citing their experiences “in another State 
[Kentucky],” where they had witnessed the “fearful consequences” of reorganizing the 
state’s judicial system, the Whigs registered a protest against Illinois’s attempts at 
reorganization. All of the signers had either been born in Kentucky, or had migrated to 
that state before coming to Illinois.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Winkle, Young Eagle, 159, 166; CW, I: 95, 158. 
6 Winkle, Young Eagle, 171, highlights this crucial period when Lincoln was working as a lawyer and 
politician, writing for the Sangamo Journal, and campaigning for William Henry Harrison. 
7 CW, I: 184, 206, 201–03, 244–49. 
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Lincoln’s involvement in state politics took place within this context of vast in-
migration of both northerners and southerners to Illinois. His political activities began 
soon after he arrived in New Salem and only expanded as he served as a state legislator. 
His unsuccessful run in 1832 demonstrated his strength as a candidate who understood 
his constituents and knew how to cross the partisan and sectional lines that divided 
Illinois migrants. Gaining 277 of the 300 votes cast in New Salem, Lincoln won the 
approval of most Democrats and Whigs, southerners and northerners, who knew him. In 
1834 he captured 64 percent of Sangamon County’s vote, gaining the crucial support of 
eminent Springfield Whigs, many of whom had relocated from Kentucky. When the 
ambitious young settler arrived in Vandalia, Illinois, in 1835 to serve in the General 
Assembly, he fit squarely within a state legislature that simply magnified the 
geographical distinctions of Illinois migrants Lincoln had encountered in central Illinois. 
While the southern section remained comprised of mostly southerners, northern Illinois 
had begun to attract more migrants from the Northeast.8 A list of all the members of the 
Illinois General Assembly in 1846 and 1847 provides a strong indication of the 
composition of northerners and southerners who likely existed throughout Lincoln’s 
terms, with perhaps a greater number of southerners serving during Lincoln’s years in the 
legislature.9 Of the 122 members serving in 1846, 55 were from slaveholding states, the 
majority of whom came from Kentucky. New York’s 15 members represented the largest 
delegation of northeasterners, which totaled 43. Also serving were 16 northwesterners 
from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, 1 Washington, D.C. migrant, and 7 foreign-born 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Soon after he arrived in New Salem in July 1831, Lincoln voted in the local New Salem elections. 
Thomas, Lincoln’s New Salem, 61; Donald, Lincoln, 46; Winkle, Young Eagle, 115. 
9 According to Michael Burlingame, in the years Lincoln served, as many as three-fourths of the legislators 
were southern-born. Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln: A Life, Vol. 1, 92. 
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legislators.10 The “Long Nine”—the delegation of legislators that served Sangamon 
County in the 1830s—was composed of 7 southerners and 2 northerners, with Abraham 
Lincoln, John Todd Stuart, and William Fletcher Elkin all hailing from Kentucky.11 
	   The vast majority of bills and proposals discussed in the Illinois General 
Assembly from 1835 to 1842 did not directly involve slavery or sectionalism but instead 
focused on state banks, internal improvements, and the reorganization of counties as the 
state grew at an incredible rate.12 Aware of this rapid growth, members sought the 
improvement of navigable streams and rivers and the building of roads and railroads to 
foster migration and trade. From late 1836 to 1838, however, Lincoln and the legislature 
were forced to confront slavery-related issues. Since the rise of antislavery and 
abolitionism following William Lloyd Garrison’s publication of the Liberator in 1831, 
the South had become increasingly anxious about the future security of its peculiar 
institution. After the abolitionist mails controversy of 1835, in which northern 
abolitionists had sent thousands of antislavery tracts to South Carolina through the postal 
system, southern post offices began suppressing abolitionist pamphlets. Southern 
legislatures, incensed by this self-perceived invasion of their rights and the additional 
responsibilities it imposed on them, sent memorials to northern legislatures calling for 
them to take action against abolitionism.13 These resolutions, filled with fear that 
southerners could not protect their slave system from abolitionist and insurrectionist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The second-largest contingent of southerners were Virginians, with 13 serving in the 15th General 
Assembly. E. Rust, List of the Members Composing the Fifteenth General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 
Session of 1846-1847 (1846), Illinois State Library, ida.illinois.org, accessed November 17, 2012. 
11 Winkle, Young Eagle, 189-90; Mrs. Mabel Riddle Carlock, comp., Wills and Family Histories 
(Champaign, Ill.: Illinois Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 1940), 150-59. 
12 “The greatest need of central Illinois was adequate transportation. The soil was rich, but it was difficult to 
get crops to market.” Thomas, Lincoln’s New Salem, 15. 
13 Richard Lawrence Miller, Lincoln and His World: Prairie Politician, 1834–1842 (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2008), 138–39. 
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threats, and with defensive resentment against the self-righteousness of antislavery 
northerners, arrived in Illinois in 1836.14 After receiving these reports, Illinois Governor 
Joseph Duncan passed them on to the Tenth General Assembly of the State of Illinois at 
the beginning of their session in December 1836. The reports and resolutions from 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Virginia, all written in the early months of 1836, 
were then referred to a joint select committee of seven House and four Senate members 
of the General Assembly.15 The documents depict southern legislators’ fears that the rise 
of abolitionism in the free states would bring devastation to the South. The four sets of 
preambles and resolutions focused on free speech, the rights of individual states within 
the Union, the relationship between the free and slave states, and appropriate responses to 
abolitionism. From them, Lincoln and his fellow Illinoisans learned the viewpoints of 
southern legislators on the slavery issue in the mid-1830s.16 
 The language and arguments employed by these southerners is of particular 
significance. Firstly, the petitioners addressed the free states as members of the same 
family. Alabama’s preamble explained that the state “approach[es] your honorable bodies 
with that confidence and good will which should characterize sisters of the family.” 
Virginia’s fourth resolution acknowledged the efforts of northern states in condemning 
radicalism and noted the “common dangers, sufferings and triumphs, which ought to bind 
us together in fraternal concord.” This common bond bestowed upon them a 
responsibility to protect one another from radicals. The committee that drew up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Donald, Lincoln, 63; Carl Lawrence Paulus, "The Slaveholding Crisis: The Fear of Insurrection, The 
Wilmot Proviso, and the Southern Turn Against American Exceptionalism," (PhD diss., Rice University, 
2012), 189–90. 
15 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Tenth General Assembly of the State of Illinois (Vandalia, 
Ill.: William Walters, 1837), 135, 148. 
16 Arvarh E. Strickland, “The Illinois Background of Lincoln’s Attitude toward Slavery and the Negro,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 56 (Autumn 1963): 480–81. 
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Kentucky’s resolutions “have been gratified with the spirit which has characterized the 
numerous and respectable meetings of our Northern brethren upon this deeply interesting 
subject, and their emphatic denunciations of the plans of those misguided fanatics.” Even 
Mississippi’s legislators, who clearly separated the free and slave states into different 
entities and passed a separate resolution each for the resolutions’ distribution to non-
slaveholding and slaveholding states, invoked “the bonds of friendship…the spirit of a 
faithful neutrality, and…the solemn and mutual guarantees of our national compact.”17  
 Despite these assurances of familial affection, the southern legislatures felt “that 
they would be violating the high trust reposed in them by the House, did they not in terms 
firm, yet respectful, admonish them of the certain and tremendous consequences which 
must attend this officious and dangerous interference with their domestic institutions.” 
Abolitionism, all four statements explained, had quickly developed into a great threat to 
the South that required the direct action of northerners, among whom the movement had 
arisen, to put down. “The abolitionists are not numerous,” the Alabama preamble 
explained, “but they are wealthy, ardent and talented. They have presses in the various 
parts of the Union, from which they issue millions of essays, pamphlets and pictures, and 
scatter them amongst our slave population, calculated to urge them to deluge our country 
in blood.” Their destructive tactics, the writers asserted, “cannot be tolerated.”18 
Mississippians likewise “have witnessed with apprehension of the deepest solicitude, the 
propagation of principles and the projection of schemes, in the non-slave holding States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 One of Kentucky’s resolutions spoke exclusively to “her sister States, where domestic slavery exists,” 
assuring them that the state of Kentucky would resist any interference with slavery by Congress, free states, 
or private combinations. Alabama Resolutions on the Subject of Domestic Slavery, Virginia Resolutions on 
the Subject of Domestic Slavery, Mississippi Resolutions on the Subject of Domestic Slavery, Kentucky 
Resolutions on the Subject of Domestic Slavery (1836), Lincoln and Lincoln-related Documents, Illinois 
State Archives, ida.illinois.org, accessed November 17, 2012. 
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of this Union, by persons and associations” that fell under the title of “Abolitionists,” 
which threatened the “rights, peace and domestic prosperity of this and others of the 
slave-holding States.” Kentucky provided a more detailed analysis of the problems 
abolitionism posed to the entire country, especially regarding the right to free speech. 
Their committee members had unsuccessfully attempted to gauge the extent of 
abolitionism in the free states. Though they failed to attain any real substantive empirical 
data, they had succeeded in learning the true intentions of abolitionists. “[T]heir object,” 
they found, “is to produce an entire abolition of slavery in the United States, by printing 
and circulating…tracts, pamphlets, almanacs and pictorial representations…to produce a 
spirit of discontent, insubordination, and perhaps, inserruction [sic] with the slave 
population of the country.” The Kentucky preamble lamented “that under the miserably 
perverted name of free discussion, these incendiaries will be permitted to scatter their 
firebrands…with no check but that which may be imposed by the feeble operation of 
public opinion.” Deeply committed to the freedom of speech protected by the 
Constitution, they perceived the actions of abolitionists as a violation of that freedom. 
“[F]reedom of the press is one thing—its licentiousness another,” they explained, and 
though “the constitution of the country guarantees to every citizen the right to publish and 
speak his opinion upon all subjects, it wisely fixed the limitation that he shall be 
responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” Circumscribing abolitionism within these 
limits, the Kentuckians admitted themselves “unable to conceive a grosser prostitution of 
the freedom of the press, than the effort of the abolitionists to stir up the population of 
eleven States of this Union to rebellion and bloodshed.”19 
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 Every single one of the four state legislatures—from Kentucky in the West, 
Virginia in the upper South, to Mississippi and Alabama in the lower South—believed 
free states had a duty to their southern sister states to pass laws penalizing abolitionist 
activities. Virginia, Mississippi, and Alabama all passed resolutions urging the free states 
to pass their own laws against abolitionism, while Kentucky’s legislators simply did “not 
entertain this hope” that northerners would ever take direct action against this form of 
radicalism. Instead, they simply stated their  “unqualified reprobation” of abolitionist 
societies in the North, formed “for the purpose of circulating incendiary publications 
among the slaveholding States of the Union.” These actions were clearly “a violation of 
the original basis of the federal compact, and calculated to endanger the integrity of this 
Union.” Rather than requesting direct action by the free states, these Kentuckians simply 
stated their grievance then passed a second resolution assuring “our sister States, where 
domestic slavery exists,” that Kentucky would take all actions necessary to resist 
abolitionism.20 
 The remaining three legislatures explicitly asked the free states “to adopt penal 
enactments, or such other measures as will effectually suppress all associations within 
their respective limits, purporting to be, or having the character of, abolition societies.” 
Virginia urged them to “make it highly penal to print, publish, or distribute, newspapers, 
pamphlets, or other publications, calculated or having a tendency to excite the slaves of 
the southern states to insurrection and revolt.”21 Mississippi also detailed the possible 
outlines such laws should take. Free state legislation would “suppress, and restrain” 
inhabitants “from associating, plotting or conspiring to undermine, disturb or abolish our 
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21 Virginia Resolutions. 
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institutions of domestic slavery, in any manner or by any means, and under any pretext 
whatever.” The legislators further suggested that the northern states prohibit their citizens 
from “writing, speaking, printing or publishing sentiments and opinion, expressive of 
advice or suggestion to the public or others, calculated in temper and spirit, to induce 
disaffection among our slaves.” Alabama hoped such laws would “finally put an end to 
the malignant deeds of the abolitionists, calculated to destroy our peace, and sever this 
Union.”22 
 In all four of these communications to free state legislatures, southern politicians 
expressed, both explicitly and implicitly, their southern-oriented views on the slavery 
issue. Each vehemently denounced abolitionism as a vile movement springing up from 
the North, but none of them cast blame upon the entire North for it. Rather, they were 
careful to qualify that “a small portion of your population” have displayed a hostility “to 
the happiness and safety of our country,” and thus it “is not believed to have emanated 
from any settled intention of your citizens to do us an injury. The dark, deep and 
malignant design of the Abolitionists…have never for a moment alienated our affections 
from the great mass of your citizens—and we have believed and still believe—that when 
you were fully apprised of the evils which this unholy land of cowardly assassins was 
bringing upon us, you would extend your hands to avert the calamities, which must 
otherwise fall upon our citizens.” Virginia’s fourth resolution specifically highlighted 
“those expressions of public opinion of our northern brethren, favourable to the rights of 
the southern states.” All four states recognized that abolitionism had not taken hold of 
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“the great body of the people” of the North and instead remained a radical movement on 
the fringes of northern society.23 
 Despite these reassurances from southerners that they continued to feel 
themselves in perfect accord with the vast majority of northerners, their resolutions 
firmly reminded the free states that slave states, alone, held the power to modify, abolish, 
or continue slavery. This conviction drove the southern legislatures to adamantly insist 
upon the exclusive right of southern states to determine their respective courses regarding 
slavery. “Slavery in the United States is local and sectional,” Alabamians explained. 
Since it now existed in the “southern and middle states,” only these entities had the 
“business to say so and remove it.” Any “intermeddling” from citizens of other states 
would only disrupt the tranquility of the Union. Kentucky defensively asserted that its 
people “hold themselves responsible to no earthly tribunal, but will refer their cause to 
Him alone.” Therefore, “so long as she remains a sovereign member of this confederacy,” 
Kentucky “can never permit another State to assail her local institutions, much less a 
combination of private individuals.” The committee specifically included a resolution 
reiterating its belief that Kentucky, alone, “has power to regulate and control the subject 
of domestic slavery as it exists within her territory.” Virginia’s resolutions reiterated the 
same sentiment and included an additional provision defending the right of any 
slaveholding state to pass laws preventing the printing and circulation of “incendiary” 
works within its boundaries.24  
 Whereas Mississippi’s communication focused specifically on the activities of 
abolitionists and did not engage in additional slavery-based issues, those released by 
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Alabama, Kentucky, and Virginia also addressed the future of slavery in Washington, 
D.C., Kentucky and Virginia flatly rejected the constitutionality of any action Congress 
might take to abolish slavery in the district. Virginia emphatically stated that it “would 
regard any act of congress having for its object the abolition of slavery in the district of 
Columbia, or the territories of the United States, as affording just cause of alarm to the 
slaveholding state, and bringing the Union into imminent peril.” Alabama, alone, 
qualified its assertion, noting that any congressional action would be unconstitutional 
“unless [prompted] by the desire of its own citizens.” By including a resolution regarding 
slavery in the nation’s capital, the slave state legislatures informed their northern brethren 
that in any location where slavery existed, the residents of that area, alone, held the power 
to determine its future. Through these statements, southerners implicitly demanded that 
northerners understand their peculiar circumstances as slave state inhabitants. As the 
Alabama members explained, “We were born in a land of domestic slavery. Like our 
liberties it descended from our fathers.” Born into a world wherein slavery dominated, 
they insisted that any blame for its continued existence should not be placed upon them. 
“We were innocent of its introduction,” they asserted, and only “time and the wisdom of 
experience” could work to eliminate it in their state. Thus, they “utterly deny the right of 
the citizens of any other states to claim an interference” because the citizens of non-
slaveholding states simply did not—could not—understand the system of slavery or how 
best to deal with it.25 
Alabama’s assertion that free state residents did not know how best to handle 
slavery-related issues must have captured the attention of the Illinois House of 
Representatives, which contained within it a large number of southern-born residents. 
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The above memorials of Virginia, Alabama and Mississippi, as well as rejoinders by New 
York and Connecticut, were all responded to by the Joint Select Committee formed by 
the two houses of the Illinois General Assembly. This committee released a detailed 
report on the issues of slavery and abolitionism, which ultimately passed both houses. In 
this document, they largely concurred in the sentiments expressed by their southern 
brethren, with the critical exception that they considered the passage of penal acts against 
abolitionism unnecessary. Their lengthy response belied sympathy for white southerners 
who, “by the misguided and incendiary movements of the abolitionists,” had reason to 
fear for the security of themselves and their institutions. The committee decided to 
“unanimously concur in the opinion that the purposes of the abolitionists are highly 
reprehensible, and that their ends, even if peaceably attained, would be productive of the 
most deleterious consequences to every portion of our Union.” Furthermore, the 
Illinoisans asserted, “We hold that the citizens of slave holding states are no more 
amenable for the existence of slavery, than are those of the non-slaveholding states. It 
was introduced by our common ancestry, and came from them to us with the inviolable 
charter of our liberty, as a part of our heritage.” Thus, North and South, slaveholder and 
non-slaveholder, all held equal responsibility for the existence of slavery in the Union. 
No more blame could be placed upon contemporary southerners than northerners. The 
Joint Select Committee assured southerners that the free states had no right to interfere 
with southern slavery, since the U.S. Constitution “guaranties to the States where it does 
exist, its continuance without interference.”26 
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Thus did the Illinois delegation convey in just a few explicit statements a 
complete understanding of, and agreement with, the resolutions and explanations released 
by southern legislators. Yet, in nearly two full pages of additional explanation, these 
northern- and southern-born Illinoisans separated themselves from the South by 
providing a denunciation of abolitionism that epitomized their unique northwestern 
perspective. Rather than criticizing abolitionist doctrines and activities for destroying 
slavery, they castigated abolitionism for perpetuating it. “Before their organization,” the 
committee lamented, “changes were rapidly making in public opinion of a character the 
most favorable to the amelioration of the condition of the colored population….not only 
was their condition as slaves made far more tolerable than it had been, but the bosom of 
the Christian and Philanthropist dilated with increasing hope that the time was fast 
approaching, when by the resistless force of public opinion, operating through 
colonization societies, and with the assent of their present owners, they would be released 
from thralldom, and returned moral and religious, to their own benighted land.” 
Essentially, their position rested on the conviction that abolitionism was impractical, 
inherently violent, and destructive to more expedient antislavery efforts. In their opinion, 
colonization constituted a far better alternative. Colonization “violated no public law, 
outraged no private right, appealed to no vulgar prejudice, excited no angry and 
malicious feelings.” The colonizationists had begun slowly and silently, “winning their 
way upon public opinion.” All the benefits colonization could have granted to slaves and 
slaveholders, black men and white men, North and South, they believed, had evaporated 
with the steady onset of abolitionism. 
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From the Illinois point of view, abolitionist societies were to be denounced not 
because they might destroy slavery, but because their radicalism turned so many others 
against the antislavery movement. This only “forged new irons for the black man” and 
“scattered the fire brands of discord and disunion among the different states of the 
confederacy.” Rather than achieving their publicly stated intentions of freeing the slaves 
and ridding the nation of its sectional cancer, abolitionists “aroused the turbulent passions 
of the monster mob.” They “have pertinaciously insisted on doctrines which if reduced to 
practice would deluge our common country in blood, rend the Union asunder, and bring 
desolation upon all that was won by the valor and hallowed by the blood of our 
fathers.”27 Illinois’s proposed solution to the problem of abolitionism drew a clear 
distinction between the Northwest and the South. Though depicting themselves equally 
opposed to abolitionism, the committee members soundly rejected the proposition that 
laws should be erected to punish abolitionist activities. The best “corrective of these 
opinions” should not be sought in new laws but “at the bar of public opinion.” They 
confidently explained “that an overwhelming majority of our fellow citizens would spurn 
indignantly” radical abolitionist doctrines and, inspired by their “deep regard and 
affection for our brethren of the South,” would uphold the U.S. Constitution. Though 
Illinois would remain ever ready to “fly to their assistance” in times of trouble, “they 
deem a decided expression of public opinion all that is at this time demanded.” 
Considering legislative action against abolitionism both unnecessary and imprudent, the 
Illinois committee pledged its support for the southern state legislators but made no effort 
to legally restrict abolitionists’ rights.28 
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28 Ibid., 243. 
107	  
	  
	  
The committee offered resolutions for consideration that reflected these assertions 
and also included an additional proposal: “That the General Government cannot abolish 
slavery in the District of Columbia, against the consent of the citizens of said District 
without a manifest breach of good faith.” When this particular resolution was discussed 
and an amendment proposed, Lincoln moved to amend the amendment, and add: 
“’Unless the people of the said District petition for the same.’” Though his adjustment 
reflected the wording of Alabama’s resolution, the House ultimately decided against 
Lincoln’s amendment and chose not to qualify their assertion that Congress simply did 
not have the power to legislate on slavery in the District of Columbia. Only the residents 
of that district, these northwesterners implied, held that power.29 
After the Illinois House had decided to pass this set of resolutions by a vote of 
seventy-seven to six, Lincoln, who had voted against, filed a protest with fellow Whig 
representative of Sangamon County, Dan Stone. In their brief statement, Stone and 
Lincoln agreed with their fellow Illinoisans that “the promulgation of abolition doctrines 
tends rather to increase than to abate its evils.” They also unequivocally accepted “that 
the Congress of the United States has no power, under the constitution, to interfere with 
the institution of slavery in the different States.” Where Stone and Lincoln differed from 
the rest of the House, however, was in their insistence that the institution of slavery, 
itself, be denounced as “founded on both injustice and bad policy” and in their assertion 
that “the Congress of the United States has the power, under the constitution, to abolish 
slavery in the District of Columbia,” if done so “at the request of the people of said 
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District.”30 Though Lincoln’s stand very briefly and pointedly explicated a relatively 
minor difference of opinion between him and his colleagues, this short statement became 
of some importance to him by 1860, when as the Republican presidential nominee he 
pointed to his protest as the clearest definition of his views on slavery.31 
This clearly delineated difference between Lincoln and the vast majority of 
Illinois representatives reveals his position within central Illinoisan political culture. Like 
his fellow southern-born migrants and in common with many of the northern-born as 
well, Lincoln despised abolitionism as a misguided method of resolving the slavery issue. 
He also clearly respected the rights of southern states to determine the future of slavery 
within their borders, without outside interference. These two beliefs resided at the heart 
of central Illinoisan culture dominated by southern-born migrants in the 1830s. However, 
Lincoln’s adamant stand against slavery, though he may have thought it in perfect accord 
with the public position of his political idol Henry Clay, went too far for most of his 
neighbors who had left behind family and friends in the South. Most families retained 
southern connections, whether through written communication or simply cognizance that 
loved ones stayed behind. Yet all the family Lincoln really knew resided in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 CW, I: 74–75; also in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Tenth General Assembly of the State 
of Illinois, 817–18. 
31 Lincoln’s vote and protest are frequently referred to as evidence that Lincoln had always, or at least very 
early in his political career, evinced a moral antipathy to slavery. Simon, Freedom’s Champion, 72. 
Kenneth J. Winkle perceives Lincoln’s autobiographical statement as evidence that the Illinoisans’ views 
on slavery underwent no significant transformation from 1831 to 1860. “Thirty-five years later, Lincoln 
was still trying to steer a path between the rock of slavery on one side and the shoal of abolitionism on the 
other.” Most scholars agree. Winkle, Young Eagle, 257–58; Burton, Age of Lincoln, 113. Many scholars 
agree. Foner distinguishes between Lincoln’s personal feelings on slavery and his formation of an 
antislavery ideology, arguing that the first remained constant, while the second evolved over time. Foner, 
Fiery Trial, 62. “Always opposed in principle to the institution of slavery, he had not hitherto enlisted 
actively in the crusade against it.” Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 23. Until Kansas-Nebraska, he remained unwilling to 
“break a lifelong habit of near silence on the slavery issue.” James Oakes, The Radical and the Republican: 
Frederick Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics (New York and London: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 2007), 53.  
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Northwest, until his marriage to Mary Todd endowed him with a set of southern in-laws. 
Lincoln understood the sentiments of these fellow southerners regarding slavery. As his 
colleague Cyrus Edwards, who served in the Illinois state Senate, wrote to fellow 
Illinoisan Joseph Gillespie in 1835 during a trip back to Kentucky: “’The small farmers 
are all bought out and have wisely sought an asylum among our rich [Illinois] prairies,’ 
while the aristocrats “‘enjoy a monopoly of those thousands of acres, which creates a 
wilderness around them.’” These opinions surrounding Lincoln in Illinois convinced him 
that slavery was not just founded on “injustice” to blacks but “injustice and bad policy” 
pertaining to whites, as well.32 
Despite this comity of feeling between Lincoln and his fellow southern-born 
migrants, the young representative’s insistence upon proclaiming slavery a moral wrong, 
and his conviction that Congress did have the power to eliminate slavery in the District of 
Columbia, differentiated him from many northwesterners’ vehement attachment to the 
principles of popular sovereignty—a sentiment they had exhibited from the very 
beginning of Illinois statehood. From Lincoln’s perspective, then, very little distinguished 
the conciliatory resolutions of the Illinois legislature, which refused either to 
acknowledge this congressional power or to engage in any moral condemnation of 
slavery, from those issued by the southern states of Alabama, Virginia, Mississippi, and 
also Kentucky. As a young migrant representative whose employment had familiarized 
him with both southern- and northern-born migrants, Lincoln believed he understood 
both. He surely understood the sentiments of one Illinoisan, who explained in 1837 that 
due to the existence of slavery in Kentucky and Tennessee, “‘the white non-slaveholding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Cyrus Edwards to Joseph Gillespie, April 14, 1835, Joseph Gillespie Papers, found in Miller, Lincoln and 
His World, 144. 
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portion of the community are leaving there for a residence in this beautiful state….The 
poorest of those hands can obtain here 75 cents for a day’s labor, with board and lodging; 
while in their own states no more than 31 ¼ cents can be got for the best of hands. This I 
have stated to show the evils resulting to the white portion of society by employing slaves 
to do the work of freemen.’” Whether or not Lincoln read these statements by William 
Smith published in the Alton Observer of February 2, 1837, he certainly heard similar 
opinions voiced by his neighbors.33 Above all, nothing in the southern resolutions gave 
Lincoln great pause. Their concerns appeared similar to those of migrants in his own 
state, and the differences between the two were not so great as to cause him to believe the 
South constituted a different society from the North. He most likely believed the demand 
of southern legislators for penal laws against abolitionism sprung from their own 
misunderstanding of northwestern society, or their faulty categorical placement of Illinois 
with northeastern states like New York or Massachusetts.  
From 1838 to 1839, another slave-related issue emerged in the General Assembly 
that required the attention of its legislators. On October 18, 1837, Kentucky Governor 
James Clark wrote a letter to Illinois Governor Joseph Duncan, with which he enclosed a 
preamble and resolution adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly. Clark explained 
that the contents of the resolution centered on the problem of fugitive slaves. Recognizing 
that the “misguided philanthropy” of some Illinoisans, as well as Ohioans and Indianans, 
had led them to hide and protect fugitive slaves who escaped from Kentucky, the 
members of the legislature passed a resolution requesting that Illinois adopt some 
measure to halt the practice. In explanation of this particular request to Illinois, Clark 
emphasized the “amicable intercourse and comity of feeling that now exists between the 
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States of Illinois and Kentucky.”34 The issue of escaping fugitive slaves pervaded the 
South during this period. In the Eleventh General Assembly of Illinois’s first session in 
1838–39, the committee on the Judiciary proposed a set of resolutions pertaining to 
fugitive slaves. The committee had been given the responsibility of responding to a 
communication the governor of Georgia had issued to Illinois and other free states. When 
the governor of Maine refused to deliver to Georgia two Maine citizens accused of 
assisting in the freeing of a Savannah slave, the Georgia governor sought support from 
Illinois and other free stats against Maine for their governor’s inaction.35 
 The Illinois committee responded first by “express[ing] a deep regret that any 
attempt should ever be made on the part of the citizens of the free States to interfere, in 
any manner whatever, with the rights of the citizens of the slaveholding States.” They 
considered the act of holding slaves “a constitutional privilege” and castigated 
abolitionism as a dangerous and self-defeating movement. Nevertheless, they refused to 
condemn the governor of Maine “until the Executive of that State should have an 
opportunity to explain the course which he has seen cause to pursue.” The Illinoisans 
then recommended two resolutions. The first pertained specifically to fugitive slaves, 
declaring “the refusal of the Executive of an State to deliver up…any person who may be 
charged with the commission of a crime” in another state as “dangerous to the rights of 
the people of the United States” and “clearly and directly in violation of the plain letter of 
the Constitution.” The second resolution more generally addressed the relationship 
between free and slave states. Here, the Illinois committee reiterated the General 
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Archives. 
35 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois 
(Vandalia, Ill.: William Walters, 1838), 62. 
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Assembly’s previous assertion that “a free State or its citizens ought not to interfere with 
the property of slaveholding States; which property has been guarantied [sic] unto them 
by the Constitution of the United States, and without which guaranty, this Union, 
perhaps, would never have been formed.”36 
Ultimately, consideration of the report and resolutions was postponed.37 
Nevertheless, the incident informed Lincoln that slave states needed assurances from free 
states that their rights would not be trampled upon by their northern neighbors. As 
legislators in a northwestern state, the Illinois General Assembly frequently had to uphold 
a middle ground, protecting antislavery doctrines within the state without imposing 
doctrines upon southerners or condemning them for the persistence of the slave system. 
Illinois navigated that middle ground by, unlike the national legislature, refusing to limit 
the freedom of petition to those who opposed slavery.38 While the U.S. House instituted a 
“gag rule” in May 1836 to stifle discussion of the slavery issue in the national legislature, 
the state of Illinois explicitly rejected such limitations on the right to free speech.39 On 
the contrary, when the Illinois Senate asked the House for its approval of a resolution 
“requiring the Engrossing Clerks of the Senate and House, respectively, to make out 
copies of memorials and resolutions, to be transmitted to Congress,” Democrat John 
Calhoun, a New England migrant who Lincoln frequently debated in central Illinois, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 170–
71. 
37 The Journal of the House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois 
reports only that representative Webb of White County motioned to postpone discussion, and the motion 
was agreed to. The Vandalia Free Press of January 10, 1839, however, reports that Lincoln had also made 
a motion to indefinitely postpone consideration of the resolutions. Journal of the House of Representatives 
of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 171, and CW, I: 126. 
38 Miller, Lincoln and His World, 269, casts Calhoun’s first resolution as a deliberate measure against the 
Slave Power and its “gag rule” in U.S. Congress. 
39 The U.S. House voted 117–68 to automatically table each antislavery petition the House received. As 
Freehling explains, the measure passed “because most Northern Democrats voted with the South.” William 
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offered an amendment to the Senate that epitomized the sentiments of many Illinoisans 
on the issue of slavery and freedom of expression. Calhoun proposed inserting a 
resolution asserting “the right of the citizens to petition the Legislature for the redress of 
any grievance, or the correction of any wrong,” and “the imperative duty of the 
Legislature to receive, to listen to, and act upon any such petition.” He also carefully 
qualified this declaration with a firm reminder that the U.S. Congress had no right to 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia or in U.S. Territories. Such action would 
amount to “an invasion of the rights of the States, and an infraction of the federal 
compact.” Calhoun’s amendment was tabled, then voted down when the Illinois House 
bundled together all but one of the amendments proposed by various House members, 
and voted on them together.40  
The House journal for the 11th General Assembly reports, later in the session, the 
passage of a similar resolution pertaining to slavery in Washington D.C., which was 
unanimously adopted: “That a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia would 
be inexpedient and unwise.” Originally, Mr. Edwards had included the clause “and 
unconstitutional” in this resolution, but Mr. Dubois amended it to exclude this assertion 
that Congress’s power to abolish slavery was actually constitutional—a controversial 
statement with which many disagreed. Thus, by merely stating that it should not be done, 
rather than saying it could not be done, the resolution gained the unanimous approval of 
all the representatives.41 The unanimous adoption of this resolution displays the 
moderation that dominated northwestern culture. In a state (and a legislature) comprised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ultimately, the House passed the Senate bill with no additional amendments or changes. Journal of the 
House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 334. 
41 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Eleventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 322–
23, 329, 485; Winkle, Young Eagle, 113.  
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of southern-born and northern-born migrants with quite different experiences and 
opinions on slavery, settlers united around the conviction that although slavery may be 
wrong, abolitionism—a virulent and dangerous form of radicalism—was worse. John 
Mason Peck, an American Bible Society agent from Connecticut with whom Lincoln 
later corresponded, became widely known in central Illinois for his moderate antislavery 
principles. Though uncompromisingly antislavery in his personal feelings, Peck 
encouraged in 1839 the continued participation of slaveholders in the church so long as 
they “profess decided opposition to slavery in principle & profess to be desirous to 
emancipate their servants” in the future. Peck justified this rather liberal antislavery 
policy under “Tarrant’s Rules,” a set of guidelines constructed in 1807 for the 
perpetuation of antislavery churches. The Rules specifically stated that churches should 
not admit slaveholders, but also made a series of exceptions, including “some other cases, 
which we would wish the churches to be at liberty to judge of agreeably to the principles 
of humanity.”42 
 From his experiences in the state legislature, Lincoln gained crucial exposure to 
the sentiments of the South and of his adopted state of Illinois regarding slavery. 
However, Lincoln’s own opinions on slavery, as well as his perception of geographically 
varying opinions on the institution, were not shaped merely by his General Assembly 
experiences. In Fall 1837 the slavery-related mob violence that had spurred southern 
legislatures to contact their northern neighbors erupted in Illinois. Two incidents—one 
locally significant, the other nationally infamous—rocked the state.  In October 1837 
Presbyterian minister Josiah Porter, a native of South Carolina whose parents had brought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 J. M. Peck to E. Rodgers, May 25, 1839, Box 1, Folder 11, Church History Documents Collection, UC; 
Rev. John M. Peck, “Brief View of the Baptist Interest in Each of the United States,” The American 
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him to Kentucky before he settled in Illinois, announced that he would give a speech on 
slavery in Springfield. On the appointed day a mob gathered to oppose his “abolitionist” 
statements, interrupting his plans. Following the incident, Springfield residents gathered 
in a public meeting and passed a series of resolutions condemning the activities of 
abolitionists. They stated that abolitionist efforts were “neither necessary [n]or useful” 
and explained that “as citizens of a free State and a peaceable community, we deprecate 
any attempt to sow discord among us, or to create an excitement as to abolition which can 
be productive of no good result.” Further resolutions declared that “the doctrine of 
immediate emancipation of slaves in this country…is at variance with Christianity, and 
its tendency is to breed contention, broils, and mobs.” Those “calling themselves 
abolitionists, are designing, ambitious men, and dangerous members of society, and 
should be shunned by all good citizens.”43 Springfield’s anti-abolitionist protest, aside 
from its focus on Christianity, largely reflected Abraham Lincoln’s personal views as 
stated in his protest against the Illinois General Assembly resolutions. Meanwhile, 
another incident, which influenced the course of abolitionism in Illinois for years 
thereafter, provoked Lincoln to castigate those who carried anti-abolitionism too far. On 
November 5, 1837, antislavery editor Elijah Lovejoy was killed by an anti-abolitionist 
mob in Alton, a mere 22 miles east of St. Louis, Missouri. A former resident of St. Louis, 
Lovejoy had moved across the Mississippi River into neighboring Illinois to continue 
editing his newspaper, the Observer, after a mob had destroyed his press and office 
possessions.44 
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 After shifting his operations, however, “some men, reportedly from across the 
river in Missouri,” again annihilated his printing press and threw it in the river.45 In 
response to Alton residents’ concerns that he would both disturb the peace and give the 
town a bad reputation, Lovejoy publicly addressed his new neighbors and vowed that he 
was opposed to slavery but did not support abolitionism. To the contrary, Lovejoy 
claimed that he had “repeatedly denounced” abolitionists in the past and had in turn been 
“denounced by Garrison and others, as being in favor of slavery, because he was 
unwilling to go with the abolitionists in favor of all their measures.” His Alton paper, he 
promised, would not promote abolitionist doctrines, since he felt himself “less called 
upon to discuss the subject than when I was in St. Louis,” and he did not expect to 
highlight those issues in his new paper.46 
Over the next year, however, Lovejoy’s support eroded as his newspaper’s 
antislavery stance evolved into full-fledged abolitionism. He denounced colonization and 
other moderate avenues of resolving the slavery issue while gradually embracing the 
uncompromising stance of immediate emancipation. When residents voiced their concern 
that Lovejoy had broken his promise to them, he explained that “he could not bow to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
College and brought two of the students before a Lynch Court. For this, his press and types were destroyed, 
and he established himself on the opposite side of the river, in the free State of Illinois.” 
45 Many of Alton’s citizens “expressed outrage at the destruction of Lovejoy’s equipment” because Alton 
had long enjoyed a “reputation of being a law-abiding city,” and they feared it would longer be considered 
as such. Simon, Freedom’s Champion, 57, 63. Robert M. Sutton, “Illinois’ Year of Decision, 1837,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 58 (Spring 1965), 46, also states the press had been 
destroyed “presumably by a St. Louis gang.” If St. Louis residents were indeed responsible for this 
incident, then the Illinois community’s ire is more understandable. 
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he was now removed from slavery….being removed from the evil, he would have no cause to express 
[antislavery opinions]….it would look like cowardice to flee from the place where the evil existed, and 
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a State in 1818 to 1847 (Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Co., 1854), 234–35; Merton L. Dillon, Elijah P. 
Lovejoy, Abolitionist Editor (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 91; Joseph C. and 
Owen Lovejoy, Memoir of the Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy; Who was Murdered in Defence of the Liberty of the 
Press, at Alton, Illinois, Nov. 7, 1837 (New York: John S. Taylor, 1838), 221. 
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their wishes without admitting the death of liberty of the press and freedom of speech.” 
Following this open embrace of immediate emancipation, Alton residents determined to 
halt Lovejoy’s radical activities. On August 21 his press was destroyed once again, and 
much of the support he had enjoyed from moderates evaporated. An additional press he 
ordered in September 1837 was immediately wrecked. The next, and last, printing press 
arrived on November 6, 1837. This time, Lovejoy had prepared to defend his machinery 
by positioning thirty friends in and around the warehouse in which the press had been 
placed. When a mob gathered to try and destroy Lovejoy’s press yet again, they set the 
warehouse on fire, forcing him and his cohorts outside. When Lovejoy emerged from 
around the corner of the warehouse, pistol in hand, he was shot in the chest and mortally 
wounded.47 
Lovejoy’s activities in Alton and his killing in late 1837 marked a crucial turning 
point in the development of the Illinois antislavery movement. Besides running the 
Observer, Lovejoy had coordinated a convention in late October to discuss the formation 
of a statewide anti-slavery society. Meeting at the house of Thaddeus B. Hurlbut, the 
group adopted a set of very exclusive resolutions that countered the alternate, moderate 
colonization movement that remained popular throughout the state. As fellow Illinois 
abolitionist Edward Beecher explained, “all offers of compromise and co-operation” with 
colonizationists and antislavery moderates “were fruitless. Those who were satisfied with 
the plans of the Colonization Society as the only effectual means of removing slavery, 
would of course reject our views entirely, and pronounce all discussion of the subject of 
immediate emancipation useless.” Upholding their principles against slavery and refusing 
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any measure of compromise, the group adopted a declaration “that the system of slavery 
is in all cases sinful; and that it is safe and a duty for the slaveholding states immediately 
to abolish it; and to replace it by wise and equitable laws, adapted to the emancipated.” 
While Beecher claimed he never bore unkind feelings toward the colonization society, he 
admitted he “never had the slightest faith in it as a means of removing slavery.” Thus, 
Lovejoy, Beecher, and their cohorts worked to create a statewide abolitionist society that 
stood far outside the mainstream of Illinois political culture.48 
Moderates—including colonizationists—at first responded to Lovejoy’s 
abolitionist activities by attempting to compromise with the abolitionists or convince 
them to accept moderate doctrines. Fervent antislavery Illinoisans like John Mason Peck, 
editor of the Western Pioneer, and Rev. John Hogan, to whom moderates turned in 
October 1837 with the plea that he compromise with Lovejoy, sought to placate the rising 
tide against abolitionism in Alton as well as channel Lovejoy’s activities into what they 
deemed more fruitful endeavors. The early historian Thomas Ford alleges that Hogan and 
Benjamin Godfrey, a leading Presbyterian, “had seen the effect of abolitionism in the 
slave States, where, instead of breaking the fetters of the slave, it had increased their 
strength and severity.”49 New Englander John Peck actively promoted the colonization 
society as a method of addressing the slavery issue without lapsing into radical 
abolitionism. A Western Pioneer article published on October 27, 1837 stated: “The 
Pioneer hoped that the meeting of the colonization society, the invariable counter-irritant 
to abolition, might set things on the right path even though ‘a very few restless spirits will 
be disappointed, vexed, mortified, and may struggle for a little time to enjoy notoriety.’” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Edward Beecher, Narrative of Riots at Alton: In Connection with the Death of Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy 
(Alton: George Holton, 1838), 35, 38, 41; Ford, History of Illinois, 288. 
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Echoing the sentiments of the Illinois legislature, the Pioneer asserted that “‘the 
benevolent and real friends to humanity will co-operate to benefit the oppressed in a way 
consistent with the peace of our Union and the happiness and rights of all concerned.’” 
When Rev. Hogan could reach no agreement with Lovejoy, he informed the abolitionist 
that they could not protect him from mob action if he continued to renounce moderation 
in favor of more radical principles.50 
Despite the acceptance of moderate antislavery principles in and around Alton, 
Lovejoy and his fellow abolitionists became more committed to controversial abolitionist 
principles and less willing to entertain any sort of compromise in founding a statewide 
society against slavery. Very soon after Lovejoy’s death in November, abolitionists 
seized the opportunity to declare him a martyr to the abolitionist cause. Harriet Martineau 
admitted in 1839 that they had always recognized the potential of such an unfortunate 
event. “Dr. [William Ellery] Channing had said, a year before this,” she pointed out, that 
‘One kidnapped, murdered abolitionist would do more for the violent destruction of 
slavery than a thousand societies. His name would be sainted.’” After Lovejoy’s death, 
she proclaimed, “These latter clauses have come true.” Elijah’s brothers Joseph C. and 
Owen Lovejoy, meanwhile, immediately released a nearly four-hundred-page biography 
of “Elijah P. Lovejoy, Who was Murdered in Defence of the Liberty of the Press.” In this 
apotheosis of their fallen brother, they cast martyrdom as “the ordeal through which all 
great improvements in the condition of men, are doomed to pass.”51 
 Newspapers across the U.S. reported the incident at Alton. Widespread 
condemnation of the Lovejoy murder spread, “mass meetings were held, sermons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Western Pioneer, October 27, 1837, in Theodore Calvin Pease, The Frontier State: 1818-1848 (Chicago: 
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preached, lectures given.”52 Though little evidence exists to pinpoint this event as a 
particularly transformative one for Lincoln, it certainly altered the direction of Illinois 
politics, boosting the antislavery effort and transforming the lives of men who, like 
William Herndon, would become Lincoln’s close friends and political associates in later 
years. One of these was Lyman Trumbull, who considered Lovejoy’s death a turning 
point in his antislavery convictions and wrote his father from Illinois College in 
Jacksonville. Though “opposed to the immediate emancipation of the slaves and to the 
doctrine of Abolitionism,” he assured his father, “yet had I been in Alton, I would have 
cheerfully marched to the rescue of Mr. Lovejoy and his property.” Antislavery societies 
spread more rapidly across the state, and Lovejoy supporters quickly determined to 
establish another press.53 J. W. Buchanan, a resident of Carlinville, Illinois, corresponded 
with Thaddeus B. Hurlbut, the minister who had provided his home for the establishment 
of Lovejoy’s abolitionist organization, about reinstating the Observer. The separation 
between antislavery and abolitionist Illinoisans made this difficult. Buchanan argued that 
the new Observer should be managed by abolitionists committed to the principles of 
immediate emancipation—not by the multitude who upheld abolitionists’ right to free 
speech and hated slavery but denounced abolitionist principles and methods. While 
Buchanan felt not “the slightest degree of ill-nature towards those men for their 
difference of opinion,” he nevertheless believed the press should not be run by those 
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“incapable of appreciating the importance of the [abolitionist] cause, or of exercising a 
due amount of sympathy for those engaged in it.”54	  
 In fall of 1838 Illinois antislavery activists finally decided that, rather than 
position a press back in Alton, they would endorse the re-establishment of Benjamin 
Lundy’s abolitionist paper, the Genius of Universal Emancipation, in Hennepin, Illinois. 
Erastus Wright, a Springfield abolitionist committed to organizing antislavery forces in 
Illinois, explained Lundy’s unparalleled experience in the industry, publishing his paper 
for a total of nearly seventeen years in various states of the Union, including Ohio, 
Tennessee, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. A December 1838 proposal to assist Lundy in 
resuming his press in Illinois detailed the abolitionist history of the paper and Lundy’s 
intention that its message should not make any changes. “[I]ts principal design has ever 
been, and will continue to be,” he asserted, “the advocacy of Free Discussion; the 
TOTAL ABOLITION OF SLAVERY; and the firm establishment of the constitutional, 
inalienable, and ‘universal’ rights of man. These objects are sought to be accomplished 
by the promulgation of facts and arguments—by moral suasion—by appeals to the 
reason, justice, and reflection, of the people and their representatives.”55 The incident 
sparked abolitionist and antislavery movements in Illinois. However, it also prompted 
many to turn away from individuals or organizations that vocally denounced slavery. 
Many viewed Lovejoy’s quick evolution from antislavery activism to abolitionism as an 
intentional, calculated attempt to placate his new neighbors. His initial pledge to them 
appeared no more than a ploy designed to gain a foothold in Alton, rather than a sincere 
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promise to the community. Therefore, while on the one hand Lovejoy’s death boosted 
support for the cause against slavery, it also imbued many with an intense distrust of any 
one who vocally opposed slavery but claimed to be a moderate. By 1850 many 
Democrats turned this wariness of abolitionism into a political tactic, charging that their 
opponents “cared more for ‘bestial blacks,’ mere ‘human brutes,’ than for the noble white 
race.”56  
 Lovejoy’s murder resulted in no legal repercussions on either side, since both the 
mob and the warehouse defenders were acquitted for their roles on that fateful night. 
Nevertheless, the force of his death rippled across Illinois.57 In a broad sense Lincoln 
responded to these momentous events, relating them to the discussions and resolutions he 
encountered as a member of the Illinois General Assembly. In his January 27, 1838, 
address “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions” to the Young Men’s Lyceum in 
Springfield, Lincoln displayed a keen awareness of America’s international role as a 
republic founded upon principles of “civil and religious liberty” and “equal rights.” 
Speaking to a group of educated young men, he explained that the greatest danger to the 
republic would not come from foreign nations but rather would “spring up amongst us.” 
Above all, Lincoln decried “the increasing disregard for law which pervades the 
country,” particularly “the worse than savage mobs.” He did not, however, rest his 
assertions on the incidence of mob violence against abolitionists or African Americans, 
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alone. Instead, he claimed that mobs “have pervaded the country, from New England to 
Louisiana;--they are neither peculiar to the eternal snows of the former, nor the burning 
suns of the latter;--they are not the creature of climate—neither are they confined to the 
slaveholding, or the non-slaveholding States. Alike, they spring up among the pleasure 
hunting masters of Southern slaves, and the order loving citizens of the land of steady 
habits.” He provided a few specific examples of such cases of mob violence: the state of 
Mississippi’s lynching of gamblers and of black and white men suspected of insurrection, 
and the burning to death of a free mulatto man in St. Louis.  
 Lincoln held up these examples as evidence that mob law resulted in uninhibited 
violence, and that violence often did not stop at the punishment of those who had done 
wrong. Too often “the innocent, those who have ever set their faces against violations of 
law in every shape…fall victims to the ravages of mob law.” The tragedies wrought by 
mobs, he argued, extended even further. Government, itself, often became a casualty of 
mob violence. The examples provided by mob perpetrators, who were often left 
unpunished after committing acts of murder, encouraged others “to become lawless in 
practice.” Those who followed the letter and spirit of the law, meanwhile, “become tired 
of, and disgusted with, a Government that offers them no protection.” Referring to 
Lovejoy’s death in Alton months before, Lincoln issued a strong warning that “whenever 
the vicious portion of population shall be permitted to gather in bands of hundreds and 
thousands, and burn churches, ravage and rob provision stores, throw printing presses 
into rivers, shoot editors, and hang and burn obnoxious persons at pleasure, and with 
impunity; depend on it, this Government cannot last.” As disruptive as abolitionism 
might prove to the community, in no instance does it ever legitimate mob action. Either 
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abolitionism “is right within itself,” or it “is wrong, and therefore proper to be prohibited 
by legal enactments,” but never by the unlawful actions of a body of angry citizens. 
Lincoln then implicitly denounced both abolitionists and radical proslavery southerners, 
who prized their principles over and above the law: “Towering genius,” explained, 
“disdains a beaten path; it “thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have 
it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.” When such men 
of genius and ambition rise to power in America, he urged, the people, driven by their 
attachment to the Constitution and to the principles of the American republic, must be 
ready to defeat them.58 
Lincoln’s responses to the southern state legislature memorials and to Lovejoy’s 
murder displayed a northwestern adherence to moderation on the slavery issue, though 
his moral repugnance for slavery separated him from many migrants, and most southern-
born settlers, to Illinois. In 1838 Lincoln’s sense of the dangers posed by the South’s 
attachment to slavery stemmed largely from his exposure to the opinions of southern 
migrants in Illinois, to the statements of southern legislatures, and to the proposals of his 
Illinois colleagues. He also, however, had accumulated a very small set of direct 
experiences that clearly affected him and his views of the slavery problem before he 
arrived in the U.S. Congress. He acquired these experiences during his two flatboat trips 
to New Orleans in 1828 and 1831, when he visited Joshua Fry Speed’s family’s 
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Kentucky plantation in August 1841, and, consequent to marrying, while spending time 
with Mary Lincoln’s family in Lexington. These events continued to inform his opinions 
on slavery and the South through 1860, when as a presidential candidate he recounted a 
particular incident from his travels. Lincoln explained that he took his first trip at the age 
of nineteen, before he had moved from Indiana to Illinois, as the hired helper of a 
storeowner’s son, who needed to transport goods down to New Orleans. “The nature of 
part of the cargo-load,” Lincoln explicated, “made it necessary for them to linger and 
trade along the Sugar coast…and one night they were attacked by seven negroes with 
intent to kill and rob them. They were hurt some in the melee, but succeeded in driving 
the negroes from the boat, and then ‘cut cable’ ‘weighed anchor’ and left.”  By 
simply retelling this incident, rather than utilizing it to make inferences regarding African 
Americans, poor whites, slaves, or slavery, Lincoln simply recreated a scene he imagined 
white southern-born northwesterners and white southerners could relate to. The 
exigencies of circumstances in 1860 make it difficult to determine what this incident 
meant for Lincoln when it actually occurred. However, it does indicate that although 
Lincoln saw very little of slavery, he paid close attention to, and took very seriously, 
those events and instances when slavery confronted him. New Orleans, and the 
settlements along the Mississippi River that Lincoln must have witnessed along his two 
journeys, exposed him to plantation slavery, slave trading, and the hunting down of 
fugitive slaves.59 As Richard Campanella notes, these flatboat journeys down the 
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Mississippi River significantly opened a window onto Deep South slave society that 
Lincoln had not before accessed. While in “Lincoln’s public autobiographical notes, the 
attack, and not slavery or slave trading, formed the single most salient recollection of 
both his Louisiana voyages,” his exposure to the various aspects of slave society in the 
plantation South certainly imbedded him with a deep sense of slavery in its most active or 
virulent form. Confronted for the first time with a society that revolved around slavery, 
Lincoln may have understood why so many southern non-slaveholders flocked to 
Illinois.60  
Following these two journeys down the Mississippi River, Lincoln took trips to 
Kentucky in the 1840s to stay with Joshua Speed near Louisville, and with his wife’s 
family near Lexington. While these powerful experiences certainly shaped Lincoln’s 
opinions on slavery, their impact was conditioned and directed, in large part, by the idea 
of the South he had formed while living and working among southern-born settlers in 
Illinois. Lincoln’s firsthand encounters with slavery certainly left a deep impression upon 
him and fostered his early resolve that he was opposed to slavery. Yet, that resolution 
“was not born of the minute,” from a single incident or set of brief encounters with the 
institution in the South. Rather, it was shaped by “these communities of southern Indiana 
and central Illinois where Lincoln had developed in a society freed from chattel slavery 
and had a chance to form his own ideas of human labor and the full freedom of wage 
contract.”61 
Though a slave state, Kentucky slavery differed greatly from that of the plantation 
slavery Lincoln witness in New Orleans during the 1830s. On average, slaveholders in 
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Kentucky held far fewer slaves than slaveholders in the Deep South. The colonization 
movement’s strongest foothold rested in this border state, and an 1833 Nonimportation 
Act “prohibited the importation of slaves for sale within the state.”62 Lincoln’s wife, and 
his best friend, had both grown up in this society, raised by families that owned slaves. 
Lincoln left no record of his impressions of Kentucky slaveholding society following this 
visit to his in-laws. He did, however, remark upon a specific incident that occurred during 
his return from Kentucky with Joshua Speed in 1841. In a letter to Joshua Speed’s sister 
Mary Speed, written on Sept. 27, 1841, Lincoln related that on their boat ride to St. 
Louis, they saw a slave trader transporting twelve African American slaves from 
Kentucky “to a farm in the South.…the negroes were strung together precisely like so 
many fish upon a trot-line.” Lincoln pondered at slavery’s destructive force in the lives of 
the enslaved, noting that these people “were being separated forever from the scenes of 
their childhood, their friends, their fathers and mothers, and brothers and sisters, and 
many of them, from their wives and children, and going into perpetual slavery where the 
lash of the master is proverbially more ruthless and unrelenting than any other where.” 
He was thus surprised to find these enslaved people “were the most cheerful and 
apparantly happy creatures on board. One, whose offence for which he had been sold was 
an over-fondness for his wife, played the fiddle almost continually; and the others 
danced, sung, cracked jokes, and played various games with cards from day to day.” 
Wondering at God’s power to make “the worst of human conditions tolerable,” he 
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considered the episode “a fine example…for contemplating the effect of condition upon 
human happiness.” As Eric Foner notes, Lincoln’s reaction to this direct encounter with 
slavery and the slave trade did not reflect the views of an abolitionist, or even one whose 
moral antipathy to the institution would compel him to act against it with any force.63 
When Lincoln defeated Peter Cartwright to become the next congressman from 
the Springfield area, he spent three or four weeks in Lexington with his in-laws before 
continuing his eastward journey to Washington, D.C. After growing up in a household 
worked by slaves, Mary Lincoln was accustomed to the idea that African Americans were 
owned by her family, and worked as servants for her, her siblings, parents, and guests. 
Mary’s father, Robert Todd, though he never freed his slaves, exhibited the type of 
political moderation on slavery that Lincoln supported and expected from many 
southerners. Robert Todd was serving in the Kentucky senate in Fall 1847, when the 
Lincolns visited them in Lexington before moving on to Washington, D.C. As a gradual 
emancipationist Whig, Todd rebuked all attempts to allow the importation of slaves into 
the state of Kentucky and supported colonization as a means to rid the South of slavery.64 
	   These opinions aligned well with Lincoln’s own conviction that slavery was both 
immoral and dangerous to the Union but should not be attacked with abolitionism or any 
species of radicalism. During his nearly three-week stay with the Todds, he experienced 
slavery within a household for the second time. He also must have read of runaways and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 CW, I: 259–61. Eric Foner points to Lincoln’s 1855 letter to Speed, in which he retold this experience 
with greater emphasis on the moral dilemma it posed, as proof that Lincoln’s feelings on the subject of 
slavery had changed by the mid-1850s. Foner, Fiery Trial, 11–12. 
64 Nat Turner’s insurrection had spurred Kentucky to pass a non-importation act “to ban slave imports in an 
effort to prevent itself from becoming substantially blacker.” Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us from Evil: The 
Slavery Question in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 359; Winkle, Young Eagle, 
228; Stephen Berry, House of Abraham: Lincoln and the Todds, A Family Divided by War (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007), 40-41; Robert S. Todd to Ninian Edwards, July 12, 1841, Robert S. 
Todd Papers, ALPL. 
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slave auctions in the city’s newspapers and perhaps witnessed such events take place. Yet 
from this stay, previous visits, and the remarks of Kentucky-born Illinoisans, Lincoln also 
developed a much more enhanced sense of the politics of slavery in Kentucky than in any 
other slave state of the Union. He knew of the widespread devotion toward Henry Clay 
and, thereby, to moderation on the slavery issue. Lexington epitomized moderate 
antislavery politics in the 1840s. Those who were antislavery were free to speak about the 
issue, while proslavery or moderate Lexingtonians carefully denounced the harsh 
treatment of slaves, slave trading, and other abuses often produced by the system.65 This 
congressman-elect from Illinois thereby re-engaged with the state of his birth after an 
extended period of living and working in Illinois. There is also a chance that Lincoln had 
the opportunity to meet Henry Clay during this interlude just prior to a single-term 
congressional career. By their mutual attachment to Clay and the Whig Party, the bonds 
of affection between Lincoln and Mary Todd had been fostered, if not initiated.66 
Despite his modest resumé as a self-educated, self-improved first-term 
congressman, Lincoln may have perceived such a meeting with his political idol as a very 
real possibility. Besides his marriage into a powerful Kentucky Whig family whose home 
neighbored Clay’s “Ashland,” Lincoln also knew of the intimate ties of migration that 
bound his state of Illinois with that of Kentucky. As Mark E. Neely shows in his study of 
Springfield’s 1843 voting records, Whig sentiment did not, as is often presumed, abound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Foner, Fiery Trial, 13; Berry, House of Abraham, 17–18. 
66 PAGE NUMBER! Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln: A Life II, notes that one such auction “was 
held in mid-November, when a man sold five of his slaves to satisfy a judgment obtained against him by 
Robert Smith Todd,” Mary Todd Lincoln’s father. Stephen Berry marks this as trip as occurring during “a 
pivotal moment” for Lincoln. Berry, House of Abraham, 38. Lincoln makes no mention of meeting Henry 
Clay, but several historians, including Berry, have pointed out that Mary claims to have introduced her 
husband to him. David and Jeanne Heidler refute these interpretations, marking it extremely unlikely that 
Lincoln would have met his political idol but never spoken of it. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, 
Henry Clay: The Essential American (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010), 498 n.24. 
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with New Englanders, but actually proved strongest among Virginia- and Kentucky-born 
Illinois residents.67 Illinois Whigs were particularly sensitive to this attachment and 
confidently sought to foster it. Those in Springfield, an overwhelmingly Whig stronghold 
in a Democratic state, perhaps held more confidence in their own efforts to turn their 
neighbors to the party of Clay. Thus they sent appeals similar to one signed by Lincoln 
on August 29, 1842, requesting that Clay visit their state. Assuring the Whig leader that 
such a visit would not prove futile, Lincoln and the rest of the Executive Committee of 
the Clay Club in Illinois promised “such a reception as shall be worthy of the man on 
whom are now turned the fondest hopes of a great and suffering nation.”68 In June 1844 
Lincoln and his Whig cohorts worked on behalf of Clay in the hopes that he might finally 
realize his ambition of attaining the presidency. As a member of the committee on 
resolutions, Lincoln helped draft a set of resolutions that supported Clay’s nomination 
and highlighted the role of Illinois in the upcoming election. Expressing “the warmest 
and deepest feelings…for the noble and generous qualities so peculiarly characteristic of 
our gallant HARRY of the WEST,” the convention declared its support for Clay for 
president in 1844. The convention then described Illinois’s political position, admitting 
that “the Whigs of Illinois” are “often beaten in their political battles.” Nevertheless, they 
promised, “we will fall into the phalanx of the Whig States, with a majority that shall 
show that in ‘every peril’ the Suckers are willing to ‘divide the danger.’”69  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As Mark E. Neely, Jr., explains, Lincoln, Albert T. Bledsoe, and Stephen T. Logan—all Kentuckians—
wrote the 1843 Illinois Whig party’s official address. Neely, Jr., ed., The Extra Journal, Rallying the Whigs 
of Illinois (Fort Wayne, Ind.: Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum, 1982), FHS. 
68 Clay declined the offer on September 6, 1842. CW, I: 297. 
69 CW, I: 338, 340. Daniel Walker Howe discusses “why Abraham Lincoln was a Whig,” when his “poor 
southern farming family” background tended to “yield followers of Andrew Jackson” rather than Henry 
Clay.” Howe argues Lincoln’s personal drive “to recast himself in a certain mold” led him to identify with 
the values espoused by Henry Clay. Howe, “Why Abraham Lincoln Was a Whig,” Journal of the Abraham 
Lincoln Association 16 (Winter 1995): 28, 37. 
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 This expression of confidence by the underdog political party in the state of 
Illinois revolved, in large part, around Kentucky- and Virginia-born Illinoisans’ belief 
that there existed a special connection between their state and Kentucky.70 For most of 
the antebellum period, many Kentuckians reciprocated this bond with the Northwest.71 
As part of this group and a native of Kentucky who married into a Kentucky slaveholding 
family, Lincoln keenly felt this connection. More importantly, it bolstered his recognition 
that when he arrived in Congress in 1847, he would be the sole Whig representative from 
his state—the “Lone Whig Star of Illinois.” This characterization evidently stuck 
throughout Lincoln’s term in Congress. As he wrote to Thaddeus Stevens in a September 
3, 1848, letter, after the longest session of the 30th Congress had ended: “You may 
possibly remember seeing me at the Philadelphia Convention—introduced to you as the 
long whig star of Illinois.” This heightened awareness of his own singularity undoubtedly 
inspired Lincoln to follow the strong stance adopted by Whig Party leader Henry Clay 
against the Mexican War and to reach Washington prepared for combat against 
Democratic ideas. It also convinced him that a western Whig would be best suited to the 
task of remodeling the Whig Party around a set of national ideals that would not upset 
either the North or the South. When he arrived in Washington in December 1847, Lincoln 
intended to draw upon his western political culture to aid the Whig Party. He perhaps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 A. P. Field inadvertently expressed this bond while working to elect Harrison to the presidency in 1840. 
He urged southern Illinoisans to “[w]rite to Indiana and Kentucky & they will send down their hosts” to 
attend a convention at Shawneetown. A. P. Field to Henry Eddy, June 8, 1840, Box 2, Folder 19, Henry 
Eddy Papers, UIUC. 
71 With political ties, as well as “extensive kin and social ties to those living in states such as Illinois, 
Indiana, and Ohio, Kentuckians and Missourians rarely viewed the national debates over slavery as 
irreconcilable.” Astor, Rebels on the Border, 9.	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little knew how significant the Northwest, and its founding document, the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, would be to his single term in Congress.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 CW, II: 1. Newspapers of the period mentioned Lincoln as the “Lone Star of Illinois.” Ibid., I: 475; II: 5. 
David Donald adopted this title for his chapter on Lincoln’s term in Congress. Donald, Lincoln, 119–41. He 
also notes that Lincoln was introduced as such in June 1848, when he addressed a Whig meeting in 
Delaware. Ibid., 127. 
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Chapter Four 
 Lincoln, the Northwest Ordinance, and the 30th Congress 
 
 Lincoln’s years in the Illinois state legislature made him well informed on the 
issues and opinions in Illinois and the rest of the Northwest. By 1847 this northwesterner 
had developed into a well-spoken, established state congressman prepared to represent 
his state in the national legislature. Eager both to make his mark and to become a good 
representative of his constituents’ interests, Lincoln arrived in Washington, D.C., in 
December 1847 and delivered his first speech before the House of Representatives of the 
30th Congress on the nation’s biggest political issue—the Mexican War. Historians 
usually focus on these and other particular efforts and statements Lincoln made during 
his term in Congress. However, as a freshman congressman serving a single term, from 
December 1847 to March 1849, this ambitious Illinoisan did much more listening than 
speaking. For months he witnessed fellow representatives from all over the country give 
speeches, make motions, and debate the nation’s most pressing issues. One of the most 
important topics discussed throughout the 30th Congress, the extension of slavery, 
pervaded House discussions after Pennsylvania representative David Wilmot’s 
introduction of the anti-slavery mandate known as “the Wilmot Proviso” in 1846. By the 
time Lincoln served in Congress the following term, politicians had developed more 
advanced arguments for or against the Proviso. In order to understand the critical effects 
Lincoln’s term in Congress had upon his viewpoint, we must consider what he heard 
from his fellow congressmen. Their opinions and ensuing discussions shaped Lincoln’s 
own views on the South and its “peculiar” institution, slavery.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Freehling, Road to Disunion, I: 458; Eric Foner, “The Wilmot Proviso Revisited,” Journal of American 
History, 56 (September 1969): 262–279. 
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Congressmen frequently referred to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 during 
many of these discussions. David Wilmot’s infamous proviso had intentionally been 
modeled upon the ordinance, specifying that in the territories acquired by the United 
States from Mexico, “neither slavery not involuntary servitude shall ever exist.” These 
words had first been penned by Thomas Jefferson in application to the Northwest 
Territory, and in congressional discussions from 1846 onward, pro- and anti-proviso 
congressmen characterized the Wilmot Proviso as an extension of the (in)famous 
ordinance.2 Sitting in the House chamber in Washington, D.C., throughout most of the 
discussions of the 30th Congress, Lincoln heard of the significance of the Northwest 
Ordinance again and again. Almost simultaneously, he began receiving correspondence 
from distant southern relatives inquiring about his family’s ancestry and migration to the 
Northwest. Lincoln first appeared to rediscover his familial and ancestral roots in Fall 
1844, when he returned to his old neighborhood in Indiana, venturing “into the 
neighborhood in that State in which I was raised, where my mother and only sister were 
buried, and from which I had been absent about fifteen years.” He consequently wrote a 
poem, “My Child-hood Home I see Again,” which he sent in April 1846 to a former 
friend of his childhood, Andrew Johnston. However, it was not until 1848, during his first 
session in Congress, that Lincoln conducted a prolonged investigation into his family’s 
roots.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Thomas Jefferson had headed the committee that originally proposed a prohibition of slavery in all 
western territories made into U.S. states after 1800, declaring that there would be “neither slavery not 
involuntary servitude in any of the said states.” Hammond, Slavery, Freedom and Expansion, 9; Chaplain 
W. Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 17–18; Joseph G. Rayback, Free Soil: The Election of 1848 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 78–79; John S. Wright, Lincoln and the Politics of 
Slavery (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1970), 11. 
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The confluence of these two influences—family correspondence and political 
arguments concerning the Northwest Ordinance—surely (re)awakened Lincoln to the 
connections between the Northwest Ordinance and anti–slave system migrants. The 
arguments he heard from and about southerners during this congressional term further 
shaped his northwestern regional perspective on slavery and the South. That conception, 
gathered during the 30th Congress, greatly influenced Lincoln’s approach as a state 
political leader in the 1850s and conditioned his response to the South in 1860 and 1861. 
The geographical shift from Illinois to Washington, D.C., exposed Lincoln to new 
sets of opinions and perspectives, influencing his idea of slavery and the South; yet, 
Lincoln did not simply replace his northwestern perspective with a national one as a 
result of serving a single term in the national legislature. Rather, this new orientation 
forced him to re-consider his very origins, upbringing, and political rise—all of which 
had taken place in the free Northwest, where he had lived since the age of seven. In 
Washington, D.C., he witnessed constant debate over perhaps the most important 
document in Illinois history, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That single piece of 
legislation had set the groundwork for the future state of Illinois, declared that “neither 
slavery not involuntary servitude” shall exist in the Northwest Territory, and had, by 
these and other laws, attracted a particular set of migrants to the Northwest who 
otherwise might have settled in the Southwest. Throughout Lincoln’s two sessions, 
congressmen persistently argued over the possible application of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 to Oregon Territory and the territories acquired from Mexico. As a 
member of Congress during these discussions, Lincoln learned firsthand the different 
ways northerners and southerners often viewed the Northwest Ordinance. Although he 
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personally abhorred slavery as a moral evil and had every day worked and lived with 
those who considered it a social evil, Lincoln may not have fully realized the overarching 
importance of the Northwest Territory until this single term in Congress from 1847 to 
1849.  
His experiences there also provoked Lincoln to turn his attention away from the 
free-soil Northwest and to consider the South. His accumulation of the arguments voiced 
by his fellow colleagues, both northern and southern, initiated a belief that a Slave Power 
worked in the South and in the national government to establish greater control and 
power over the South and the nation. In Congress, Lincoln began to build upon the ideas 
of the South he had been surrounded by in Illinois, where fellow migrants sought greater 
freedom in free territory. He gathered greater proof that the South had become a 
restrictive society that bound and gagged the white nonslaveholder.3 Lincoln, who 
believed individuals tend to be driven as much by their own economic self-interest as by 
any moral or intellectual beliefs, particularly honed in on what he believed to be a great 
lack of freedom and opportunity for the white nonslaveholder in the South.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  As Leonard Richards, Chaplain W. Morrison and Jonathan Earle highlight, the “slave power” idea became 
much more prominent during Polk’s administration, when Van Burenites split away from Polk’s 
administration and castigated the “aggressive slavemasters” who “stole the heart and soul of the 
Democratic Party and began dictating a course of the nation’s destiny.” Leonard Richards, The Slave 
Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780–1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2000), 159; Morrison, Democratic Politics; Jonathan Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery and the Politics 
of Free Soil, 1824–1854 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Rayback, 
Free Soil, 78–79, argues the free soil movement fit squarely within the already-existing tensions within the 
Democratic Party, rather than providing the blow that eventually divided it in half, while Joel Silbey points 
out that both the Whig and Democratic parties maintained their core constituents despite the separate 
strains of slavery and antislavery. Silbey, Party over Section: The Rough and Ready Presidential Election 
of 1848 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 140. Regardless of their immediate effectiveness in 
disrupting the two major political organizations, the free soil and slave power arguments suddenly became 
legitimate on a national level and comprised a major portion of national discourse during these years.	  
4 Lincoln occasionally expressed his belief that economic self-interest directed men’s actions. Globe, 30th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 533. His conviction that the South stifled the nonslaveholder was matched by a converse 
one, that the free Northwest held ample opportunities for hard-working men. When his step-brother John D. 
Johnston wrote him in December 1848 asking for a loan, Lincoln refused, noting that hard work would 
provide Johnston with the means to repay his debts. CW, II: 15–16. 
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 Although Lincoln spent only a single term in the House of Representatives, the 
combined effects of the Mexican War, the Wilmot Proviso, and the 1848 presidential 
campaign resulted in a “momentous” 30th Congress.5 In the less than two years he spent 
in Washington, D.C., this Kentucky-born Illinoisan gained a firsthand look at the 
problems facing the nation—not just the state of Illinois, or the Northwest—that left him 
with an altered perspective on the issues of slavery and the South. When the 30th 
Congress opened on December 6, 1847, the Mexican army had recently surrendered to 
the United States, peace talks had begun, and President James K. Polk, then in the third 
year of his presidential term, had by his actions cleaved the Democratic Party into 
opposing factions. As the term advanced, two slavery-related issues often enveloped the 
proceedings: the status of territories acquired from Mexico and the desire to eliminate 
slavery and/or the slave trade in Washington, D.C. With the 21st Rule (known as the Gag 
Rule) abolished from the House in 1844, many congressmen freely voiced their opinions 
and those of their constituents regarding slavery’s presence in the annexed areas. In the 
midst of these debates, in February 1848, ardent opponent of the Gag Rule John Quincy 
Adams collapsed in the House and died soon thereafter. Throughout these events and 
circumstances Lincoln watched, learned, and participated.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Henry W. Moore wrote to Democratic Congressman from Illinois John A. McClernand in 1848 that 
“[y]ou will have a momentous session,” due to the persistence of the Whig opposition, Clay’s stand in 
opposition to the Mexican War, and the inevitable acquisition of territory that would result from the 
conflict. Henry W. Moore to J. A. McClernand, January 6, 1848, John A. McClernand Collection, ALPL. 
6 Congressman had debating the possibility of abolishing slavery and/or the slave trade in Washington, 
D.C. for decades. Although the abolition of the Gag Rule in 1844 had re-opened debate upon slavery in the 
House, the slave trade was not abolished in the nation’s capital until 1850, as part of the Compromise of 
1850. Mary Beth Corrigan, “Imaginary Cruelties? A History of the Slave Trade in Washington, D.C.,” 
Washington History 13 (Fall/Winter, 2001/2002): 21; John M. McFaul, “Expediency vs. Morality: 
Jacksonian Politics and Slavery,” Journal of American History 62 (June 1975): 24–39; Freehling, Road to 
Disunion, I: 351; Evelyn C. Fink, “Representation by Deliberation,” Journal of Politics 62 (November 
2000): 1109–25. McPherson highlights antislavery Whigs’ role in fighting the Gag Rule during the 27th 
Congress as a harbinger of the destruction of that party, and the rise of a new coalition that later became the 
Republican Party. James M. McPherson, “The Fight against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and Antislavery 
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 His introduction of the “Spot Resolutions,” the proposal to end the slave trade in 
Washington, D.C., efforts to elect Zachary Taylor to the presidency, and votes on 
significant issues all leave behind a useful record of Lincoln’s attitude toward slavery, 
expansion, the Whig Party, and the South from 1847 to 1849.7 While these actions all 
serve as vital indications of Lincoln’s own convictions, however, they serve little purpose 
in addressing his evolving conception of slavery and the southerner. As a northwesterner 
whose family had migrated from the slaveholding state of Kentucky to the free soil of the 
Northwest, the discussions of representatives from across the Union provided a new 
perspective on the region from whence Lincoln came. That Lincoln did not choose to 
speak in regard to the Wilmot Proviso, the Northwest Ordinance, or the slavery issue in 
general does not mean these subjects were of less significance to him. Rather, their 
frequent recurrence in congressional discussions and statements suggests that Lincoln 
was forced to personally and professionally grapple with their import during his brief 
period in Washington, D.C.8 
Although the Congressional Globe remains the most useful guide to 
understanding the issues and discussions Lincoln encountered during his single term in 
Congress, it does not provide a comprehensive summary of Lincoln’s experiences in 
Washington, D.C. As Rachel Shelden has pointed out, congressmen were often “less than 
attentive,” engaging in other activities while colleagues spoke on the floor. They also 
frequently edited their own speeches prior to publication in the Globe’s accompanying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Insurgency in the Whig Party, 1839–1842,” Journal of Negro History 48 (July 1963): 194. John Quincy 
Adams, who had long led the fight against the Gag Rule, died on February 23, 1848. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 381, 384. 
7 See Paul Findley, A. Lincoln: The Crucible of Congress (Fairfield, Calif.: James Stevenson Publisher, 
2004); Donald Wayne Riddle, Congressman Abraham Lincoln (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957); 
and Donald, Lincoln, 123–25. 
8 David Donald explains that Lincoln declined to speak upon the Wilmot Proviso in the House, but voted in 
favor of the Proviso repeatedly. Donald, Lincoln, 134–35. 
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Appendix.9 This relatively bare record of transactions does not reveal the many 
experiences and encounters Lincoln had outside the halls of Congress. The freshman 
congressman engaged in countless conversations as a temporary resident at Mrs. Sprigg’s 
boardinghouse, as a member of the Young Indians, a Whig club organized to elect 
Zachary Taylor, and as a generally sociable and politically ambitious individual. In 
particular, Lincoln’s proposal to end the slave trade in the nation’s capital, devised after 
multiple conversations with his colleagues outside the halls of Congress and his 
participation in the Young Indians, clearly show that life beyond the House chamber 
played a significant role in his political development. The little that can be gleaned from 
the relationships Lincoln built and the conversations he participated in outside of his time 
in the House are necessary to any study of Lincoln’s perception of the South during this 
period.10 
 Several Whig colleagues resided at the same boardinghouse throughout Lincoln’s 
term, leading Lincoln to frequently associate with Ohioan Joshua Giddings, 
Pennsylvanians Abraham McIlvane, James Pollock, and John Blanchard, and 
Mississippian Jacob Thompson.11 In early 1848 Lincoln joined a group called the Young 
Indians organized to support the presidential candidacy of Zachary Taylor in that year’s 
national election. Composed of five southerners and two northerners (including Lincoln), 
the Young Indian Club regularly met outside of Congress and proved influential in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rachel Aliyah Shelden, “Washington Brotherhood: Friendship, Politics, and the Coming of the Civil 
War” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2011), 35, 5, 46, 48. 
10 Key discussions often took place “in political and social clubs, at dinner parties, in chats among desk-
mates and in Capitol antechambers. They happened in boardinghouses and hotels, in drinking rooms and 
gambling dens, and even in the rooms of the Supreme Court.” Shelden, “Washington Brotherhood,” 66. 
11 Findley, A. Lincoln, 85. 
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gathering momentum for “Rough and Ready’s” candidacy and election.12 Working with 
these fellow Whigs brought the northwesterner closer together with northeastern and 
southern congressmen, and Lincoln praised the Whig efforts of Alexander H. Stephens, 
who in winter 1848 “concluded the very best speech, of an hour’s length, I ever heard.”13  
Exchanges and conversations with colleagues, whether Whig or Democrat, must 
have occurred frequently, though little record of them survive. One particular letter 
Lincoln wrote to Josephus Hewett on February 13, 1848, reminds us that although 
Lincoln certainly did gain a new perspective in Washington, D.C, his familiarity with 
northerners and southerners had deep roots in his experiences as a northwesterner. Thus 
he was able to write Hewett, a former resident of Springfield, Illinois, who had removed 
to Natchez, Mississippi, that your “Whig representative from Mississippi, P. W. 
Tompkins, has just shown me a letter of yours to him.” Accustomed to conversing freely 
in Illinois on political issues with southerners as well as northerners, and Democrats as 
well as Whigs, Lincoln cheerfully referenced to Democrat Hewett his conversation with 
Southern Democrat John A. Quitman before openly admitting to Hewett his disagreement 
with him regarding the subject of presidential electors.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Lincoln became active in the Club at least as early as February 1848, when he expressed to Thomas S. 
Fluornoy his conviction that Taylor must be the Whig nominee. Abraham Lincoln to Thomas S. Flournoy, 
February 17, 1848. Available at Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division 
(Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000-02]), 
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Silbey, Party over Section, 56–57; Rayback, Free Soil, 38; Shelden, “Washington Brotherhood,” 73, 76. 
13 Abraham Lincoln to William Herndon, February 2, 1848, LC. Rachel Shelden highlights this remark as 
an instance of the admiration the Young Indians soon felt for one another, as they worked together on the 
Taylor campaign. Shelden, “Washington Brotherhood,” 79-80. Riddle argues Lincoln’s affiliation with 
southern Whigs was natural for him, stemming directly from his interactions with Kentuckians and other 
southerners in Illinois. Riddle, Congressman Abraham Lincoln, 17. 
14 Abraham Lincoln to Josephus Hewett, February 13, 1848, LC. In this critical respect, Lincoln’s position 
as a northwesterner, a resident of central Illinois, prepared him for the intersectional and interparty 
associations he would make in the U.S. Congress. 
141	  
	  
	  
Extra-congressional discussions also led Lincoln to formulate a proposal to 
eliminate slavery in Washington, D.C. After meetings with his fellow boarders at Mrs. 
Sprigg’s house, most notably ardent antislavery radical Joshua Giddings, Lincoln gave 
notice during the second session of Congress that he would ask “to introduce a bill to 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, by consent of the free white people of said 
District, and with compensation to owners.” Though Lincoln’s proposal had incorporated 
the views of northerners and southerners alike, the support for his bill apparently 
evaporated once he planned to introduce it, and his work to abolish slavery in the nation’s 
capital came to naught.15 Thus, through involvement in the frequently recurring issue of 
the slave trade and slavery in D.C., Lincoln learned that abolition—even a very gradual 
emancipation—would be difficult to accomplish anywhere and by any means.16 
 Despite the many instances when Lincoln surely gathered particular ideas about 
the South while walking about Washington, D.C. or engaging in conversations outside of 
the House, as a freshman congressman inserting himself into Washington life for the first 
time, Lincoln still gained most of his experience and exposure in the House chamber 
itself. Thus, the Globe still provides the best record of what Lincoln encountered during 
his time in the nation’s capital that specifically influenced his views of the South. 
Lincoln’s extraordinarily high attendance record and involvement indicates an acute 
attentiveness to the issues discussed during his term. Meanwhile, his affinity for reading 
and eagerness to communicate with constituents in Illinois led him to pay special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Lincoln also claimed that “fifteen of the leading citizens of the District of Columbia” had approved his 
proposal. Globe, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., 212. He surely took into consideration the opinions he had heard 
voiced in Congress on the matter since his first session of Congress. Even popular sovereignty Democrats 
like Dickinson had vocally pledged their support for abolishing at least the slave trade in D.C. Appendix to 
the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 645; Findley, A. Lincoln, 139; Donald, Lincoln, 136–37; 
Foner, The Fiery Trial, 57–58. 
16 Globe, 30th Cong., 2nd Sess., 244. 
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attention to the published Globe.17 Furthermore, while Lincoln did, as a result of after-
hours conversations with fellow congressmen, indeed compose legislation pertaining to 
slavery in Washington, D.C., in his spare time, he also chose to submit such resolutions 
based upon House events. He was undoubtedly encouraged to propose abolishing the 
slave trade in the district by the fact that discussion of this specific topic and of slavery in 
general had become much more commonplace in the House by mid-1848. As a frequent 
attendee, Lincoln witnessed these and other important debates of the antebellum era. 
The arguments, speeches, and comments he heard his fellow legislators expound 
upon during his two sessions greatly influenced his conception of the South, particularly 
in relation to the Northwest in which he had grown up, matured, and thrived. After the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act passed on May 30, 1854, Lincoln made speeches throughout the 
northwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, reiterating the Northwest Ordinance’s 
significance in way he had never before publicly expressed. From 1854 to 1860, he 
pointed to the Northwest as “a section of country whose career in prosperity has no 
parallel,” because of the exclusion of slavery included in the ordinance. These statements 
derived in part from Lincoln’s familiarity with the vast number of southerners who had 
moved to the Northwest in search of free soil. However, the great importance he 
attributed to the Northwest Ordinance in the 1850s also stemmed largely from the 
arguments he heard concerning that ordinance during his single term in Congress. Not 
until popular sovereignty posed a threat to freedom in the Kansas-Nebraska Act did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Paul Findley, Donald Wayne Riddle, and David Herbert Donald mention Lincoln’s glowing attendance 
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Lincoln utter public statements granting the ordinance such power, and highlighting 
Thomas Jefferson’s role as its architect. These opinions sprung from the congressional 
discussions that consumed Lincoln’s time in the national legislature.18  
 The 30th Congress, while still governed as much by party divisions as sectional 
ones, was forced to constantly re-address the slavery problem in the aftermath of the 
Wilmot Proviso. Late in the session Tennessean Washington Barrow remarked that a 
“strange spectacle has been presented in this House during the present session. It has 
been ordinarily the case in the history of parties in this country, that those who professed 
to coincide in opinion with an existing Administration were found ready to support its 
recommendations,” but now, a “large portion, if not a majority, of the Democratic party 
arrayed [itself] in opposition to the…Administration.”19 David Wilmot, the Democratic 
congressman from Pennsylvania who had proposed a proviso keeping slavery out of all 
territories acquired from Mexico, explained the change in the hall as a direct result of his 
proposal. “[M]en are denounced, proscribed, read out of the party, for no other offence 
than demanding that the free soil of the country shall be preserved for freemen,” he 
lamented.20 Wilmot and John Wentworth, both northern Democrats, argued that they 
supported the Proviso not as a sectional measure but as a Democratic one.21 “We have 
heard for the last year,” Wilmot stated in the House, that the Proviso “was a firebrand 
thrown into the ranks of the Democratic party, which is likely to divide, and perhaps 
eventually to result in the defeat of that party.” No matter how forcefully he urged that 
his legislation had been crafted in the interest of the “laboring, toiling [white] masses” 
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19 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 979. 
20 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 307. 
21 Globe., 30th Cong., 2nd sess., 549. 
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who “bear the load in silence, because they have no pensioned presses to utter their 
grievances,” the absolute intractability of the South in its resistance to the Proviso 
ultimately divided the country along sectional lines. Throughout Lincoln’s term, he 
watched some northerners and southerners clash over the issue of slavery, while others 
pledged to alleviate sectional tension through the moderate principle of popular 
sovereignty. Regardless of the stance congressmen chose, the Wilmot Proviso redefined 
the political atmosphere in Congress. When the Whigs announced Zachary Taylor as 
their candidate for president in 1848, the nominee’s ambiguous position in regard to the 
Proviso unhinged Whigs and Democrats alike, resulting in numerous House speeches and 
arguments that focused less on legislation at hand than on deriding, chiding, or defending 
Taylor’s apparent unwillingness to decide for or against the prohibition of slavery.22 Even 
those like Michigander Lewis Cass who, unwilling to isolate North or South, embraced 
the popular sovereignty principle, could not escape the Proviso. As Richard W. 
Thompson of Indiana explained, these men did not present a moderate alternative but 
were simply “on both sides of the Wilmot proviso.”23 
  Although Lincoln clearly must have felt the impact of the Wilmot Proviso on 
national politics, his attention surely would have been most piqued when the debates over 
the Proviso began revolving around a piece of legislation that had shaped his own life—
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Very early in the session, representatives began 
characterizing Wilmot’s piece of legislation as “the reenactment of the ordinance of 
1787.” Criticizing Zachary Taylor’s lack of any real position on the issue of slavery’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Examples of these speeches abound in the Congressional Globe, and do not stem from radicals like 
Robert Barnwell Rhett or Joshua Giddings, alone. Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st 
sess., 242, 395.  As Thomas Henley of Indiana declared to Giddings, the nation demanded that Taylor 
“must proclaim himself to be either for or against the Wilmot proviso.” Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 396. 
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extension, Joshua Giddings equated the Ordinance and the Proviso as one and the same. 
This abolitionist firebrand from Ohio was one of the first to use Jefferson’s words in 
support of the Wilmot Proviso, pointing his fellow congressmen “to a very powerful anti-
slavery paper, drawn up by one THOMAS JEFFERSON, in 1776,” and connecting the 
words of the Declaration of Independence to the moral antislavery principle he beheld in 
the Northwest Ordinance.24 David Wilmot himself provided one of the best summations 
of the Proviso’s connection to the principles of 1787. Considering that “territory lying 
northwest of the Ohio river...the great heritage of our people,” Thomas Jefferson, in 
Wilmot’s eyes “the great apostle of our faith,” had submitted a resolution declaring that 
“there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude” in any of the states formed out 
of that territory. “This, sir, looks very much like the ‘Proviso.’” Pointing to Jefferson’s 
efforts against the destructive influence of slavery in the Northwest, Wilmot asserted: 
“Here is the original ‘firebrand’—the heresy, for holding on to which men are now 
proscribed by the Government of their country. Mr. Jefferson, had he lived at this day, 
would have been denounced as an abolitionist, and a disturber of the peace of the 
Union.”25  
In his retelling of the Northwest Ordinance’s history, Wilmot exaggerated 
Jefferson’s role in the process of effectively passing the ordinance and also incorrectly 
cast early republican southerners as unanimously opposed to slavery’s extension simply 
because the legislation “was passed by the unanimous vote of the slaveholding States.” 
No mention was made of the Southwest and of that territory’s organization in 1790 
without the antislavery prohibition. Nevertheless, many northern congressman followed 
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Wilmot by invoking Jefferson and his “wisdom and patriotism” in creating the restriction 
in 1784 and claiming that this measure was largely responsible for “such high honor” the 
people conferred “upon the name of the illustrious Jefferson.” Since Jefferson hailed 
from the southern state of Virginia, northern congressmen frequently reasserted Wilmot’s 
claim that the South had once endorsed the Northwest Ordinance as a wise edict to 
advance the best interest of the American nation. Hannibal Hamlin of Maine noted 
Virginia’s particular role in enacting the Ordinance, praising the state’s cession of the 
northwestern lands to the federal government, and venerating “Thomas Jefferson, the 
patriot, statesman, and sage” who “was the originator of the principle in that ordinance 
which excluded slavery from that territory.” Connecting Jefferson’s decision in 1784 to 
the political movements of 1848, Hamlin claimed: “Nay, it went further; it abolished 
slavery there and made it free soil.”26 
New York representative Harvey Putnam asked southerners who resisted the 
extension of the Northwest Ordinance prohibition into the territories acquired from 
Mexico “if Mr. Jefferson and others were mistaken in their views?” Indianan George 
Dunn remarked that the 1787 Ordinance, “with the restriction, passed, receiving every 
vote (except one, Mr. Yates, of New York) of every State represented, to wit: 
Massachusetts, (then the only non-slaveholding State,) New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.” Besides the obvious 
conclusion that these states supported a restriction upon slavery, “It is well known that 
this met Mr. Jefferson’s hearty approbation.” This depiction of the Northwest Ordinance 
as a Jeffersonian document clearly resonated beyond the halls of Congress, as indicated 
in a petition presented in Congress by “William Russiter and 33 other citizens of the 
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borough of Norristown, Pennsylvania, asking that the Jeffersonian ordinance of 1787, 
prohibiting slavery, may be ingrafted on any law which may be passed organizing 
Territorial Governments for New Mexico and California.”27  
Speaking before their colleagues in 1848, northern congressmen cast the Wilmot 
Proviso as a mere continuation of the fundamental principle Jefferson and the South had 
endorsed with the Ordinance of 1787. As voiced by Hoosier representative George D. 
Dunn, the question they posed to southerners was: “Who follows Mr. Jefferson?” If the 
country had unanimously endorsed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, northern 
representatives argued, those who refused to back the Wilmot Proviso clearly resisted the 
principles that formed one of the nation’s most cherished founding documents. That 
Lincoln did not engage in the congressional wrangling over slavery and the Northwest 
Ordinance does not mean that they bore less significance to his own views on slavery and 
antislavery politics. Ten years later, as he debated Stephen Douglas on the merits of 
popular sovereignty, he utilized many of the arguments he heard from 1846 to 1848.28 
Though these northern queries appear to outnumber southern responses, those in 
Congress who hailed from the South offered an alternative interpretation of the 
Ordinance and Jefferson’s role in crafting it. Thomas Bayly of Virginia claimed “that 
ordinance originated in a palpable usurpation of power by the Congress of 1787. The 
articles of confederation,” under which it had initially been adopted, “conferred upon 
Congress no such power.” Far from mandating that slavery must not exist in the states 
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formed out of the Northwest Territory, Bayly argued, Jefferson and the other Virginian 
authors had ceded those extended Virginian lands to the U.S through a “charter of 
compact” that guaranteed settlers the right to self-government, including whatever 
decision they might make in regard to slavery, once they applied for statehood.29  
  The Wilmot Proviso had indeed opened Pandora’s Box, and congressmen 
resurrected this topic of the expansion of the Northwest Ordinance at every opportunity. 
The following interchange between several congressmen offers one example of 
representatives’ tendency to inject the extension of the Northwest Ordinance into House 
debates on other topics. As the House considered a set of resolutions on April 3, 1848, 
declaring the United States in favor of the recent French revolutions, congressman 
George Ashmun of Massachusetts proposed the following as an amendment to one of the 
resolutions: “And we especially see an encouraging earnest of their success in the decree 
which pledges the said Government of France to early measures for the immediate 
emancipation of all slaves in their colonies.” To this Congressman Schench offered a 
further addition: “Recognizing as we do that cardinal republican principle that there shall 
be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except for crime,” which Ashmun concurred 
in.30 A vigorous debate ensued over the introduction of this amendment, in which most of 
the speakers, North and South, declared the reference to slavery both unnecessary and 
disruptive.  
The remarks of Joshua Giddings, Thomas Bayly, William Haskell of Tennessee, 
and New Yorker William Duer are of particular note, since all four adopted different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 574. Leonard Richards describes the turn Van 
Buren Democrats took toward embracing Thomas Jefferson. They celebrated him as “author of the 
Declaration of Independence” and emphasized the “prohibition of slavery in the Old Northwest in 1787” in 
their local gatherings and “Jefferson Committees.” Richards, Slave Power, 159. 
30 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 572. 
149	  
	  
	  
approaches to the question of prohibiting slavery in the territories. Giddings and Bayly 
represented the more radical positions taken by North and South, respectively, with 
Haskell and Duer occupying more moderate ground and attempting to settle the issue 
without lengthy dispute. These four thus represent the positions of the radical and the 
moderate in both North and South.31 “The people of the South did not complain if the 
balance of the world saw fit to abolish slavery within their own jurisdictions,” the 
Tennessean explained. “As a southern man, as a slaveholder, he could stand by and 
cheerfully see Kentucky abolish slavery within her limits. What the South complained of, 
was not that other people were endeavoring to ameliorate their condition, to abolish 
slavery if they saw fit, but of the unnecessary interference of other people with them.” 
Haskell disclaimed radicalism and castigated those congressmen “who were continually 
introducing this subject of slavery,” which was “calculated to produce disunion in this 
Hall…and put out this light of freedom towards which with hope we turned the eyes of 
the downtrodden world.” Congressman Duer adopted a similar stance, admitting that he 
admired the “moral courage” of abolitionists in the House yet could not support such an 
amendment. His extreme antipathy to slavery, he explained, remained “wholly 
unattended by any personal feeling of ill will toward slaveholders.” Thus, while “he did 
most sincerely rejoice to learn that it had been abolished in the colonies of France….he 
could not but regret its introduction on the present occasion as unnecessary and uncalled 
for.”32 
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As much as these men tried to temper such outbursts of sectional hostility among 
northerners and southerners following the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, the more 
radical members of Congress often inflamed the debate. In response to Haskell’s 
moderate remarks, Giddings announced that he was proud to hear Haskell in favor of 
abolition (which, of course, Haskell did not support). When Haskell further explained to 
the Ohio congressman that southerners simply “desired those who held slaves to set for 
themselves, without exterior interference, and to abolish them for themselves, if they 
pleased to do so, and the South would not complain,” Giddings declared that the 
“conversion of the South on the subject of slavery was absolutely more sudden than that 
of St. Paul.” Giddings’s sarcastic chidings provoked the southwestern moderate into 
defensively posturing that he “hoped the gentleman from Ohio did not understand him to 
be a quasi abolitionist, nor a half-way slavery man. He believed the institution of slavery 
to be of divine origin, and that God in his wisdom had made negroes for the benefit of 
white men.” Nevertheless, that belief did not make it right for him to impose it upon 
others, even if neighboring states chose to abolish slavery within their own borders.33 
  Bayly needed no prodding to adopt a more radical stance. He denounced the 
“effort which was made to seize this occasion, which ought to be one of national 
rejoicing, and turn it into one of domestic discord,” but he did not proceed upon the 
moderate grounds assumed by Haskell and Duer. He placed blame directly on Giddings 
and “his coadjutors,” Ashmun and Schenck, for supporting the amendment, then 
proceeded to debate Giddings over the history of emancipation in the United States. 
When Giddings brought up the ordinance of 1787 as proof of the Founders’ support for 
abolition, Bayly responded that “the ordinance of 1787, as far as slavery was concerned, 
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was treated practically as a nullity. It never had any legal force in the Northwestern 
Territory.”34 
Throughout this extended discussion over a set of resolutions to recognize French 
liberty, Lincoln witnessed the pervasive controversial quality of the Wilmot Proviso, the 
paralyzing and divisive effects of radicalism on the slavery issue, and the gradual 
sectionalization of politics. To be sure, though congressmen often jumped at the 
opportunity to resurrect or extend debate over slavery’s extension, issues surrounding 
topics such as internal improvements, land grants, U.S. troop benefits, and the annual 
budget still commanded the majority of the House’s attention. Nevertheless, the 
perpetuation of Wilmot’s Proviso as a lightning rod and, more importantly, the frequency 
with which members debated the validity and legacy of the Northwest Ordinance, surely 
gave Lincoln pause. Perhaps he had never comprehensively considered the power of that 
early Ordinance in eliminating slavery; or, perhaps from his experiences in Illinois, he 
had already formed his own opinions in regard to that document. Regardless, the 
statements Lincoln heard throughout his Congressional term must have developed or 
strengthened the conviction he later expressed, that the Northwest Ordinance had been 
crucial to preserving his state against the creeping influence of slavery. Exposed to this 
idea over and over again in Washington, D.C., in his detachment from those southern 
migrants with whom he had settled in central Illinois, Lincoln formed a mental map of 
migration and slavery in the United States. This cognizance poured forth in his speeches 
throughout Illinois during the 1850s, displaying itself in cities like Cincinnati, where 
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Lincoln retold the history of the Northwest Territory to a crowd of Kentuckians and 
Ohioans.35 
 New York congressman William Collins believed that with the acquisition of 
territories, “the passage of an act of Congress is desired, containing the anti-slavery 
provision of the 6th section of the ordinance of 1787, known as the ‘Proviso.’” The 
introduction of slavery in new territories, he alleged, would bar white northern laborers 
from the new lands, while “to prohibit it, would not exclude the same class from the 
South.” As evidence that the Wilmot Proviso should be enacted, Collins pointed to the 
effects of the Northwest Ordinance. “The honorable member from Maine [Ephraim 
Smart] has shown that more than one-half the population of Indiana and Illinois 
emigrated from the slave States.” The restriction upon slavery thus encouraged greater, 
not less, migration into U.S. territories.36 
 On March 28, 1848, Ephraim Smart had introduced a set of resolutions by his 
state’s legislature declaring slavery “a moral and social evil” that must be prohibited from 
entering newly acquired territories. As expressed in those resolutions, the state of Maine 
believed it “the duty of the General Government to extend over the same the ordinance of 
1787, with all its rights and privileges, conditions and immunities.” Declaring himself in 
accord with these resolutions, Smart explained that “I have thus far spoken of this 
question as if Southern men had no interest in free territory; but I believe they have a 
deep interest in its preservation.” In the Northwest, upon the lands that had been set aside 
for freedom in 1787, “may be found at this moment an immense population that 
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originated in the slaveholding States. The free States formed out of the ‘Northwest 
Territory’ are an asylum for the free white men of the South.” In support of this assertion, 
which posed a great problem to southerners who claimed slavery proved beneficial to the 
nonslaveholder as well as the slaveholder, Smart read aloud two letters: one from the 
Secretary of State of Indiana and the other from the Secretary of State of Illinois. The 
Indianan first described his own background, explaining that “‘I am from a slaveholding 
State, (Kentucky,) and have resided in the Territory and State of Indiana near forty 
years.’” He then proceeded to estimate the number of inhabitants of Indiana at about 
900,000 and claimed “more than one-half that number are from the slaveholding States. 
This may be wide of the mark, one way or the other, as it is but conjecture. My own 
opinion is, however, that I have not stated the inhabitants from the slaveholding States as 
many as they are.’”37  
Smart then informed Congress that he had “an extract of a letter from the 
Secretary of State of Illinois, which I wish to put on record as an additional evidence of 
the common enjoyment of the free territory of the West by the people of the North and 
South.” This official had similarly admitted that he had no exact data regarding the 
relative proportion of northerners and southerners in the state, but after asking the 
Governor and ex-Governor, estimated “‘that about one-half of the present citizens of this 
State who have come from other States, originated in the slaveholding States.’” In case 
the statements of two state officials in the Northwest did not sway his colleagues, Smart 
referred to “Southern testimony” given by Thomas Clingman, of North Carolina, in a 
speech recorded in the Appendix of the Globe. Though Clingman had declined from 
going so far as to denounce the institution of slavery, he nevertheless admitted that “a 
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very large portion of the emigration of the old Southern States goes into the free States of 
the Northwest. This, as I have observed myself, is eminently true of the North Carolina 
emigrants.” Reiterating that quote within the context of his discussion, Smart pointed out 
that “the South” did not simply constitute slaveholders and their slaves but also numerous 
white nonslaveholders who, historically, had often chosen the free Northwest over the 
slave South or Southwest. Prohibiting slavery in acquired territories, then, would make 
them into “an asylum for the poor but enterprising men of both sections of the Union. 
Thus far I can see no injustice to the South in securing freedom to the territory we 
acquire.”38  
 Smart would continue to raise this point in congressional discussions over 
resolutions related to the territories acquired by the U.S. after the Mexican War. In the 
second session of the 30th Congress, he reminded his fellow representatives than even in 
his own references to the extent of the territories, “I have assumed that the eight millions 
of people in the South are all interested in slavery, while it is a fact that not over three 
hundred thousand have any pecuniary interest in slaves.” In addition to pure economic 
self-interest, he argued, that fact was sustained by the actions of the nonslaveholding 
southerners, who “constantly emigrate from choice to such [free] territory in great 
numbers.” As further proof that that was the case, he provided a chart from the War 
Department listing the locations of the land warrants that Mexican War veterans chose in 
reward for their services. The total number of warrants sold in the states of the Northwest 
Territory plus Iowa, versus the amount sold in the western and southwestern states of 
Missouri, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida, stood at 10,159 to 
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1,750. Surely, Smart reasoned, “[m]ore than 1,700 of these 12,000 men must have 
belonged to the South.”39 
 Smart also furnished further statistics that compared the populations and 
economic production of the free states and slave states and indicated that both factors 
were much higher in the free states. The conclusion that Smart gathered from all these 
sources was not simply that nonslaveholders preferred free states and thrived in them, but 
that Congress must take direct action to legislate against slavery even in those states 
where it was believed slavery could not exist. “[I]f slavery can exist in Virginia for 
hundreds of years, why can it not exist upon such a soil as these extracts describe? Sir, 
the man who relies upon soil and climate to keep slavery out of these Territories, in my 
opinion, has not informed himself in relation to them, or is willing that it should go in.” 
Popular sovereignty, he thereby asserted, would not keep slavery out of the territories; 
only federal legislation would effectively do so.40  
 Smart was one of several congressman who centered on the volume of migration 
from the South to the Northwest as proof that slavery was, indeed, a social evil. John G. 
Palfrey of Massachusetts likewise brought up Clingman’s admission that North Carolina 
had lost much of her population to the free Northwest. He asked, “what is it that sets the 
prodigious current of emigration so determinately in that direction, winning even the sons 
of the sunny South from the homes of their childhood and the graves of their fathers, and 
all the associations of kindred and of memory, to seek the hardships of an untried 
condition and a northern sky?” Something very important must have lured them away, 
Palfrey reasoned—“Just the intense desire for that equality, and those social advantages, 
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which the presence of slavery absolutely excludes.” Palfrey then extended his discussion 
beyond the short reaches of North Carolina, pointing to Maryland, Virginia, and 
Kentucky as states from whence the masses of non-slaveholders fled in search of land 
devoid of slavery. Clearly, a great swell of anti-slavery sentiment existed amongst the 
southern nonslaveholding population.41 
Whether Lincoln had before pondered the influx of southerners into the states of 
his upbringing and adulthood, these statements voiced throughout his term would have 
struck him a familiar chord because of his own family’s journey from slave territory, and 
the very similar travels undertaken by friends and neighbors. More importantly, 
congressmen did not stop at the recognition that vast numbers of southerners chose to 
migrate to the free Northwest rather than remain in the South or settle in the Southwest. 
Rather, these simple observations generated much larger, more detailed comparisons 
between Northwest and South, free territory and slave. These comparisons further 
adjusted Lincoln’s mental map of migration and slavery and supported his existing sense 
that slavery tended to limit the freedom and opportunity of nonslaveholders.  
Charles Hudson of Massachusetts, another congressman who addressed the issue, 
declared that a simple “comparison of Kentucky with Ohio will show the advantage of 
free over slave labor.” He drew upon the observations of former congressman Kenneth 
Rayner, of North Carolina, who cautioned that anyone who travelled in the South would 
“see the very soil, consecrated by having been the battle grounds of the Revolution, being 
fast converted into its original waste…He will see the remnants of mansions, once the 
abode of refinement and gayety, now tumbling into desolation and ruin.” Rayner had not 
explicitly attributed these effects to slavery but remarked that their former inhabitants had 
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“all gone to the far West.’” Virginia’s “natural advantages, superior in many respects to 
theirs” in the Northwest, explained Ashmun, were nullified by the stultifying effects of 
slavery. “Had it been possible, at the time that ordinance was passed, to rid Virginia of 
her slave population and place her in that respect on a footing with the northwestern 
States, her progress might at this time have been as rapid as theirs.” Since slavery had 
continued there without interruption, her citizens fled while her lands deteriorated.42 
Since 1787 when the nation’s “fathers abolished slavery, and devoted the whole 
northwest region to freedom,” that section of the nation acted as a standard against which 
Americans judged the effects of slavery in the slave states. E.B. Holmes of New York 
claimed that after just a half century, “that whole country stands out in bold relief, in 
striking contrast, in all the elements of national greatness, with that portion of the old 
thirteen smitten with the blights of slavery.” Putnam provocatively urged his fellow 
congressmen to “[l]ook at the intelligence of the masses of the people” and to “compare 
the new States formed form the Northwestern Territory, where the first anti-slavery 
proviso was adopted, with an equal amount of contiguous slave territory.”43  
Harvey Putnam, like Hudson and other northern congressmen, drew from 
southern sources to legitimate his arguments against slavery. Reciting the 1832 remarks 
of William H. Broadmax in the Virginia House of Delegates, he sought to show 
southerners in 1848 that slavery must be kept out of the territories acquired from Mexico. 
Broadmax had boldly stated: “‘That slavery in Virginia is an evil, and a transcendent evil, 
it would be idle, and more than idle, for any human being to doubt or deny. It is a mildew 
which has blighted in its course every region it has touched, from the creation of the 
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world.” Broadmax then lamented the particular effects of the institution upon his own 
state.  
That Virginia—originally the first-rated State in the Union—the one 
which, in better days, led the councils and dictated the measures of the 
Federal Government, had been gradually razed to the condition of a third-
rate State, and was destined soon to yield precedency to another, among 
the youngest of her daughters; that many of the finest portions, originally, 
of her territory, now (as was so glowingly depicted the other day) 
exhibited scenes of wide-spread desolation and decay; that many of her 
most valuable citizens are removing to other parts of the world—have 
certainly been attributed to a variety of causes; but who can doubt that it is 
principally slavery that is at the bottom of all—that this is the incubus 
which paralyzes her energies and rewards her every effort at 
advancement?44 
 
 Kingsley S. Bingham of Michigan utilized statistics given by “Professor 
[Nathaniel Beverly] Tucker, of the University of Virginia, in regard to the relative 
population of the free and slave States, and their relative increase.” Tucker had found that 
while about seven million people inhabited the slave states in 1840, nearly ten million 
had settled upon free territory. “Mr. Speaker,” Bingham continued, “it is my good fortune 
to represent on this floor a portion of the Northwest Territory redeemed from the curse of 
slavery by the wise and sagacious provisions of the Jeffersonian ordinance of 1787.” 
Highlighting the astonishing growth of his section of the Union, he pointed out in 1800, 
“that whole Northwest Territory contained but 50,240 people, and had no Representative 
on this floor. In forty years, her population had increased to 3,000,000! Five States in this 
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Confederacy have been formed out of her, and she has now forty-two Representatives on 
this floor.”45 
 New Yorker S. Lawrence praised the Ordinance and the West from his vantage 
point in the Northeast, asking, “Who that has ever passed down the Ohio [river] has not 
been struck with astonishment at the difference between the appearance of a slave 
country on one side, and a free population on the other?” After quoting Jefferson’s 
criticisms of slavery, Lawrence restated part of an address that Virginia slaveholders had 
recently published. The Virginians had chosen to make their own comparison of the old 
free states and old slave states, noticeably leaving out any study of the Northwest or 
Southwest, and instead studying Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia against New 
England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. They concluded: “‘It is in the last 
period of ten years, from 1838 to 1848, that this consuming plague of slavery has shown 
its worst effects in the old Southern States.’” While the South had gained only 7.5 percent 
more inhabitants, New England had increased 15 percent, and the “middle states” an 
entire 26 percent. Rhetorically asking “[w]hat has done this work of desolation?” they 
responded: “Not war, nor pestilence, not oppression of rulers, civil or ecclesiastical, but 
slavery—a curse more destructive in its effects than any of them.” Lawrence also quoted 
from a Virginian who claimed the state generally supported emancipation, contrary to 
popular belief. “It is not generally known, yet it is nevertheless true, that two-thirds of the 
people of Virginia are open and undisguised advocates of ridding the State of slavery,” 
this writer alleged. “We have, within the last two years, conversed with more than five 
hundred slaveholders in the State, and four hundred and fifty out of the five hundred have 
expressed themselves ready to unite upon a general plan to abolish slavery upon almost 
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any terms.” From these statements, in combination with southern opinions most often 
voiced in Congress, Lincoln may have understood Lawrence’s sources to fit squarely 
within the popular opinion of much of the South. While perhaps the one writer’s 
contention that 450 out of 500 slaveholders supported emancipation appeared vastly 
inflated, Lincoln nonetheless would likely have applied these very same expressions to 
the white nonslaveholders who had not (or not yet) migrated away from slavery. After all, 
that characterization fir the southern-born migrants he knew in Illinois. Lincoln certainly 
did not doubt Lawrence’s conclusions that “the present prosperous and happy condition 
of the great West” proved “the wisdom and patriotism of Jefferson, when he devised and 
drew up this restriction in 1784, or of his associates, who carried it into effect in 1787.”46 
Listening to these expressions regarding the Northwest Ordinance from members 
both North and South, Lincoln re-created his memories of Kentucky, Indiana, and 
Illinois. He perhaps recalled the opinions and prejudices of those southern migrants 
whom he knew in Illinois, with whom he had lived and worked, and considered their 
statements in a new context. A northwesterner temporarily removed to Washington, D.C., 
he began to perceive the settlement of southerners in his district as an active effort to get 
away from slavery, whether due to their moral antipathy to the institution or a fear of its 
economically crippling effects on the white nonslaveholder. As Lincoln considered the 
testimonies of northerners and southerners connecting migration with the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 with the Wilmot Proviso, he 
developed a conviction that slavery acted against the best interests of the white 
nonslaveholder, that nonslaveholders in the South knew this fact, and that only federal 
legislation could guarantee the prohibition of slavery in the West. As Lincoln 
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contemplated these ideas, he also created a new memory of his ancestors’ gradual flight 
from slavery as the natural process nonslaveholders underwent to find freedom on free 
soil. Through this lens he interpreted the South’s actions and responses in 1848 and 
beyond. 
Unlike northern men, who at times reveled in their ability to provide statistics 
indicating their state’s or region’s growth of trade, inhabitants, and output, southerners 
often displayed a reluctance to gathering, utilizing, and revealing information and 
opinions. As members of the 30th Congress were most acutely aware, the 21st Rule or 
“gag rule” had been repealed just four years earlier. This rule had forbidden the 
presentation of any petitions in the House of Representatives relating to the abolition of 
slavery—a prohibition that John Quincy Adams and many others believed clearly 
violated the right to free speech and discussion—for eight years. Many southerners also 
believed the census had unfairly treated the South by attempting to gather information 
they considered unnecessary. As Robert Barnwell Rhett alleged on December 15, 1847, 
“A portion of the people of the South—of Virginia, South Carolina, and other States” had 
resisted the census takers’ requests for information about their property and their slaves, 
beyond the simple count required for accurate representation in Congress. Rhett opposed 
the formation of an additional Committee of Commerce, whose duties would include 
assessing the production of all the individual states, rather than simply the commerce that 
flowed between the states. As Caleb B. Smith remarked in his response to the 
congressman, the proposition of gathering such statistics had always incurred the 
resistance of southern members who knew that particular northern congressmen would 
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wield that information against slavery—as, indeed, many did.47 A similar attitude 
pervaded reactions to the proposition of printing and binding the report of the 
Commissioner of Patents. Illinoisan Smith unhesitatingly endorsed this action, since the 
“agricultural portion of it was carefully read and examined by farmers; to that class of his 
constituents it was of great value.” While representatives of northern agricultural districts 
overwhelmingly favored the printing of the patent report, a few key southern leaders 
denounced it. Alexander Stephens, Robert Toombs, and Robert Rhett, an odd 
combination of Whig and Democrat, opposed the printing of this information for their 
constituents, arguing that the “whole matter was in conformity with the course of 
usurpation by this House,” which tended to overextend its powers. Rhett alleged that the 
measure was driven by congressmen who desired to win votes rather than serve the best 
interest of their constituents. “If they were to vote these things—if it was the purpose of 
Congress to give to members the means of pleasing the people by the donation of 
information, let them not confine themselves to this document; let them subscribe for 
works upon agricultural chemistry—let them go to philosophers, those who analyzed the 
great principles of agriculture, and give their works to the people.”48 
This mockery of the idea that Congress had a responsibility to provide its 
constituents with information pertinent to self-improvement must have sounded to 
Lincoln like a mockery of self-improvement itself—at least for the white yeoman farmer. 
As a self-improved man who soon thereafter patented his own invention, he would have 
identified with Smith’s constituents and objected to the arguments given by Rhett, 
Toombs, and Stephens. Those white laboring classes of the South craved the same 
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information, and the same means to improve themselves and their families, as their 
brethren who had migrated to the Northwest.49  From this and other comments in the 
House, Lincoln gathered the impression that many of the southern representatives in 
Congress did not adequately represent their constituents’ interests or opinions on 
important subjects. Returning Rhett’s rhetoric with his own, Lincoln spoke in favor of 
utilizing statistics for the benefit of assessing internal improvements and the produce of 
the nation. “One of the gentlemen from South Carolina….particularly objects, as I 
understand him, to counting all the pigs and chickens in the land.” While “[i]t is true, that 
if everything be enumerated, a portion of such statistics may not be very useful to this 
object,” Lincoln chided, “[t]he surplus, that which is produced in one place to be 
consumed in another; the capacity of each locality for producing a greater surplus; the 
natural means of transportation, and their susceptibility of improvement; the hinderances, 
delays, and losses of life and property during transportation, and the causes of each, 
would be among the most valuable statistics in this connection.” Lincoln perceived only 
beneficial results from gathering such statistics. Most importantly, they would help the 
national legislature decide which projects and problems deserved their greatest attention. 
“[W]hat is made unequal in one place may be equalized in another, extravagance 
avoided, and the whole country put on that career of prosperity, which shall correspond 
with its extent of territory, its natural resources, and the intelligence and enterprise of its 
people.”50  
The protests of particular southern gentlemen did not drown out the more 
moderate expressions of others. When North Carolina representative Abraham Venable 
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had assured his fellow congressmen that “Southern men and slaveholders have nothing to 
fear from the full development of the truth,” he spoke to southern and northern men alike, 
reassuring them that free speech, statistics, and unbiased information did not pose a threat 
to slavery.51 Indirect disavowals of southern radicalism by moderate southerners 
reassured Lincoln that proslavery radicalism did not reign in Congress or in the South. 
Oddly reassuring, also, was the mere fact that most southern representatives were 
slaveholders. In a letter Lincoln wrote to Usher F. Linder on March 22, 1848, he argued 
that the Whigs had been unfairly charged with abolition doctrines. To prove this, he 
counted up each southern Whig then serving as a representative in the House: “one from 
Louisiana, one from Mississippi, one from Florida, two from Alabama, four from 
Georgia, five from Tennessee, six from Kentucky, six from North Carolina, six from 
Virginia, four from Maryland and one from Delaware.” This amounted to “thirty-seven in 
all,” he explained, “and all slave-holders, every one of whom votes the commencement of 
the war ‘unnecessary and unconstitutional’ and so falls subject to your charge of 
abolitionism!”  
Content that he had proved to Linder the absurdity of charging Whigs with 
abolitionism, Lincoln did not appear to recognize the significance of his own declaration. 
His perception that all thirty-seven Whigs in the House of Representative were 
slaveholders not only proved to him that radicalism did not prevail among slaveholders, 
but also that the South’s representatives did not sufficiently represent the interests of their 
neighboring white nonslaveholders. When southern congressmen spoke of the South and 
slavery, they spoke as though each southerner had a direct and immediate interest in 
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slavery.52 Yet as Lincoln looked about him, he must surely have noticed the stark contrast 
between these men and the nonslaveholders he had frequently encountered in the 
Northwest. From his point of view, nonslaveholders did not, could not, have a direct 
interest in upholding the slave system. The information he had obtained directly from 
white nonslaveholding southerners in the Northwest had only confirmed that view, and 
since Lincoln’s association with southerners went only as far south as Kentucky, he was 
not familiar with southern nonslaveholders who may have argued that the institution 
directly benefited them. Most southerners whom he knew had migrated out of the South 
and into the Northwest in search of greater opportunity on free soil. The presence of so 
many southern slaveholders in the national legislature, speaking about the South’s 
interests in slavery as though each and every southerner were a slaveholder, certainly 
imbued this Lone Star Whig with a sense that the white nonslaveholding southerner 
remained underrepresented, misunderstood, and ostracized from the higher seats of 
government. 
Remarks such as these by Mississippian Jacob Thompson were common: “You 
claim the power, and express the determination, to pass the Wilmot proviso over all the 
vast territory now held by the United States.” This act, he accused northern congressmen, 
would “virtually exclude every Mississippian, with his household, from the occupancy of 
one solitary acre in all your broad possession.”53 Venable of North Carolina attempted to 
explain away the emigration of the nonslaveholding masses from his state, characterizing 
their treks as either the “pursuit of a more extended field for the employment of the 
wealth accumulated there [in North Carolina]” or the product of “increasing families,” 
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which “invite them to the enterprise and advantages of a new country.” Fully 
acknowledging the outflows described by northerners and southerners alike, Venable 
struggled to redefine emigration to the South as a favorable process that resulted not from 
“poverty and distress” but the desire for even greater wealth and opportunity welcomed 
by the West.54 
Most southern congressmen, however, acted as though every white southerner 
was a slaveholder, holding equal interest in the institution. Virginian Thomas Bayly 
countered Smart’s argument that allowing slavery into the territories prevented masses of 
Americans from moving there, while prohibiting it limited no one. “Now, sir, I hold that 
the very reverse of this is true,” Bayly asserted. “Prohibit slavery in a Territory, and in 
what position do you place a slaveholder who desires to emigrate? Before he goes, he 
must either sell his slaves, or emancipate them.” Not content to simply characterize the 
South as land of slaveholders, Bayly also addressed Smart’s claim that “slavery, 
wherever it exists, degrades labor, and thus the free white laborers of the North are 
excluded.” The Virginian chided his fellow representatives for this pervasive attitude, 
which “shows that want of information upon the subject which is always manifested 
here.” He then offered the southern proslavery argument explaining why the institution 
benefitted the white nonslaveholder: “In a slave State, the distinctions in society do not 
grow out of the difference of pursuits, but of condition and color. It is not the fact that the 
negro labors that degrades him; for let him be as idle as he may, even if he be able to live 
without work, his social position is still beneath that of the poorest white laborer.” He 
explained that rich white men and their sons often worked alongside their slaves in the 
fields, and that white blacksmiths preferred working with black blacksmiths because they 
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could “make him perform menial duties in and about the shop, which they would be 
reluctant to exact of a white man.” Bayly claimed the white nonslaveholder preferred this 
slave society to that of the free states, because all menial labor was left to blacks, and the 
divisions in society created by “color and condition” rather than “wealth and pursuits” 
meant that the “respectable white laborers in the South are treated with an infinite deal of 
more courtesy and respect by men of other pursuits, than they are at the North.”55 
 To the son of a former southern nonslaveholder who had moved to the Northwest, 
this analysis did not ring true. Abraham Lincoln, the self-embodiment of the American 
idea that one’s destiny was not predetermined by his father’s place in society, never 
strayed from his belief that a man’s “condition” was never permanent—that it was 
precisely his “pursuits” which defined him. Over the course of the two sessions of the 
30th Congress, Lincoln would learn that many of the wealthier, politically powerful men 
of the South had become more—not less—wedded to slavery. Slaveholding congressmen 
claimed to represent the views of their non-slaveholding neighbors in Congress, injecting 
a variety of proslavery arguments into territorial disputes and offering little explanation 
of the benefits slavery brought to white non-slaveholders. Lincoln had arrived in 
Washington, D.C., the unabashed admirer of Henry Clay, who advocated colonization as 
a means to foster the movement for gradual emancipation and would reiterate his 
antislavery pledge in the next Congress: “I never can, and never will vote, and no earthly 
power will ever make me vote, to spread slavery over territory where it does not exist;”56 
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The comments of other congressmen gave Lincoln the sense that a dangerous 
transformation was taking place among southern slaveholders. Northerners and 
southerners both remarked on this transformation during the 30th Congress. Richard 
Brodhead of Pennsylvania noted on June 3, 1848, that the South suddenly demanded that 
Congress take direct action in regard to slavery, after years of advocating the very 
opposite. “Until within the last few months, the doctrine of non-interference upon the part 
of the General Government upon the subject of slavery was vehemently enforced by 
southern statesmen and southern Representatives upon this floor.” During the last session 
of Congress, “the whole South seemed to be satisfied with the position of neutrality or the 
Missouri compromise. Now, for the first time in this House, the honorable gentlemen 
[Mr. Rhett] contends that the legislative power of the General Government should be 
exerted to protect slavery in the Territories.”57 
 This transition of the South’s position on slavery was partly acknowledged by 
southern congressmen, who placed the blame for their new stance on northern 
congressmen who insisted on supporting the Wilmot Proviso. South Carolinian 
Armistead Burt explained that South Carolina’s representatives had originally voted in 
favor of the prohibition of slavery contained in the Oregon bill, “because it lay north of 
the [Missouri] compromise line.” Everything changed, he argued, when “a gentleman 
from Pennsylvania rose and proposed what had since become so famous as the Wilmot 
proviso. Then the South took the alarm. At the next session the same proposition was 
renewed; and the South could no longer doubt the existence of a purpose which had now 
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become openly manifest to all.”58 Texas representative David Kaufman had voted to 
prohibit slavery in Oregon “because all of Oregon lies north of 36 ½ degrees north 
latitude, or what is commonly known as the Missouri compromise line.” Because the 
Missouri compromise line had been applied to Texas’s admission into the Union, he 
deemed the application of the same principle to Oregon both consistent and fair. 
Wilmot’s proviso had violated that compromise, and therefore altered his position on the 
matter of slavery in Oregon. “I never have voted against slavery in Oregon since the 
Wilmot proviso was introduced into and passed by this House,” Kaufman declared, and 
“I never will vote to exclude slavery from Oregon or any other Territory of the United 
States as long as I see the North determined to force down upon the South the Wilmot 
proviso.”59 As one of the most outspoken members of Congress on the slavery issue, 
Robert Barnwell Rhett sought to show Congress that his newfound appreciation for 
Congress’s right to legislate on slavery was embraced by the entire South. On June 1, 
1848, he read three resolutions to the House, which had been passed by the states of 
Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama. These declarations by the state legislatures “contain, I 
believe, the principles of the South on the important subject to which they relate,” 
slavery. Rhett therefore offered them as proof that his own words stemmed from the 
convictions of his southern constituents, who opposed the Wilmot Proviso’s prohibition 
of slavery. Though each of the three states utilized different words, they all expressed the 
same sentiment that they would agree to no law that did not recognize “the natural and 
indefatigable right of each and every citizen of every State of this Confederacy to reside, 
with his property of whatever description, in any territory which may be acquired by the 
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arms of the United States or yielded by treaty with any foreign Power.” With these 
declarations, the three states disavowed the Northwest Ordinance, the Missouri 
Compromise, and the Wilmot Proviso, insisting that Congress had no right to limit the 
freedom of slaveholders desiring to migrate to new territories with their slaves. During 
the second session of the 30th Congress, Daniel Wallace of South Carolina presented 
resolutions by the legislature of his state expressing its unanimity “with her sister States 
in resisting the application of the principles of the Wilmot proviso to such territory, at any 
and every hazard.”60 
As evidenced by these statements, the Wilmot Proviso had inspired the South to 
alter its position in regard to slavery in expansion and to castigate the Ordinance of 1787 
as “the baneful cause and foundation of all the fearful agitation which now threatens us.” 
Bayly’s opinion resonated with much of the southern delegation, when he stated: “I 
regard the Wilmot Proviso as designed to repudiate the Missouri compromise. If that 
compromise is to operate, [the Proviso] is unnecessary; and gentlemen, in insisting upon 
it, repudiate the Missouri compromise.”61 Since the North had abandoned the Missouri 
compromise, the South would also. Whereas before nearly all of the South would have 
been satisfied with an extension of the Missouri Compromise line, many southerners now 
believed the federal government must protect slavery and the right of inhabitants to bring 
all of their property—including slaves—into any territory. Mississippian Winfield 
Featherston argued away the Northwest Ordinance as “not applicable to this question 
arising under the Constitution,” because it had been adopted before the Constitution. 
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Since the Wilmot Proviso rested directly upon this principle, it constituted an invalid 
assertion of congressional power. Thomas Bocock of Virginia similarly argued that the 
Ordinance passed, “as Mr. Madison said, ‘without the slightest shadow of constitutional 
authority’….It cannot commit the South to the whole principle contended for; and the 
Missouri compromise, no more than the ordinance, commits the South to the power 
claimed for Congress to prohibit slavery.”62 
Although the instances of southern congressmen railing against northerners might 
make the differences between the two sections appear irreconcilable, the moderate 
position on popular sovereignty seemed to provide some middle ground for the North and 
the South on the issue of slavery. This doctrine proved especially popular among 
northwesterners, many of whom believed popular sovereignty more responsible for 
generating the Northwest’s wealth and success than the Northwest Ordinance. William 
Sawyer of Ohio announced that “[t]here was a sovereignty existing in the people—he did 
not care where or in what capacity you found them—whether in a town, a county, or a 
Territory. Our laws and our Constitution were predicated on the fact that the people had a 
right to self-government.” Congress, therefore, did not hold the power to decide slavery’s 
inclusion or exclusion in the territories. Fellow Ohioan Rodolphus Dickinson referred to 
the Northwest Ordinance, urging that “[h]e did not consider that ordinance binding; it 
never had been so considered by the people northwest of the Ohio.”63 He claimed the 
northwestern states carved out of that territory could have introduced slavery if they had 
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wished; they simply chose not to do so. He attributed the preservation of that free soil to 
the “good sense of the inhabitants of these States,” who chose “to exclude the evil from 
their borders” and thereby secured them for a future of “unexampled prosperity and 
progress.” Since all “Territories stood in the same relation to the General Government as 
did the States….the power to legislate for the government and general policy of 
Territories” did not belong in Congress but “necessarily remained with the people of the 
Territories.”64  
William Preston of Virginia concurred with the sympathies of these northwestern 
congressmen, voicing his approval of striving “to bring every citizen in this nation upon 
the broad, elevated American platform of popular sovereignty, resting with the people 
and with no Government whatsoever.” Preston also supported that doctrine because he 
believed it would most fairly resolve the slavery issue for the nation. How else “can this 
question be relieved from perpetual agitation, but by the enactment of a law assenting to 
the surrender of this territorial power to those to whom it belongs, and taking it from us, 
to whom it does not belong?” Preston then forecast the rise of “a great conservative party 
in the country, to be found north and south, in every portion of the Union,” built upon 
that single principle that the people of a Territory must decide their own laws. “I do not 
mean the Whig or the Democratic party,” he explained, “it may be and will be constituted 
of both. But upon it will be found that great republican national party who can and will 
maintain the Constitution and the Union.” By uniting around that party and its doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, Preston alleged, northern and southern extremism would dissipate 
and the Union would be saved.65 
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Most northern Democrats who embraced popular sovereignty were driven by the 
conviction that in northern territories lying above the 36 degrees 30’ line, settlers would 
undoubtedly prohibit slavery themselves, by popular vote. This method would thus 
achieve the same end sought by antislavery and abolitionist Americans, while at the same 
time preserving the most sacred democratic rights of the people and settling sectional 
turmoil instigated by the Wilmot Proviso. New York Democrat Ausburn Birdsall pointed 
to Iowa as the exemplar territory that epitomized popular sovereignty’s effectiveness. As 
part of the land acquired from the Louisiana Purchase, Iowa Territory was ruled by no 
ordinance barring the institution of slavery from its borders. “[Y]et, by natural laws,” 
Birdsall noted, “it was a free Territory, and is a free State” because migrants to those 
lands utilized their power to make their own decisions. Missourian Willard P. Hall 
concurred, arguing that “since we know that slavery cannot exist in Oregon…the attempt 
to embarrass the Oregon question with the clause restricting that institution, appears to 
me a most needless, a most reckless, a most wicked supererogation.”66  
These popular sovereignty advocates believed that supporters of the Wilmot 
Proviso—not so-called doughfaces—had adopted a political position aimed at making 
political gains rather than at the safety and perpetuity of the Union. “Men worked 
themselves into a fever about this Wilmot proviso,” Brodhead asserted, regarding 
territories like California and New Mexico that simply were not conducive to 
slaveholding. “Southern men would probably not take their slaves there in any 
numbers…but southern men, by a very natural feeling, were unwilling to be put under the 
ban.” Astonished by the extremes to which North and South had both flown following the 
Wilmot Proviso’s introduction, he wondered that “southern gentlemen assume just the 
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position the abolitionists of the North, and their allies, desire them to take,” arguing that 
Congress had the power to introduce slavery into new territories, and that they should 
utilize that power. “They want a pretext to agitate the slavery question in Congress” for 
its expansion, he explained, just as northerners sought to agitate it in favor of abolition. 
Brodhead believed popular sovereignty the only real solution to this dilemma. The 
Democratic Party’s presidential nominee and popular sovereignty hero Lewis Cass of 
Michigan “repudiated these extreme positions on both sides.”67 
 In 1848, with Cass on the Democratic ticket, popular sovereignty was just gaining 
momentum on a national platform, but the underlying principles of that doctrine had been 
popular in the Northwest for years. Since the early settlement of Illinois and her sister 
states of the Northwest Territory, migrants had wrestled with the Northwest Ordinance 
and its restrictions upon their rights. Many northwestern popular sovereignty advocates 
believed the Ordinance had not the power—whether legal or actual—to keep slavery 
from entering the Northwest; only the inhabitants ultimately decided that question.68 
Although Lincoln had settled in the state six years after the virulent debate over holding a 
statewide convention had unsettled the new state of Illinois, he nevertheless knew of 
those events and had politically matured in their wake. His politics had always been 
somewhat determined by his antislavery convictions, but time and experience began to 
solidify a concurrent belief that slavery would poison any ground that had not been 
specifically set aside as free soil. By the time he debated Stephen Douglas for an Illinois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 813; Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 649. 
68 Lewis Cass believed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had gone beyond the tradition of local self-
government fought for in the American Revolution and upheld by the Founding Fathers, and that it 
unconstitutionally gave Congress a power it did not legally have. Stephen Douglas was reluctant to go so 
far in his popular sovereignty position, yet emphasized that Congress “should be guided by ‘the great 
principle’ of local self-government.” Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the 
United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York and other cities: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 268. 
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Senate seat, his arguments in favor of the Northwest Ordinance had become cemented by 
regular use. This process began, for Lincoln, during his congressional term, when he 
perceived that the South had not gradually loosened its commitment to slavery but had 
bound itself closer to the institution; that slavery strangled the southern nonslaveholder as 
well as the free black, eliminating his opportunities to the point of poverty or the decision 
to migrate hundreds of miles away; and that the country would have to choose between 
the eradication of slavery embodied by the Wilmot Proviso, and the cementation of 
slavery through popular sovereignty.   
 Popular sovereignty, he believed, posed a far greater danger to the Union than 
proslavery ideology because it hid its potentially proslavery implications behind a veneer 
of national unity and moderation.69 It legitimized an otherwise radical ideology of 
proslavery, created by a small section of slaveholders seeking greater wealth and control 
over the nonslaveholding population.70 Thus, when David Wilmot responded to these 
popular sovereignty expostulations with the rhetorical question, “if the proviso was not 
adopted and acted on, would not slaveholders go into these territories, and would not the 
perpetuation of slavery there inevitably follow,” Lincoln answered “yes.”71 He also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Lincoln’s derision for popular sovereignty emerged in many of his speeches. CW, II: 240, 278; III: 405, 
437, 465–67. 
70 Lincoln appears to have been as fearful of the political and practical attractiveness of popular 
sovereignty—its ability to sway masses of white nonslaveholders who opposed slavery but nonetheless 
thought popular sovereignty the fairest method of resolving the slavery issue—as of the attractiveness of its 
principles. Therefore, although I agree with Fehrenbacher and others who argue that Lincoln “discovered in 
popular sovereignty an odious new principle which placed slavery and freedom on the same ethical level,” 
for the purposes of this study I rather emphasize his fear that popular sovereignty appeared as a fair, 
moderate solution to a divisive issue. Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness, 24; Hammond, Slavery, 
Freedom and Expansion, 150. 
71 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 813. Lincoln voted in favor of the anti-slavery extension principle several 
other times in Congress. In 1855, Lincoln informed his Kentuckian friend Joshua Speed that “[w]hen I was 
at Washington I voted for the Wilmot Proviso as good as forty times.” CW, II: 323.  When the Senate’s 
amendment to the Oregon bill proposed to strike out all reference to the ordinance of 1787, Lincoln voted 
against that amendment. He also voted against an amendment to base the exclusion of slavery in Oregon 
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campaigned vigorously for Zachary Taylor against Cass. On July 27, 1848, his speech on 
“The Presidential Question” carefully dodged the ambiguity of Taylor’s own views on 
the proviso, while it castigated the position held by Cass. “I am a northern man, or, 
rather, a western free State man,” Lincoln asserted, “with a constituency I believe to be, 
and with personal feelings I know to be, against the extension of slavery.” Therefore, he 
sought to reveal to his constituents and to the nation the real choice that lay before them. 
While Taylor might not push to apply the Wilmot Proviso, Lincoln explained, he would 
not veto it should Congress pass the restriction. Cass, meanwhile, would inevitably bring 
slavery into new territories through the back door of popular sovereignty. Therefore, 
regardless of Taylor’s ideological commitment to the Wilmot Proviso, Cass must be 
defeated.72 
As a lawyer, Lincoln was also familiar with such cases as those invoked by John 
Pettit of Indiana, who with “a legal mind” proved to the House that the Northwest 
Ordinance had actively worked to halt slavery’s growth in the Northwest. He mentioned 
that several Kentucky court cases “had, over and over again, decided that a negro born in 
the Northwest Territory after the passage of the ordinance in 1787 could not be taken into 
slavery at all.” If members of the House “did not like the decisions of the courts of 
Kentucky—as some were pleased to call it a quasi slaveholding State—let them go 
further south, and he would refer them to adjudicated cases in Missouri and Louisiana, 
where the courts held precisely the same doctrine, and affirmed the ordinance to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not the Missouri Compromise line, instead of the Northwest Ordinance. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 1027 
and 1062. 
72 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 1041. The party line adopted by Whigs was 
that Cass, as president, would utilize executive power to veto the Wilmot Proviso, while Taylor would 
refuse to do so. Morrison, Democratic Politics, 156. Lincoln reiterated time and again, in his campaign 
speeches for Taylor in New England and Illinois, that he believed General Taylor “would not veto the 
Wilmot proviso if passed by Congress.” CW, II: 12. 
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binding.” In numerous ways, Lincoln learned, the Northwest Ordinance’s antislavery 
clause had kept the institution at bay.73 
 If these discussions, alone, had enveloped the 30th Congress, Lincoln would have 
gathered that slavery was, as Joshua Giddings claimed, the “transcendent and absorbing 
question which occupies the intellect of the nation.” As the records of the Congressional 
Globe make apparent, slavery did devour much of the 30th Congress’s time and attention, 
and the ensuing debates often appear to ominously portend the dissolution of the Union. 
Giddings perceived the formation of new parties as “old party lines are becoming 
indistinct and uncertain. A portion of those who have heretofore acted with us now 
incline to the cause of extending slavery, and some who have acted against us now go for 
limiting that institution.” Persisting in this portrait of a 30th Congress shattered by the 
slavery issue, Giddings declared that “on this principle of opposing all attempts of the 
Federal Government to extend and uphold that institution [slavery], against all 
interference or connection with slavery….is now based a party, or the germ of a party, 
that will at no distant day become dominant in this nation.”74 Elihu Root feared that such 
portentous claims might prove true. Early in the session, in December 1847, he stated, 
“[i]t requires no gift of prophecy to foretell that there is even now a black cloud lowering 
upon our political horizon—I hope I am understood, sir; I say a black cloud—which is 
soon to burst, with more wind and thunder than anything else…with wind and thunder 
sufficient to distract this body and disturb the peace of the country.”75 
Throughout the two sessions of the 30th  the introduction of so many petitions, 
bills, and debates on topics other than slavery, especially those directed related to trade, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 718. 
74 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 394; Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 380. 
75 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 30. 
178	  
	  
	  
railroad expansion, the budget, and the postal system, belied the charge that slavery had 
yet become an all-consuming issue drowning out all others. Most importantly, many 
southerners permitted their love for the Union and desire for compromise to shine 
through even the most sectional of rants. These statements convinced Lincoln, first, that 
southern leaders might talk of secession all they liked but they would never actually carry 
it through; and second, that the masses of southern nonslaveholders would never rally 
behind secession in defense of slavery. 
 Amid warnings that the South would not tolerate the North’s antislavery politics, 
the more conciliatory and Unionist remarks of several southern congressmen served to 
temper the proceedings and remind the representatives that secession remained a radical 
doctrine attracting relatively few supporters within the South. Avid Whig leader 
Alexander Stephens gave a speech implicitly denouncing Democrats as “political 
managers and intriguers, who had not the principle and spirit of men about them.” 
Stephens claimed “he would prefer an out-and-out Wilmot proviso man to one who 
would undertake to cheat him, to deceive him,” and to mislead his constituents. That 
Stephens’s Wilmot Proviso comment did not incite the wrath of the entire southern 
delegation indicates that, in 1848, sectionalism had not yet come to define American 
politics. Lincoln would have agreed with Stephens’s further remarks that the Democratic 
Party’s position of popular sovereignty sought merely to “deceive, mislead, humbug the 
honest yeomanry of this country.”76 Joseph Woodward of South Carolina, though he 
fervently fought against the Wilmot Proviso, urged the North to embrace compromise 
with the South at a level bargaining table, just as they had done in 1787. Meanwhile, 
North Carolina representative Thomas Clingman’s remarks reminded the House that the 
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South remained committed to Union with the North. “I voted against the rule excluding 
abolition petitions,” Clingman explained, “not only because I regarded that rule as an 
infringement of the right of petition, but because I was well aware that most of the 
citizens of the northern States viewed it in that light.” Forcing the North to accept that 
rule, Clingman explicated, had only allowed abolitionists to “acquire a great show of 
strength by blending with themselves the friends of the right of petition.”77 
 Even Thomas Bayly, the outspoken proslavery representative from Virginia, left 
the door open to better relations between North and South. Decrying abolitionists for 
hypocritically condemning southerners for slavery even as their own northern states 
sought to exclude or limit the freedoms of blacks within their borders, he castigated 
Giddings and other radicals on the House floor. Yet, when Illinois representative Orland 
Ficklin openly admitted the restrictions placed upon blacks by the Illinois legislature, 
Bayly responded with appreciation for his willingness to honestly describe the position 
assumed by many northerners. Bayly “believed all of the delegation from Illinois—
perhaps he did wrong in saying all, but he knew it was true in reference to most of 
them—were acting towards the South on this subject in a spirit very different from the 
spirit in which Ohio and other States were acting.” Bayly’s reaction indicates the respect 
southerners still felt for those northern colleagues who did not seek to place the blame for 
slavery upon their shoulders, or to interfere with the institution as it existed in the 
South.78 
 The subject of Bayly’s tirade—the prevalence of anti-black sentiment among 
whites both North and South—also resonated with Lincoln. Familiar with the often 
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78 Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 612. 
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violent anti-black feelings exhibited by so many of his constituents in Illinois, Lincoln 
knew that white northerners and southerners shared a common antipathy toward African 
Americans—an antipathy that reminded him of the further commonalities between his 
Illinoisans and the typical white southerner. Clingman had mentioned those “similar 
feelings,” explicitly referencing “the extraordinary provision in the new constitution of 
Illinois, to prevent free negroes from being admitted into the territory of that State.” 
These brief glimpses into the ideology of the white southern nonslaveholder reminded 
Lincoln that, as Palfrey alleged, the political divide in regard to the slavery question was 
not between the North and the South, but rather “was between fifteen millions of white 
non-slaveholding people and some three hundred thousand white slaveholding people of 
this Union—between fourteen thousand of thousands on the one side, and three hundred 
thousand on the other.” The class divide between slaveholders and nonslaveholders, 
Lincoln believed, served as a greater obstacle to political coalescence than the 
geographical divide between North and South. This gulf between slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders would steer nonslaveholders away from any radical secessionist 
movement based on the extension of slavery—an institution that did not serve their best 
interests.79  
 Because he believed men tended to act in their own self-interest, and that living in 
a slave-based society offered little benefit to the nonslaveholder, Lincoln did not perceive 
secession as a real threat in 1849 and, more importantly, he did not believe it would ever 
pose as serious a threat to the Union as it ultimately did in 1860 and 1861. Furthermore, 
though the Wilmot Proviso had cleaved the two national parties and forced a sectional 
vote, with northern congressmen voting for, and southern congressmen voting against, 
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the measure, this sectional tear in the seam of national party organizations still appeared 
manageable.80 Rather than heeding the appeals of John C. Calhoun for southerners to 
unite, men like Robert Toombs and Alexander Stephens, whom Lincoln knew well from 
their work as part of the Young Indians, re-committed themselves to the Whig Party of 
Zachary Taylor. Congressional voting records from Lincoln’s session and a few years 
thereafter support this surprising degree of party unity over the great majority of issues 
and votes. As Eric Foner has asserted, Lincoln did not believe slavery would inevitably 
destroy the Union when he finished up his term in Congress and returned home. Rather, 
he “still viewed the slavery controversy as, in his own words, a ‘distracting question,’ a 
threat both to the unity of his party and to the survival of the Union and Constitution he 
revered” which might be avoided.81 
From his time and experiences in Congress Lincoln concluded that popular 
sovereignty—not secession—had the capacity to both spread slavery and embroil the 
nation further in sectional turmoil.82 In Washington, D.C., he encountered the same 
arguments for freedom and territorial sovereignty that had convinced unsuspecting 
migrants to embrace the proslavery designs of demagogic aristocrats in 1824 Illinois, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Scholars debate the extent to which the Democratic Party irrevocably split during this period, and how 
much the advent of Free Soil had to do with the Wilmot Proviso, rather than with intra-party quarrels 
between Van Burenites and Polk supporters. Morrison, Democratic Politics; Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery; 
Rayback, Free Soil, 78–79; Potter, The Impending Crisis, 23. 
81 Freehling, Road to Disunion, I: 479; Joel H. Silbey, “Parties and Politics in Mid-Nineteenth Century 
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82	  As far back as 1837, Lincoln felt popular sovereignty to be a misguided doctrine. Yet at that time he 
chose to ignore Douglas and his political views, rhetorically asking fellow Whig representative William 
Minshall: “Isn’t that the best mode of treating so small a matter?” Not until his session in U.S. Congress did 
Lincoln confront the possibility that popular sovereignty could capture a significant portion of the 
electorate. CW, I: 107. 
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which had created a political culture that continued to embrace state sovereignty over 
slavery or antislavery. The disregard congressmen and Illinois Democrats displayed 
toward the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 convinced Lincoln that he would have to 
strongly counteract the growing movement in favor of popular sovereignty. He knew that 
“Doughfaces” and Douglas Democrats often gained popularity among southern-born 
migrants in Illinois who sought to escape slavery without blaming, or restricting the 
freedoms of, southerners who remained in the South.83 Arguments akin to those presented 
by Congressman Thomas Henley of Indiana, who cast Wilmot Proviso supporters and 
Whigs as radical abolitionists, resonated with many of these settlers. Henley and other 
Democrats’ representation of the Democratic Party as the only political body committed 
to antislavery, yet truly willing to embrace southern slaveholders and all their faults, 
attracted droves of voters in the Northwest.84 
 As the second session of the 30th Congress closed and Lincoln returned to Illinois, 
he carried home with him the satisfaction of Zachary Taylor’s success over General Cass 
for the presidency, but he looked forward to an uncertain future in Illinois politics. His 
single term in Washington, D.C., however, had been the most formative of his life. 
Lincoln had been reintroduced to the power of the Northwest Ordinance, that document 
that had shaped his state’s history and given him, he believed, the means by which he 
rose to his present position as U.S. Congressman. Significantly, his time in Congress also 
coincided with a renewed interest in his family’s history, sparked by a distant relative in 
Massachusetts. 
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 Solomon Lincoln of Massachusetts, curious if this new Illinois congressman bore 
any relation to his own family, sent an inquiry to Lincoln asking about his heritage. 
Lincoln responded to him on March 6, 1848: “I was born Feb. 12th, 1809 in Hardin 
county, Kentucky. My father’s name is Thomas; my grandfather’s was Abraham,—the 
same of [sic] my own. My grandfather went from Rockingham county in Virginia, to 
Kentucky, about the year 1782; and, two years afterwards, was killed by the Indians. We 
have a vague tradition, that my great-grand father went from Pennsylvania to Virginia; 
and that he was a quaker. Further back than this, I have never heard any thing.” He 
apologetically explained that, “Owing to my father being left an orphan at the age of six 
years, in poverty, and in a new country, he became a wholly uneducated man; which I 
suppose is the reason why I know so little of our family history.”85 
Apparently, Lincoln did not consider this inquiry into his heritage much of an 
inconvenience. He politely responded to Solomon, “[i]f you shall be able to trace any 
connection between yourself and me, or, in fact, whether you shall or not, I should be 
pleased to have a line from you at any time.” More importantly, Lincoln did not put his 
own, awakened, curiosity about his family history at rest with this simple reply. Instead, 
he acquired the name and address of David Lincoln of Virginia from fellow congressman 
James McDowell, a Democrat, and wrote to the Virginia Lincoln on March 24, 1848, “to 
ascertain whether we are not of the same family. I shall be much obliged, if you will 
write me, telling me, whether you, in any way, know any thing of my grandfather, what 
relation you are to him, and so on. Also, if you know, where your family came from, 
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when they settled in Virginia, tracing them back as far as your knowledge extends.”86 
After receiving reply from David Lincoln, congressman Abraham Lincoln concluded that 
David’s uncle was Abraham’s grandfather. Upon realizing he had established this 
connection with an estranged family member, Lincoln gave a short biography of himself, 
as well as a short history of his father’s move to the West. After asking David several 
questions about the family history beyond what he already knew, Lincoln asked if knew 
“any thing of your family (or rather I may now say, our family) farther back than your 
grandfather?”87  
 These written exchanges Lincoln held with extended family members sparked his 
interest in his family genealogy and history, causing him to reconsider his father’s and 
grandfather’s migrations westward. In light of David and Solomon Lincolns’ continued 
residences in the East, he must have wondered how different his own life would have 
been if his own grandfather had chosen to remain on the East coast. Most significantly, 
Abraham Lincoln’s reference to Thomas Lincoln’s poverty not only reveals his own lack 
of knowledge about his own family but also, significantly, took place within the context 
of a 30th Congress dominated by the single document that had opened the Northwest to 
Lincoln’s father. Lincoln began this correspondence with family members separated from 
him by this migration just as he witnessed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 re-emerge as 
a crucial political issue in the halls of the national legislature. The confluence of these 
events sparked the creation of a memory for Lincoln—a memory of his parents’ 
migration from Kentucky to the Northwest as one made “partly on account of slavery.”88  
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This short period of Lincoln’s life would thus shape his evolving memory of his 
early childhood, and his own connection to the Northwest Ordinance, for years to come. 
He travelled back to Illinois with the convictions that the Northwest Ordinance had been 
crucial to preserving its states’ freedom from slavery, that the Wilmot Proviso simply 
applied that principle to all future lands to the benefit of all nonslaveholders, and that the 
South had become less democratic over time, as an autocratic body of slaveholders 
increased its power over white nonslaveholders and blacks alike. These ideas coalesced 
into a general complacency in regard to secessionist threats, since he believed the 
majority of the South—black and white—would never gather behind a secessionist 
movement. It also caused Lincoln to fixate on popular sovereignty as the most dangerous 
doctrine to the Union. Since there was little actual danger of the masses of 
nonslaveholders allying with their fellow southern slaveholders, the real danger, he 
believed, existed in a doctrine that undermined anti-slavery arguments. The former 
congressman thus disregarded the warning of slaveholding congressmen like Venable, 
that they “shall cease to regard the Union as desirable” if slavery agitation continued.89 
His mind, and future, was set on defeating popular sovereignty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 540. 
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Chapter Five 
Adopting Antislavery Politics, 1849–1854 
 
During his two years in U.S. Congress, Abraham Lincoln gained exposure to a set 
of ideas that influenced his views of the South and the spread of slavery. Although his 
political ascent leveled off when he returned to his law career full time in 1849, Lincoln 
never abandoned politics, and the years between 1849 and 1854 were a politically crucial 
period of his life. It was then that he began to formulate an antislavery politics, laying the 
foundation for the position that he would later come to embrace as a Republican leader of 
the Northwest, as the main challenger to Stephen Douglas, and as the first Republican 
president of the United States. The post–Wilmot Proviso arguments Lincoln had 
encountered in Congress, especially those regarding the Northwest Ordinance and 
migration to the free states, played a vital role in this evolution. By 1854 he had become 
convinced that the Northwest offered a shining example of America’s free soil future in 
contrast to the South, which was blighted by the effects of slavery; that the Founding 
Fathers had intended for slavery to eventually disappear from America; and that 
proslavery sentiment was growing in the South. These three convictions re-activated his 
political ambitions, inspired his active political involvement against the spread of slavery, 
and eventually led him to join the Republican Party, through which he challenged 
Stephen Douglas for a U.S. Senate seat and for the office of President of the United 
States.  
Evidence that the influences of migration and his congressional colleagues had 
caused Lincoln to reconsider his public stance on slavery first emerged in his 1852 
eulogy of Henry Clay. His articulation of a new antislavery politics truly blossomed two 
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years later, in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, when Stephen Douglas’s 
proposed act threatened the extension of free soil. Although Lincoln’s personal 
antislavery beliefs did not change from 1848 to 1860, he made a monumental shift during 
the years 1849 to 1854, from downplaying the slavery issue to publicly advocating for the 
non-extension of slavery into U.S. territories. In his public statements following the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act’s passage, Lincoln emphasized the Northwest Ordinance, 
Jefferson’s role in restricting slavery in U.S. territories, and the evils of slavery—all of 
which, he had learned from both antislavery congressional colleagues and anti–slave 
system migrants, were crucial to ensuring America’s future as a nation freed from 
slavery. Meanwhile, the little he gleaned from the South gave him the discomfiting 
realization that proslavery doctrine had grown, rather than withered, in the region. 
Nevertheless, he believed proslavery secessionism would never enrapture the majority of 
white southern nonslaveholders. His political upbringing in Illinois, as well as the 
statistics and statements of his congressional colleagues, had taught him that southerners 
often sought to flee from the system, even if that entailed leaving behind friends, family, 
and home. Popular sovereignty, far more than proslavery radicalism, proved uniquely 
capable of attracting the masses, both North and South. Lincoln feared that the nation 
would slide into this comfortable doctrine of self-determination, and thereby let slavery 
in through the back door. A nation opposed to slavery, he feared, might allow it to spread 
in the name of Union, compromise, or conciliation. That it could possibly come in 
through the front door, with the support of the vast majority of white southerners, did not 
seem plausible. Therefore, from 1849 to 1854 Lincoln drew upon his northwestern 
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experience and his time in Congress to emerge as a leading Illinois opponent of popular 
sovereignty and the extension of slavery in the United States.  
 Lincoln returned to Illinois in 1849 after helping to elect Zachary Taylor the next 
Whig president. Through his work with the Young Indians, his familiarity with southern 
members of Congress, and his continued adherence to national Whig principles, Lincoln 
ended his single term convinced that a strict party adherence to the Union would alleviate 
sectional tensions over slavery and allow the question to eventually be resolved. 
Similarly convinced that both abolitionism and proslavery radicalism brought only 
disunion and destruction, Lincoln sought to avoid the two extremes in favor of a national 
course that continued the Union’s commitment to gradually ending slavery without 
forcing any plan upon the South. Campaigning for Taylor in the Northeast in 1849, he 
carefully navigated around the question of slavery, supporting his party’s tactic of 
explaining that the slaveholding Taylor was opposed to any veto of the Wilmot Proviso, 
while avoiding the question of whether or not he personally supported or opposed the 
extension of slavery in the territories. Lincoln explained in his Massachusetts speeches 
for Taylor “that the will of the people should produce its own results, without Executive 
influence.” He therefore left the distinction between Taylor and Cass to rest on the very 
basic point that Cass “has avowed his favor of the unlimited exercise of the veto power,” 
while Taylor would not authoritatively reject the legislation of U.S. Congress.1 The 
“Lone Whig Star” of Illinois’s speeches belied that nationwide, people perceived him as 
the leading Whig representative of Illinois. Lincoln saw this achievement as just the 
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beginning for Illinois, and he hoped to expand upon the Whig stronghold in central 
Illinois.2  
 During the spring of 1849 Lincoln avidly worked to accomplish this through his 
support of particular Illinois Whigs as candidates for various offices on the local and 
national level. Lincoln received requests from a multitude of constituents and political 
friends, many of whom he wrote recommendation letters for appointments. These 
positions included everything from the local Tremont postmaster to national 
commissioner of the General Land Office.3 By April, many of the Illinois Whigs who had 
worked to elect Taylor feared his administration had neglected them in favor of other 
Whigs. William D. Briggs of Tremont explained to Lincoln that he personally did not 
seek an appointment, but he wished to at least “have a good Whig Taylor man 
appointed.” Yet two Whigs, Dr. Shaw and Dr. Stockwell, neither of whom had supported 
Taylor for President, were now put forward as leading candidates for a position within 
the administration. Both these men, Briggs pleaded, “threw cold water on the cause 
during the canvass….For Heavens sake do not let those who did nothing for Old Zack be 
the first benefited by his election.” George Rives pointed out to Lincoln that 
proportionate to Whig strength in their respective states, Missouri and Wisconsin men 
had received more appointments than Whigs of Illinois. James Kennaday, meanwhile, 
complained that “[i]f bolters are to be fattened up with offices from the general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 CW, II:3, 2:32. As a member of the Young Indians, Lincoln had also done critical work to elect President 
Zachary Taylor; while as the Lone Whig Star he helped accelerate the party to a greater future in the 
Northwest. Consequently, he anticipated he would continue to play an important role in creating a brighter 
future for the Whig Party in Illinois. 
3 William D. Briggs to Lincoln, April 19, 1849, Jesse K. Dubois to Lincoln, April 2, 1848, C. Burr Artz to 
Lincoln, April 19, 1849, LC. In the case of Ann E. Campbell, an extended family member asked Lincoln 
for his aid in getting her husband an appointment in Washington, D.C. Ann E. Campbell to Lincoln, April 
29, 1849, Ibid. Charles H. Constable was an old friend who humbly explained to Lincoln his necessity for 
any appointment that would pay off his debts and support his family. Constable to Lincoln, May 5, 1849, 
Ibid. 
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Government, it is poor encouragement for whigs who never ask for office, to keep up a 
regular organization at home.” He informed Lincoln that he had “promised the whigs of 
this county that the acts of a bolter should be brought before you and the general 
government….and I have kept my word.” Only a Taylor Whig deserved to receive an 
appointment from the president’s administration.4  
 One reason Illinoisans perhaps felt slighted stemmed from President Taylor’s 
decision to institute a new practice in receiving requests and recommendations for 
appointments within his administration. Taylor had decided to immediately direct all 
letters and persons requesting appointments to the respective departments of his 
administration, and he refused to deviate from this practice in the least. Ben E. Green 
illustrated the difficulties inherent in this system and recalled to Lincoln his unsuccessful 
attempt to submit any sort of recommendation directly to President Taylor, despite 
getting an interview with him in late May 1849. Green expressed his frustration that 
because Lincoln’s letter would not be read by Taylor but by the secretary of the Interior, 
it was difficult for General Taylor to “know the true feeling of his friends in Illinois.” 
Lincoln’s task was rendered even more challenging by the apparent inability of his friend 
and successor to U.S. Congress, Edward D. Baker, to assist in these efforts. Baker told 
Lincoln he was “annoyed to Death, about offices.” Meanwhile, according to his 
constituents, Baker apparently did not exert any great efforts to attain offices for them. 
George Rives said he did not believe there had been “any effort made by our prominent 
men in behalf of our state” since, as C. Burr Artz alleged, Baker had “neglected” the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 William D. Briggs to Lincoln, April 19, 1849, James Kennady to Lincoln, May 2, 1849, LC. 
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matters of his constituents. In light of this neglect, Illinoisans continued to viewed 
Lincoln as the state’s “sole representative.”5  
 The majority of letters exchanged between Lincoln and his political friends, 
however, revolved around the prized position of commissioner of the General Land 
Office, which Illinois Whigs believed should go to a Taylor Whig from Illinois. Lincoln 
was at first insistent that the office go to one of several Illinoisans who had supported 
Taylor and expressed interest in the position—Martin P. Sweet, James L. D. Morrison, 
Orville H. Browning, or Cyrus Edwards—but not to himself. However, Lincoln and his 
fellow Whigs soon realized that Justin L. Butterfield, a Chicago Whig who had disdained 
the Whig nomination of Taylor, had been employing his political connections (some of 
them within the Taylor Cabinet) to win the General Land Office appointment.6 Josiah M. 
Lucas believed “every whig in Illinois—with few exceptions” would support Cyrus 
Edwards, or Lincoln if he should choose to vie for the position, but Butterfield “would be 
a mere tool, without any will of his own.” Lucas believed no one in Illinois wanted 
Butterfield to get it and that an immediate effort must be made to prevent Secretary of the 
Interior Thomas Ewing from convincing Taylor that Butterfield was the best choice.7 In 
the meantime, Lucas rushed to Taylor’s office and showed him several letters proving 
“that Butterfield was the last man in the state that Whigs would go for, for any office.” 
Apparently affected by this evidence against Butterfield, Taylor held off the appointment 
for several weeks.8 Lincoln had still hesitated to put forward his name as a candidate for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ben E. Green to Lincoln, May 29, 1849, Edward D. Baker to Lincoln, April 27, 1849, George W. Rives to 
Lincoln, April 25, 1849, C. Burr Artz to Lincoln, April 19, 1849, LC. 
6 Josiah M. Lucas to Lincoln, April 12, 1849, LC; CW, II:28–29. 
7 Thomas Ewing exercised the power of his position to aid Justin Butterfield in attaining the appointment, 
then offered Lincoln the governorship of the Oregon Territory. Donald, Lincoln, 139–41. 
8 Josiah M. Lucas to Lincoln, April 12, 1849, Lucas to Lincoln, May 7, 1849, William H. Henderson to 
Lincoln, May 13, 1849, LC. Lucas told Anson G. Henry that Taylor had “expressed great partiality for 
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the office, always believing that he should get it if he chose to apply, but preferring that 
one of his Taylor Whig friends be chosen instead. However, he refused to allow Justin 
Butterfield, who had opposed Taylor’s candidacy and done nothing to elect him to 
national office, to receive the appointment. Writing to southern Whig William B. Preston, 
with whom he had served in U.S. Congress, Lincoln explained that he had “received 
letters from different persons at Washington assuring me it was not improbable that 
Justin Butterfield, of Chicago, Ills., would be appointed Commissioner of the Genl. Land-
Office. It was to avert this very thing, that I called on you….and besought you that, so far 
as in your power, no man from Illinois should be appointed to any high office, without 
my being at least heard on the question.” Lincoln intimated that while Butterfield was a 
personal friend of his, he had proven, multiple times, that he would follow the winds for a 
good appointment, whether those winds blew for or against the benefit of the Whig party. 
Last year, “when you and I were almost sweating blood to have Genl. Taylor nominated,” 
Lincoln remembered, “this same man was ridiculing the idea, and going for Mr. Clay.” 
Then, when the nomination went to Taylor, Butterfield did not lend any assistance to the 
Whig campaign. Lincoln warned Preston that awarding these offices to detractors would 
ultimately hurt the cause of the Whig Party and, by extension, the nation itself.9 
 As Lincoln began to question his previous assumption that a fellow Taylor Whig 
from Illinois would undoubtedly receive the General Land Office position, he decided 
that he should, for the benefit of the Illinois Whig party, muster all available resources to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lincoln,” and derisively referring to Butterfield, noted that Taylor “was astonished to find that Butternuts 
was not their choice.” Josiah M. Lucas to Anson G. Henry, May 22, 1849, LC. 
9 CW, II:48–49. 
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win the appointment for himself.10 He therefore drew on local, state, regional, and 
national ties to gain the commissionership. He sent requests to former congressional 
colleagues like Elisha Embree of Indiana, “to write General Taylor at once, saying that 
either I, or the man I recommend, should, in your opinion, be appointed to that office, if 
any one from Illinois shall be.” Several of these men from the 30th Congress replied in 
Lincoln’s favor. Abraham R. McIlvaine of Pennsylvania agreed to send Taylor a letter, 
intimating that “there is no one in Ill. or any other state, upon whom I would rather see 
this appointment fall.” Chester Butler, also a Pennsylvania congressman, and Maryland 
Whig Alexander Evans, each reiterated the same sentiment.11 Lincoln returned to those 
men whom he had before talked out of recommending him, like Nathaniel Pope, U.S. 
district judge for the state of Illinois. Aware of the late hour of his request, Lincoln asked 
Pope in a June 8, 1849, letter whether he could not, “without embarrassment, or any 
impropriety, so far vindicate the truth of history, as to briefly state to me, in a letter, what 
you did say to me last spring on my arrival here from Washington, in relation to my 
becoming an applicant for that office?” Fearing that Thomas Ewing would do all in his 
power to suppress consideration for him, he asked supporters to write to other Whigs, 
such as John J. Crittenden, for support in Washington, D.C. Lincoln hoped resurrecting 
these statements and wielding them on his behalf would prove enough to convince Taylor 
to extend him the job.12 John H. Morrison, Jesse K. Dubois, George W. Stipp, William T. 
Page, General Asahel Gridley, Anson G. Henry, and a host of other politically active 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As Thomas F. Schwartz explains, Lincoln initially declined to run for the General Land Office because 
he knew there were several qualified Whig applicants, and he upheld “organizational efficiency and unity” 
as vital to the strength of the Whig Party. Schwartz, “’An Egregious Political Blunder:’ Justin Butterfield, 
Lincoln, and Illinois Whiggery,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association 8 (January 1986): 13–14. 
11 CW, II:50; Abraham R. McIlvaine to Lincoln, June 18, 1849, Chester Butler to Lincoln, June 18, 1849, 
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12 Lincoln to Nathaniel Pope, June 8, 1849, LC; CW, II:49–50. 
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Illinois friends sent letters and petitions to Washington, D.C., on Lincoln’s behalf. That 
Lincoln gathered a sense of his own vital importance to the Whig cause was unavoidable; 
as William H. Henderson assured him: “Illinois looks to you, her hopes are all 
concentrated upon you.”13 
 Lincoln also drew upon his southern Whig connections for support. He and 
William B. Preston, formerly Whig congressman from Virginia during Lincoln’s term, 
exchanged numerous letters after Preston accepted the post of Secretary of the Navy 
under President Taylor. Feeling that “[n]o member of the cabinet knows so well…the 
great anxiety I felt for Gen. Taylor’s election,” Lincoln pressed Preston early on to make 
sure Whigs received appointments over Democratic competitors. Upon hearing rumors 
that Justin Butterfield would likely receive the appointment, he complained again to his 
southern Whig confidant. “It was to avert this very thing, that I called on you at your 
rooms one Sunday evening shortly after you were installed, and besought you that, so far 
as in your power, no man from Illinois should be appointed to any high office, without 
my being at least heard on the question.” Lincoln also seemed to imply that the Whig 
Party had changed, that a new guard had transitioned it to the new times, and that 
“making appointments through old-hawker foreign influences” would only turn people 
away from them.14 Considering Preston a political friend, he informed him that it would 
be prudent to grant the position to any Taylor Whig, and above all, to any one but 
Butterfield. Lincoln similarly penned to John M. Clayton his concerns that Taylor was 
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11, 1849, LC. 
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not managing his appointments as he should, and to Willie P. Mangum, a senator from 
North Carolina, for a recommendation.15 
 When rumors of Butterfield’s candidacy for the position persisted, Lincoln finally 
decided to travel to Washington, D.C., to lobby in person for the General Land Office 
commissionership, in rejection of Justin Butterfield’s proposition that they each remain at 
home and allow the Taylor administration to make its own decision.16 In a memorandum 
Lincoln wrote to Taylor in June 1849, he emphasized the vast extent to which Illinois and 
her Whig party leadership had been ignored. He largely agreed with friend David Davis, 
who had remarked on how “strange” it was “that the voice of members of Congress from 
a State is not taken about appointments.” To Lincoln, this neglect perhaps seemed more 
unnerving than strange. In his letter to Taylor, he emphasized the significance not only of 
Illinois but particularly of central Illinois—that section of the state that contained many 
Kentuckians and other southern migrants who revered Henry Clay. While northern and 
southern Illinois had received attention from the administration, central Illinois had been 
given no apparent consideration in its appointment decisions. “Is the center nothing?” 
Lincoln asked. “[T]hat center which alone has ever given you a Whig representative?” 
This insistent plea underscored Lincoln’s frustration in navigating between the politics of 
northern and southern Illinois, and finding a moderate course. To this one-term 
congressman, the center of Illinois represented the heart of the national Whig party, and 
its own attempt to unite the sections of North and South under one platform. By ignoring 
the middle of his state and pandering to the most extreme sections of it instead, Lincoln 
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16 Anson G. Henry to Lincoln [May 24, 1849], Richard M. Young to Lincoln, May 7, 1840, Justin 
Butterfield to Lincoln, June 9, 1849, LC. 
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believed the Taylor administration undid its own work and erased the accomplishments 
of recent months and years.17  
 Despite this sincere and coordinated effort on Lincoln’s behalf, Justin Butterfield 
ultimately received the position of commissioner of the General Land Office; Lincoln, 
offered the station of Governor of the Oregon Territory, rejected it in favor of returning to 
his law practice in Illinois. For the next several years, law and family matters kept 
Lincoln quite busy. His father, Thomas Lincoln, died in 1851, not long after Mary’s 
father passed away, and Lincoln dealt with financial matters following in the wake of 
these deaths.18 Upon returning to Springfield, Illinois, in 1849, most of his time was 
consumed by a busy law practice and circuit routine. Some historians depict this period 
of Lincoln’s life as a politically inactive time when he withdrew from politics, possibly 
intending to permanently lay at rest all his former ambitions in that area.19 Though his 
disinclination to seek or accept political positions certainly resulted in a decreased 
involvement from his former days as congressman, Lincoln did not leave politics behind 
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95. 
19 Foner, The Fiery Trial, 60; White, Jr., A. Lincoln, 167–85; and Donald, Lincoln, 142 portray an abrupt 
conclusion of Lincoln’s political career in 1849, then its restart with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act. Other scholarship, however, has acknowledged that Lincoln “did not completely abandon politics 
during the early 1850s.” William C. Harris, Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2007), 58. See also Roy Morris, Jr. The Long Pursuit: Abraham Lincoln’s Thirty-Year Struggle 
with Stephen Douglas for the Heart and Soul of America (New York: HarperCollins, 2008) 55; Schwartz, 
“’An Egregious Political Blunder,’” 12–14. Don E. Fehrenbacher believed the characterization that Lincoln 
“retired” from politics considerably overstates the case,” and offers John J. Duff, A. Lincoln; Prairie 
Lawyer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) and Benjamin P. Thomas, Abraham Lincoln; a 
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), as other notable examples of that trend. Fehrenbacher, 
Prelude to Greatness, 20, 174 n4.  
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him.20 Besides remaining apprised of national political events through his avid reading of 
newspapers and speeches, the former congressman continued to participate in local and 
state Whig events and held party responsibilities, clearly retaining an active presence 
among the Illinois Whigs.21 Following President Taylor’s death in 1850 and Henry 
Clay’s passing in 1852, this “lone Whig star” also delivered two eulogies of national 
Whig leaders. His language in these two eulogies, written just two years apart from one 
another, each addressed the slavery issue in very different ways. The differences between 
them belie Lincoln’s growing concern both that the slavery issue would destroy the 
Union and that the idea that slavery was not a moral wrong but a positive good was 
growing in the South. Hailing the life of Zachary Taylor, a westerner raised in Kentucky 
after his parents moved from Virginia, Lincoln asserted that the nation had lost a key 
leader in resolving the slavery issue. “I fear the one great question of the Union, is not 
now so likely to be partially acquiesced in by the different sections of the Union, as it 
would have been,” he assured his audience, “could Gen. Taylor have been spared to us.” 
Though alienated from the Taylor administration after failing to acquire the General Land 
Office for an Illinoisan, Lincoln nevertheless continued to hold on to his belief that 
Taylor and his position on the slavery issue had held great potential for resolving 
differences over slavery.22 
By the time Abraham Lincoln delivered his eulogy of Henry Clay to a small 
audience in Illinois on July 6, 1852, that fear over the “one great question of the Union” 
had developed into a firm conviction that Lincoln and others opposed to the spread of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lincoln not only denied rumors that he was seeking a seat in the next Congress, but stated that he 
wouldn’t want the job. CW, II:79. 
21 CW, II: 113, 162. 
22 CW, II: 83–84. 
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slavery must take on a public role to prevent proslavery and popular sovereignty 
doctrines from gaining momentum. This eulogy thus marks a significant departure from 
his previous career. Though unafraid to speak his mind in regard to the Mexican-
American War or the swath of rioting that engulfed a fevered nation in 1837, Lincoln had 
never publicly advocated antislavery principles to his constituents. The resolutions he had 
submitted with fellow Illinois Whig Dan Stone in 1836, which did explicitly outline his 
sentiments regarding slavery, and his votes in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, were never 
expressed in his speeches until 1852. Not until then did Lincoln dare to publicly express 
his opinions on slavery, and where the nation should stand in regard to it, in an 
intentional effort to convince Illinois and the rest of the nation to commit itself to the 
non-extension of slavery.  
Lincoln’s experiences in the 30th Congress, his upbringing and experiences in the 
Northwest, and the information he continued to receive from and about the South, all 
gave him the tools he needed to verbalize these antislavery arguments.23 Lincoln 
explained his antislavery position to Richard Yates, a fellow southern-born migrant to 
Illinois with a very similar stance on slavery. Addressing the slavery question as it related 
to the Wilmot Proviso and the compromise package proposed by Henry Clay, Lincoln 
declared that he remained “inflexible” in his “opposition to the extention [sic] of slavery 
into territories now free.” He therefore supported the Wilmot Proviso and declared that if 
ever elected to Congress again, he would continue to support that proviso as long as it 
presented “the best mode of preventing” slavery’s extension “at the same time as not 
endangering any dearer object.” If at any point the proviso itself threatened to hinder the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As Don E. Fehrenbacher notes: “The Illinois environment thus deserves careful attention not only as a 
backdrop but as one of the basic reasons for Lincoln’s emergence” in the 1850s. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to 
Greatness, 5. 
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nation’s commitment to anti-slavery extension principles, or to endanger the Union, he 
vowed, he would relinquish his support of it. Lincoln further informed Yates that “I have 
not at any time supposed the Union to be in so much danger as some others have—I have 
doubted, and still doubt, whether a majority of the voters, in any Congressional District in 
the nation are in favor of dissolution in any event—slavery restricted, or slavery 
extended.”24 Lincoln persisted in his belief that Unionism triumphed in both sections of 
the country, and that the vitriolic discourse produced in debates over slavery did not 
accurately reflect the true intentions of the overwhelming majority of the nation’s 
citizens. 
The arguments and information Lincoln received about the South from 1850 to 
1852 significantly corroborated what he had learned in the Northwest and in Washington, 
D.C. As particular pamphlets and letters found in his collected papers indicate, Lincoln 
kept apprised of national discussions revolving around slavery during these years, 
especially as Congress wrestled to pass a compromise in 1850. One particular speech 
Lincoln likely read concerning the compromise resolutions was given by Truman Smith, 
a congressman from Connecticut who had served with him in the 30th Congress. Smith 
claimed that he had never before spoken on the slavery issue in Congress but now 
perceived a need to make his own observations known. He first agreed with the same 
sentiment expressed by Lincoln, that “[t]he dangers arising from this cause have, in my 
judgment, been greatly exaggerated….I have myself felt very little alarm on this subject. 
There is in the country a strong and all-pervading attachment to the Union, which cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Mark E. Neely, Jr., “Lincoln’s Theory of Representation: A Significant New Lincoln Document,” 
Lincoln Lore 1683 (May 1978): 162. 
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be weakened, much less destroyed.”25 Next, Smith offered an interpretation of the natural 
interests dividing slaveholder from non-slaveholder that surely resonated with Lincoln as 
a northwesterner familiar with nonslaveholders’ migration to Illinois. Smith argued that 
animosity existed “between different classes of citizens, and not between States or 
sections—between slaveholders and non-slaveholders both of the free and slave States.” 
Specifically pointing to westward migration as it played out in the Northwest, he 
explained that “non-slaveholders of the slave States can and do go to our new 
possessions….and, what is remarkable, they are, when settled in the country, just as 
determined to exclude slavery as any other class.” To further advocate the expansion of 
free territory over slave, Smith provided a chart proving that free states had 
overwhelmingly gained more population than slave states over time. The chart 
specifically depicted the gains and losses of northern and southern states in the House of 
Representatives, projecting that in a few decades, this population increase in the free 
states would result in a great majority of free state representatives in the House. Finally, 
Smith referred to the slave trade that continued daily in the District of Columbia. Pointing 
to southerners’ extreme distaste for slave-trading and the slave trader, he asked: “[w]hy 
should Southern men endure here what they will not tolerate in their own States? The 
people of the District are utterly opposed to [the slave trade], and earnestly desire its 
abrogation.”26 
Smith’s insistence that the United States could and should maintain its pledge to 
eventually eliminate the institution of slavery mirrored Lincoln’s own. Meanwhile, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This pamphlet appears in Lincoln’s papers, and was likely one of the speeches he read regarding the 
Compromise of 1850. Truman Smith, Printed Pamphlet on Compromise of 1850, July 8, 1850, 3, LC. 
26 Smith alleged that nearly 500 families had recently settled in northern Virginia from free states, and 
argued that should this migration trend continue, by 1900 Virginia and other slave states would become 
free states. Smith, Printed Pamphlet on Compromise of 1850, 6, 12-13, 16, LC. 
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migration-related evidence in support of his case reflected the arguments many 
colleagues had made from 1847 to 1849. The statements emanating from the Louisville 
Kentucky Examiner in March 1850 may have pushed Lincoln to reconsider his political 
silence in light of these arguments. The Examiner outlined a brief history of the 
emigration of two southern groups away from the South. The first, the Society of Friends 
and similar antislavery groups, had once inhabited the slaveholding states but moved on 
to the free Northwest and continued to do so through the present day. As a result of this 
trend, “Tennessee has scarcely a meeting of Friends within her borders, and the very 
large settlements of the members in Virginia and North Carolina have been greatly 
reduced.” In addition to these “strictly conscientious” folk, “the poor and enterprising” 
nonslaveholders of the South also moved to free territory. Such statements always 
alluded to the effects such movements produced upon both sections of the country, but 
the Examiner explicitly pointed to two negative effects of this migration upon the South. 
First, the exodus of “enterprising classes” has reduced the “common wealth’ of their 
native states; and, second, “the slave States have deteriorated in respect to one of the 
most sacred of all rights, the right of free speech.” Since so many of those opposed to 
slavery relocated, proslavery citizens were left to “say what they please, while they who 
are opposed to slavery are cowed into silence.” Although to the Examiner emigration had 
affected all the slave states, the newspaper separated Kentucky from states like South 
Carolina when it came to this “despotism” and proclaimed that “but few men in Kentucky 
would shackle the tongue or the press.” The article also denounced all men who 
personally hated slavery but rebuked antislavery advocates for publicly speaking against 
the institution. That hypocritical stance, the Examiner argued, had allowed proslavery 
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enthusiasts the opportunity to press their demands upon the free state and to place 
limitations on free speech in the South. Such arguments presented by antislavery 
Americans may have played a role in Lincoln’s decision to take a firm public stance 
against slavery beginning in 1852.27  
Meanwhile, political events closer to home continued to reflect the information 
Lincoln gathered from these sources, and from his colleagues of the 30th Congress. The 
Illinois Democratic Congressional Convention held in Joliet, Illinois, in September 1850, 
provided a set of “Resolutions Against Slavery” that evidently left a strong impression 
upon Lincoln. These resolutions, which Lincoln invoked against Douglas in their third 
debate at Jonesboro, Illinois, professed an “uncompromising” opposition to the extension 
of slavery, based upon the principles “recognized by the Ordinance of 1787, which 
received the sanction of THOMAS JEFFERSON, who is acknowledged by all to be the 
great oracle and expounder of our faith.” That many members of the Democratic Party 
held such a position, and maintained it through the 1850s despite the party’s emphasis on 
popular sovereignty or the protection of slavery, led Lincoln to deem popular sovereignty 
as a doctrine of political convenience rather than fervent conviction.28  
The combination of all these sources provided Lincoln with a distinct sense that 
although most Americans opposed slavery for one reason or another, a small proslavery 
movement threatened the entire Union’s security and freedoms. He first articulated a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Examiner printed another article, referring to a speech by Alabama senator Jeremiah Clemens in 
which the southerner declared “the men and women employed in the New England factories as being in a 
state of deeper degradation than the slaves of the South.” An exchange ensued between Clemens and the 
citizens of Dover, New Hampshire, who rebutted the southerners’ charges. Whether or not Lincoln read 
this article, it corroborated similar statements he had heard and would continue to hear from southerners. 
Louisville Kentucky Examiner, March 1850, LC. 
28 During that debate, Lincoln fiendishly called upon the signers of that resolution, all professed Democrats 
in 1858, to come forward and explain themselves. CW, III: 124; “Printed Resolutions Against Slavery,” 
September 11, 1850, LC. 
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public response to these development in his 1852 eulogy of Henry Clay, in which he 
argued before his fellow Springfielders that Henry Clay had been committed both to the 
Union and to the ultimate extinction of slavery. In this eulogy, Lincoln drew upon a 
newspaper that eulogized Clay though it had opposed him throughout his life, repeating 
that “Henry Clay belongs to his country—to the world, mere party cannot claim men like 
him. His career has been national.” Giving his own summation of Clay’s political life, 
Lincoln explained that the Kentuckian’s attachment to a single political party never 
clouded his commitment to the Union. When in times of peace a country “naturally 
divide[s] into parties….the man who is of neither party, is not—cannot be, of any 
consequence. Mr. Clay, therefore, was of a party.” While many Americans disagreed 
with Clay on matters of party, Lincoln intoned, there were certain instances that arose in 
which “there is little or no disagreement amongst intelligent and patriotic Americans.” 
These Lincoln listed as: the War of 1812, the Missouri Compromise, nullification, and 
the Compromise of 1850. After Clay’s repeated successes navigating the country through 
turbulent seas riven by sectionalism and slavery, “he seems constantly to have been 
regarded by all, as the man for a crisis.”29 
If Lincoln had simply characterized Clay as an agent of compromise to save the 
Union from discord, he would have mirrored the sentiments presented in various eulogies 
by other political figures across the country.30 Yet his own exposure to proslavery and 
antislavery debates in Congress, combined with his experiences in Illinois politics and 
society, generated within him an urge to remind his fellow Americans never to forget the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 CW II:122, 126–27, 129. 
30 Mark E. Neely, Jr. refers to the “non partisan-nationalism” of all the eulogies given of Henry Clay, 
excepting Lincoln’s. Neely, “American Nationalism in the Image of Henry Clay: Abraham Lincoln’s 
Eulogy on Henry Clay in Context,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 106 (Summer/Autumn 
2008): 31–60. 
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most significant aspect of Clay’s national career—his “deep devotion to the cause of 
human liberty.” This devotion extended to various peoples around the globe but applied 
particularly to those enslaved blacks residing within the United States. Lincoln 
emphatically asserted that Clay’s commitment to ending slavery in America had never 
altered its course, had never changed, and had never presented a threat to the nation. A 
slaveholder himself, Clay “did not perceive, as I think no wise man has perceived, how it 
could be at once eradicated, without producing a greater evil,” Lincoln explicated, and he 
therefore “oppose[d] both extremes of opinion on the subject.”  
Espousing the northwestern approach to the slavery issue that resonated among 
central Illinoisans, Lincoln condemned abolitionists “who would shiver into fragments 
the Union of these States…rather than slavery should continue a single hour.” Yet, while 
they “have received, and receiving their just execration,” so too, would he wield Clay’s 
“name, opinions, and influence against the opposite extreme—against a few, but an 
increasing number of men, who, for the sake of perpetuating slavery, are beginning to 
assail and to ridicule the white-man’s charter of freedom—the declaration that ‘all men 
are created free and equal.’” Lincoln then presented a short history of the proslavery 
movement, noting that John C. Calhoun had sparked it, and South Carolina fostered it. 
“[N]ot much shocked by political eccentricities and heresies in South Carolina,” Lincoln 
was nonetheless disturbed when “only last year, I saw with astonishment, what purported 
to be a letter of a very distinguished and influential clergyman of Virginia, copied, with 
apparent approbation, into a St. Louis newspaper,” that condemned the principle that “All 
men are born free and equal.”31 
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Within this long address, Lincoln offered his own history of slavery in the United 
States, arguing that the nation had remained committed to a tradition of the non-extension 
of slavery since its earliest days. The brief historical record that he traced in the 1852 
eulogy sketched a foundation upon which he would erect a more mature antislavery 
history of the United States, emphasizing the role of Thomas Jefferson and the Northwest 
Ordinance in creating a free soil American future. For the rest of the decade, Lincoln 
would draw upon this history not simply to present what he deemed the true account of 
the nation’s antislavery trajectory but also to appeal to “the better angels of our nature”—
to the underlying sense that slavery was indeed a moral wrong, a sentiment that he 
believed resided within most, if not all, Americans. Keeping his eulogy centered on its 
main subject, Lincoln did not yet pronounce the more assertive statements he would later 
make regarding the Northwest Ordinance and Jefferson’s role in guarding the West 
against slavery. Although he did point to Jefferson’s role in introducing the Northwest 
Ordinance’s clause granting the Northwest Territory its freedom from the peculiar 
institution, he did not emphasize their significance as he would in later speeches. Instead, 
he simply quoted Jefferson and Clay to show that each had been firm believers in the 
immorality of slavery and had promoted the Declaration of Independence’s promise of 
liberty for black as well as white men.32  
Lincoln’s Clay eulogy marked a crucial transition in his political career, when he 
began to publicly articulate the vision of an antislavery Union. Through Clay’s words, 
Lincoln argued that proslavery doctrine “sound[ed] strangely in republican America” and 
countered the antislavery tradition created by the Founding Fathers and carried forward 
by Henry Clay. He reiterated this sentiment in subsequent speeches, such as his August 
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1852 speech to the Springfield Scott Club. Not until the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 
however, did Lincoln develop a mature form of these arguments and put forward an 
antislavery platform upon which, he believed, the country must move forward. Before 
then, he perceived the growth of proslavery radicalism and popular sovereignty as 
disturbing but not significant enough to lose faith in the Whig Party. Though he had 
voted for the Wilmot Proviso, Lincoln had never condemned slavery publicly in U.S. 
Congress, and, following the lead of those northwesterners who equally abhorred 
proslavery radicalism and abolitionism alike, he had rarely ever brought up the issue in 
his other speeches.33 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act compelled him to act when he realized the measure 
threatened to transform America’s position on slavery from antislavery to ambivalence. 
When Stephen Douglas’s proposed act sent ripples of dissent across the nation, the 
information and reactions Lincoln gathered from his fellow Illinoisans—whether in favor 
of, or against the Act—prompted him to speak publicly on the issue. Their statements 
alternatively affirmed his fears that popular sovereignty would capture the minds (and 
votes) of many and renewed his hopes that he could project America’s antislavery past 
into a vision for the future that would resonate with much of the country. Lincoln 
recognized that the anti–slave system sentiments of white southern-born northwesterners 
(as well as many northern-born migrants) often led them to embrace measures such as 
popular sovereignty, which allowed them to individually oppose slavery without 
imposing that belief on southerners. Others, meanwhile, so vehemently opposed slavery 
that they revolted against the Kansas-Nebraska measure. Lincoln hoped that a moderate 
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antislavery stance could convince men of both sides to oppose not only proslavery 
doctrine but popular sovereignty as well.  
The Illinois state legislature, immediately following the proposal of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act in the U.S Congress, exhibited the difference of opinion that split 
Illinoisans over the slavery issue. Attempting to pass legislation regarding the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, the legislature batted various proposals back and forth. Democrat Edward 
Omelveny staunchly supported Douglas and the Act, calling for the Illinois legislature to 
highlight the “Little Giant” and his actions as being in “the best interests of the Union.” 
Omelveny called for a resolution to “sustain Judge Douglas against all abolitionists and 
free-soilers in this state.” A string of further proposals ensued, as one Illinois Senator 
after another submitted their own resolutions. A fellow Democrat reiterated the 
arguments voiced by supporters of an Illinois state convention in 1824, offering a 
resolution that upheld state sovereignty over antislavery moralism. He declared “the right 
of the people to form themselves such a government as they may choose” to be “the 
birth-right of freemen…secured to us by the blood of our ancestors.” This sacred right, he 
believed, “ought to be extended to future generations, and no limitation ought to be 
applied to this power.” To these popular sovereignty Democrats, Illinois had indeed 
rebelled against the restriction placed upon her by the Northwest Ordinance, and had 
ultimately decided to prohibit slavery. The clause, itself, had been subject to the will of 
the people, who should never be bound by such imposed laws. Popular sovereignty 
supporters therefore “deemed[ed] the restriction of a geographical line, upon the right of 
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the people to form such a government as they may choose in regard to the question of 
slavery, as a gross violation of that sacred right.”34  
The division among Illinoisans’ approaches to the slavery issue, as Lincoln well 
knew, did not correlate to Whig and Democratic party membership. This fact appears in 
the records of the Illinois legislature immediately following the proposal of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act in the U.S. Congress. Of the thirty-two members of the Illinois state Senate 
serving in 1854, only four were Whigs. Amid that sea of Democrats existed many 
antislavery representatives who proved unwilling to embrace popular sovereignty as the 
Democratic Party’s platform. John M. Palmer molded himself into a leading anti-
Nebraska Democrat when he offered a substitute to Omelveny’s resolutions that 
supported the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 as “a satisfactory and 
final settlement of the subject of slavery.” Rather than praise the bill, Palmer declared 
that it “meets the unqualified condemnation and opposition of the Gen. Assembly.” Judd, 
meanwhile, refuted Douglas by proposing that the General Assembly support “the 
Missouri Compromise act…as a wise and beneficial enactment” that should “be 
preserved inviolate.”35 
John Detrich, meanwhile, sought to prevent an extended discussion of the Illinois 
General Assembly that revolved around slavery. He asked that their consideration of the 
various resolutions be postponed so as “to expedite legislative action on important 
measures now before the General Assembly.” The Speaker ruled his resolutions out of 
order, however, forcing the Illinois Senators to continue their discussion until they 
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reached a final resolution. Pushing his colleagues to support the geographical ban on 
slavery embodied in the Missouri Compromise, Palmer submitted an amendment 
deeming the laws in that compromise and in the bill organizing Oregon Territory to be 
“wise and judicious” and asserted that they “ought to be maintained.” Burton Cook 
responded with his own amendment that highlighted “all of the compromises upon the 
subject of slavery as of binding force and obligation, to be honorably observed and 
strictly adhered to.” The Senate’s continued discussion of the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
displayed the recurring split between popular sovereignty Democrats and those who 
pushed for more solid guarantees against the extension of slavery. John M. Palmer 
ultimately became a crucial member of the Illinois Republican Party, interacting closely 
with Lincoln in the latter part of the decade. What Lincoln surely learned from Palmer, 
the debates within the Illinois state legislature, and in his interactions with other residents 
of the state, was the overwhelmingly effectiveness of Douglas’s attempts to brand 
antislavery advocates as abolitionists. By collapsing the distinction between moral 
antislavery and abolitionism, then casting popular sovereignty as an effective yet 
inoffensive method of keeping slavery out of the West, he convinced scores of anti–slave 
system southern migrants to Illinois to support the doctrine.36  
The writings of Charles Fletcher, who communicated his stance on popular 
sovereignty to revered Illinois politician Sidney Breese, point to the unique ability of 
popular sovereignty doctrine to capture the sentiments of northwesterners and entice 
them to believe they could carefully navigate around the volatile slavery issue. In several 
communications written in 1848, Fletcher intimated that “Slavery is a great evil,” and 
that the election of Lewis Cass would be the wisest course for the nation, since he would 
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secure free territory for white men rather than for slaveholders and their slaves. Fletcher 
cast opposition to Cass as stemming from his own “singular devotedness to the 
sovereignty of the people & their principles of democratic liberty.” The Whigs and 
aristocrats, he argued, “oppose him because he has always been in opposition to the few 
governing the many.” Fletcher vehemently denounced abolitionists and antislavery 
Whigs for “invading the rights of the South wantonly and unnecessarily.” He believed 
there was no reason to create “agitation on the subject of slavery,” as it might “create a 
revolution in the whole country by which every householder will suffer.” This 
“fanaticism” could and should be overcome by a national commitment to the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, by which, he believed, slavery would slowly disappear.37 
Many Illinoisans echoed Fletcher’s sentiments, conveying an ambiguous but 
existent dislike for slavery and condemning abolitionism as an abhorrently radical 
doctrine. Their northwestern distrust for radicalism of all kinds—proslavery and 
antislavery alike—generated a fierce opposition to any party, person, or doctrine that 
might be tinged with radicalism. Because proslavery doctrine never took hold in Illinois 
as abolitionism did, most Illinoisans did not fear it would disrupt the nation. They 
perceived abolitionists as the main culprits for disrupting the nation’s peace and security 
through the slavery issue. When Lincoln re-focused on Illinois politics in 1849, 
references to abolitionism proved crucial in debates over Illinois candidates for elections 
and appointments. Richard T. Gill and L. T. Garth, two residents of Tremont, informed 
Lincoln that one of the men being considered for the postmaster position “is an avowed 
abolitionist” and should not receive the appointment. John H. Ball, however, “is a good 
whig and would give general satisfaction in this place.” Peter Menard similarly intimated 
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that his only objection to one candide [sic] was “that he is vastley [sic] impregnated with 
Abolitionism,” and “this is to me an insufferable objection.” As Democrat Benjamin 
Baldwin related in 1855, “nothing but Evil, and that continually, can be the result of the 
Election of an abolitionist.”38 
Most Douglas Democrats in Illinois appeared to firmly believe their party had 
become the bulwark of the Union, binding it together across sectional lines and offering 
the only safe route past the slavery problem. Lincoln, elated to learn from a letter he had 
intercepted that Douglas appeared to be losing ground in Illinois in 1854, relayed 
Democratic convictions that “we must elect a Nebraska U.S. Senator, or elect none at 
all.” Jason Riggin explained that “the contest, now going on in the northern states,” over 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act “lies at the foundation of the government; and the success of 
the democratic-nebrasky party is the only shure guarentee [sic] for the stability and safety 
of the Union.” Another Riggin family member reported one year later that upon hearing 
Stephen Douglas speak in St. Louis, “[h]e gave me some ideas in regard to the Nebraska-
Kansas question that set my mind at ease on some points that I had not fully understood 
before. I came to the conclusion after listening to him, that he was all that I had heard of 
him, a very great little giant.” As W. D. Latham explicated, many people “of the western 
& South western States look upon him as the embodiment of the great principles of 
Nationality.” He captured the sentiments of many northwestern Democrats when he 
asserted that “Abolitionism and Nationality, are the political sentiments that will 
influence all—there is no middle ground for ‘fence-men’ to ride—a choice of one or the 
other must be made.” Like Lincoln, many southern-born settlers in Illinois perceived no 
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actual threat looming over them from their brethren in the South. They therefore focused 
their attention against abolitionism, while Lincoln, who believed himself better informed 
than they, directed his efforts toward defeating popular sovereignty.39 
The chief attraction of popular sovereignty was its perceived moderation on the 
slavery issue. Supporters’ greatest weapon against political enemies, therefore, was the 
charge of radicalism. As Elijah P. Lovejoy had shown, those who professed to be 
moderates may indeed to turn out to be unyielding radicals.40 Popular sovereignty 
Democrats therefore wielded accusations of radicalism, built from a combination of 
honest fear and political fabrication, against antislavery zealots. A group of Tazewell 
County citizens communicated to Lincoln in May 1849 that one of the men he had 
recommended for the Springfield land office was being charged “with being an 
Abolitionist, a Drunkard, and a Gambler, with a view of defeating his appointment.” The 
citizens defended King from these accusations and assured Lincoln that he remained 
capable of the post.41 In 1854, when Democrat Lyman Trumbull decided to oppose the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, he complained that his “warm friends in the South part of the 
state” had turned against him, and “have cried out abolition so much that if I was really a 
[William Lloyd] Garrison or a [Wendell] Philips they could not think worse of me than 
they do.” Although many Illinois Democrats did leave the party and eventually join the 
Republicans in a public pledge against slavery’s extension, most remained in, or returned 
to, the Democratic Party. Unlike Trumbull, many Democrats still believed their party 
would ensure “the triumph of Freedom over Slavery.” Thomas S. Hick expressed such a 
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sentiment to John McClernand in 1850, imparting his regret that some Democrats, 
apparently including Illinois’s Democratic Governor William H. Bissell, had supported 
the Wilmot Proviso. Hick felt that “whether on slave Territory or free, whether defended 
by slave Holders or Free soilers; it was the Government of the American People, and 
reproach [for slavery] should not come from American Citizens.” Perceiving the 
Democratic Party as the one truly national party, he therefore supported any slavery 
compromise that did not, in his opinion, trample upon the rights of the South with moral 
condemnations of slavery.42 
Such antagonism against those who vocally professed a hatred for slavery resulted 
in a general reluctance from many Democrats to break away from their party.43 Fellow 
Democrats John M. Palmer and Lyman Trumbull experienced a backlash from their own 
party when they chose to oppose the Kansas-Nebraska Act. W. D. Wyatt confided to 
Palmer in 1854 that “[n]o one here approves of your course by the Whigs and 
Abolitionists—real genuine abolitionists.” Wyatt apologetically explained that he 
remained Palmer’s “warm friend,” and that everyone in Carollton, Illinois, “knows here 
that others went for you who are Nebraska democrats—that is opposed to those opposing 
the measure.” Thus, while some “speak of burning you in effigy,” other constituents “are 
of a better spirit and are getting up and circulating petitions with a view to instruct you 
politely relative to the wishes of they party.”44  
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Nevertheless, 1854 proved a crucial turning point for the Democratic Party. 
Douglas Democrats’ insistence that the Kansas-Nebraska Act be adopted as the official 
party position on the slavery issue bred indignation and resentment from many 
antislavery Democrats, who “determined not to swallow [it] as a new test of 
Democracy.”45 From 1854 to 1856, many of these Democrats waded uncertainly in the 
aftermath of Douglas’s actions, attempting to shift the direction of their party or splitting 
off into different factions. Eventually, many left to join the Republicans. Unsure of what 
political party he should join in August 1855, Trumbull assured Owen Lovejoy of his 
commitment “to stay the spread of human slavery,” but he also questioned “whether it 
would be advisable at this time to call a state convention of all those opposed to the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.” Too many people feared the fusion movement 
directed by abolitionists, and therefore refused to join in it despite their antislavery 
convictions. “If a convention of the Democracy opposed equally to the spread of slavery, 
to abolition & to Know Nothingism, could be called,” Trumbull advised, “we could, I 
think, get a respectable representation from this part of the state, and such a movement 
would probably damage the Nebraska democracy more than anything else which could be 
done.” As fervently anti-abolitionist as he was anti-slavery, Trumbull believed a “large 
majority of the Democrat party are…opposed to the spread of slavery.” A tactful redress 
of the issues, he implied, could turn the tide against Douglas and his pro-Nebraska 
faction.46  
Later, after Trumbull had become more explicit in his denunciation of the spread 
of slavery, John Palmer wrote to him that proslavery Democrats remained determined to 
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reject him. Attempting to capture the sympathies of the broadly antislavery electorate, he 
offered Trumbull the idea that Colonel Thomas Hart Benton might succeed “as the 
candidate of the true Democracy” for president in 1856. Struggling to avoid both the 
treachery they perceived in the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the “abolitionizing tendency” 
of many antislavery activists, Trumbull and Palmer attempted to steer their party away 
from Stephen Douglas’s beloved piece of legislation. They did, indeed, find many 
supporters to join with them. As Palmer’s brother informed him: “I am pleased at your 
position on the Nebraska & Kansas Bill & hope you will not cave in like most the antis 
here are doing, not most but a few.” Evidently, the pressures of leaving the Democratic 
party caused some to waver, and others to push forward.  David A. Smith of Jacksonville, 
uttering words of encouragement and advisement to the belabored John Palmer, insisted 
that he do all in his power to ensure their party put forward an anti-Nebraska candidate 
for Senate in Illinois. If they did not do so, he urged, “you must be the opposing 
candidate, & inscribe on your banner ‘An exterminating war against intemperance—A 
restoration of the Missouri Compromise.’ Do or die under this banner.”47 
 Despite the risks involved, many Democrats did choose to speak out against 
popular sovereignty. One of the most visible defectors of the Democratic Party was 
William H. Bissell, who became Governor of Illinois in 1856. Bissell opposed popular 
sovereignty and committed himself to the non-extension of slavery into U.S. territories. 
He also exhibited views of the South that reflected Lincoln’s own. In his speech to the 
Illinois House of Representatives in 1850, Bissell labeled the claims radical southern 
representatives in U.S. Congress made that their constituents were prepared to overthrow 
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the government if slavery were not further protected as outlandish and not truly 
representative of most southerners. Although his speech exuded a polite regard for these 
opinions, Bissell declared himself “slow, especially, to distrust [the patriotism] in the 
people of the generous South.” He then provided a series of arguments to assert that 
antislavery sentiment was not sectional, but national, and that the voices of those who 
opposed slavery also hailed from slave states such as Kentucky and Missouri. He echoed 
Missourian Thomas Hart Benton’s warning that a “small but active party in the extreme 
South” sought “a dismemberment of the Union in order to the establishment of a separate 
‘southern confederacy.’” Nevertheless “the people,” he believed, “will defeat their 
designs; and in due time they will visit with just retribution those who have sought to 
mislead them.”48 
 The expressions of discontent with the Kansas-Nebraska bill voiced by so many 
Whigs, free-soilers, and Democrats, surrounded Lincoln as he considered his own 
political future. Proslavery and proslavery-leaning opinions certainly existed in Illinois, 
but they remained exceptions. John Mathers, who once corresponded with Lincoln, 
voiced the common concern of non-slaveholding migrants who had fled from the South, 
asking whether “the few slave holders of this nation” shall “rule & govern this great 
republic to her injury, by spreading negro slavery over every foot of territory, which has 
been consecrate to freedom by our Fathers?” Should the Kansas-Nebraska Act allow “the 
domineering slave holder with his hundreds & thousands of slaves” to “take possession 
of these territories & thereby drive out the poor laboring white man?” Certainly, that had 
not been the intentions of the Founders, who through “the adoption of the Ordinance of 
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1787” sought “to prevent the extension of slavery in this nation.” Mathers argued that 
since each territory held the right to make its own laws once it became a state, the people 
always had the opportunity to introduce slavery, at any time after statehood, in Illinois 
and the other free states. Thus “the people of Ill[inois] decided by vote which they would 
have—slavery or not. So in the case of Kansas & Nebraska if the Compromise had 
remained.” Because the Kansas-Nebraska Act allowed the territory to decide at such an 
early phase, it did not offer the people ample opportunity to exclude slavery therefrom.  
 A “Democratic Anti-Nebraska Committee” in Indiana made similar arguments 
against the act. Gathering together on the anniversary of the Northwest Ordinance’s 
passage in 1787, the meeting published a preamble and set of resolutions upholding the 
Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise as evidence that the Founders intended to halt 
the expansion of slavery. These Democratic party members echoed Illinoisan anti-
Nebraska Democrats when they declared themselves “opposed to the extension of 
slavery” and against “the principles of the platform adopted by the self-styled Democratic 
convention of last May, held in this city, to further the Nebraska swindle.” Lyman 
Trumbull, despite his troubles in combatting anti-abolitionists, decided to run as an anti-
Nebraska candidate for the U.S. Senate. He explained: “I thought the repeal of the 
Missouri compromise wrong & believed the mass of the People would think so too, if it 
was rightly understood.” Trumbull proved at least partially right, as he won the election 
by a majority of 2,700 votes.49  
 In this political turmoil that enveloped the nation in 1854, anti-Nebraska Whigs, 
Democrats, and Free Soilers coalesced into tenuous combinations that took years to 
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develop into a major party organization. Throughout that year, Lincoln remained as 
uncertain about his future course as did Lyman Trumbull, considering himself an anti-
Nebraska Whig. The “fragments on government” he composed, most likely in the months 
surrounding the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854, reveals a man digging 
for the very roots of the American republic’s relationship to slavery. Attempting to 
objectively consider popular sovereignty, though he had set himself in opposition to it his 
entire life, Lincoln carried the main conviction of popular sovereignty Democrats—that 
the people of a territory should have the power to make their own laws without the 
intrusion of the federal government—to its utmost extreme, asking whether the people 
should have any national government at all. “Why not each individual take to himself the 
whole fruit of his labor,” and remain free from the taxes, the services, and the laws 
inevitably imposed upon him by government? In response to his own query, Lincoln 
determined that government was merely “a combination of the people of a country to 
effect certain objects by join effort.” A structure built, maintained, and perpetuated by the 
people, American government’s “legitimate object” was “to do for the people what needs 
to be done, but which they can not, by individual effort, do at all, or do so well, for 
themselves.'' This included on the one hand the building and maintenance of public roads 
and schools, and providing care for children and the poor, and on the other hand 
protecting its people against and punishing perpetrators for “the injustice of men.”50 
 Little other evidence of Lincoln’s thoughts remains from this period until he 
addressed the people of Illinois in his summer 1854 speeches against the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. In a letter marked “confidential” to John Palmer, whom Lincoln knew to 
be struggling under the weight of intraparty dissension following his disavowal of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 CW, II:220–22. 
219	  
	  
	  
Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln gave some indication why he chose to launch into the 
public arena again. Lincoln urged Palmer that he had a duty to explain to people why 
“you have determined not to swallow the wrong.” Regarding his own course of action, he 
explained: “[h]ad your party omitted to make Nebraska a test of party fidelity…I should 
have been quit, happy that Nebraska was to be rebuked at all events. I still should have 
voted for the whig candidate [for congress in the district], but I should have made no 
speeches, written no letters.” The Democratic Party’s embrace of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, which repealed Clay’s beloved Missouri Compromise and opened formerly free 
territories to slavery, threatened to turn Americans against the nation’s antislavery 
tradition and pave the way for the spread of slavery.51 
 Awakened to the real danger the slavery issue posed to the Union, Lincoln 
asserted his antislavery politics across Illinois, not only making speeches but proposing a 
set of resolutions to the Illinois legislature to repeal much, if not all, of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, while assisting fellow anti-Nebraska Illinoisans in their campaigns for 
office.52 Some of his greatest initial efforts were put forward on behalf of Richard Yates, 
a fellow Kentuckian-born Whig and son of Virginia parents, who, like Lincoln, had 
moved to the Springfield, Illinois, area in 1831. Apart from attending and graduating 
college, Yates had an upbringing that bore remarkable similarities to Lincoln’s. In letters 
Yates wrote to L. U. Reavis in 1870, he described his childhood in Kentucky, infatuation 
with Henry Clay, and his fathers’ decision “not to raise his family, then large, in a slave 
State.” After attending college in Jacksonville, Illinois, Yates embarked on a similar 
career in law and politics. Yates’s particular antislavery politics largely mirrored 
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Lincoln’s, as well.53 While serving in Congress in 1852 he defined himself as “in favor of 
a fugitive slave law to carry out the provisions of the Constitution,” yet he refused to 
grant his support for this law in Congress unless southerners officially recognized the 
other pieces of the Compromise of 1850, which admitted California as a free state and 
abolished the slave trade in Washington, D.C. Yates’s approach of accepting the entire 
Compromise of 1850 as a package that must be agreed upon by northerners and 
southerners alike was precisely Lincoln’s method of dealing with the slavery problem at 
the time.54 During that term he also delivered a speech on Western Interests in Congress 
that displayed the national spirit that pervaded the Northwest, and that had long 
encouraged northerners and southerners alike to settle within its bounds. Presenting the 
Illinois River as an equally significant tributary to the West as the mighty Mississippi, he 
demonstrated that there one “finds the Western man, the Southern man, and, of course, 
‘Brother Jonathan,’…discussing stocks, finance, railroads, trade, agriculture, corn, cotton, 
and codfish; the compromise, secession, slavery, and, what is better, learning from each 
other that there is no good reason for the local animosities which have heretofore existed 
and exhibited themselves in alarming aspects, threatening to jar the pillars of the Union.” 
Yates’s speech, focused as much on the availability of land titles to settlers as the ethos of 
the West, resonated among Illinoisans.55 
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 Though Yates’s speeches and actions in the 1850–1852 Congress ushered him to 
re-election for the following term, he lost his seat after the political turmoil that followed 
in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. While serving out his second term as U.S. 
congressman, Yates became embroiled in the discussions and debates over the proposed 
Act in early 1854. Evidently learning from J. B. Turner, a well-connected Illinoisan who 
had migrated from Massachusetts, that the people of his district had largely denounced 
the bill, he explained with relief that “I took grounds against it before I had heard from 
one of them.”56 As it turned out, Douglas Democrats were able to gain enough support in 
that district to threaten Yates’s chances for another term in late 1854. Alerted to this 
danger, Lincoln made great efforts to help all anti-Nebraska candidates, but Yates in 
particular. The two frequently corresponded in 1854 as Lincoln attempted to drum up 
popular support for this fellow Kentuckian-born opponent of popular sovereignty. His 
efforts ultimately failed, as Yates lost his bid for re-election, possibly in part due to 
rumors that he had secretly joined the nativist Know Nothing organization.57 
 Throughout that fall, Lincoln delivered a set of speeches on the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act that built upon his experiences in Illinois and in Congress and laid the foundation of 
the arguments he would later articulate in the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas Debates. In these 
speeches he provided two justifications for his opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act: 
that it violated America’s sacred compromises, and that popular sovereignty functioned 
as a means to spread slavery—not democracy—across the nation’s territories. He 
illustrated both these convictions in the form of a parable in September 1854, imagining 
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that two men had made a pact that the first should own a particular parcel of land. The 
second, though he had originally consented to the agreement, became envious and tore 
down his fences, allowing his cattle to invade the first man’s land in clear violation of the 
pact. When the first man angrily objected, the second explained that “I have taken down 
your fence; but nothing more. It is my true intent and meaning not to drive my cattle into 
your meadow, nor to exclude them therefrom, but leave them perfectly free to form their 
own notions of the feed, and to direct their movements in their own way!” Through this 
illustration, Lincoln conveyed his sense that the Kansas-Nebraska Act both violated the 
sacred Missouri Compromise and delivered slavery when it promised freedom. His 
characterization of the parable’s second man as “both a knave and a fool” served as a 
thinly veiled allusion to Stephen Douglas.58 
 In his October speech at Peoria, Lincoln highlighted the creation of, respect for, 
and adherence to compromises essential to maintaining the Union. Douglas’s callous 
disregard for the Missouri Compromise clearly touched a nerve and caused Lincoln to 
distrust the Little Giant’s motives. “Slavery may or may not be established in Nebraska,” 
he explained, but if the Kansas-Nebraska Act is not repealed, “we shall have 
repudiated…the SPIRIT of COMPROMISE; for who after this will ever trust in a 
national compromise?” This, to Lincoln, was the Act’s most damning feature—not the 
introduction of slavery. He quite accurately feared that henceforth, each section would 
refuse to accept compromise—the trustworthy last resort the nation had turned to in its 
most divided days—after Douglas had proven that compromises would be broken. At this 
moment, Lincoln still clung to the hope that the Missouri Compromise could be 
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reinstated, and “the national faith, the national confidence, [and] the national feeling of 
brotherhood” restored. He therefore continued to uphold his conviction to anti-slavery 
extension and compromise on the same level.59 
 Lincoln thus retraced the history of the Missouri Compromise and the 
Compromise of 1850, emphasizing the mutual agreement of North and South, Democrats 
and Whigs, upon these compromises and vowing to uphold them. Although the 
compromise of 1850 had passed as a series of acts rather than as an entire package, as 
Clay had desired, Lincoln asserted that it nevertheless constituted a whole set of 
agreements that must be followed together. Offering Daniel Webster’s definition of 
“compromise” as “to adjust and settle a difference, by mutual agreement with 
concessions of claims by the parties,” Lincoln argued that the acts of 1850 fell under this 
designation and had been respected as a compromise by the people. Lincoln firmly 
believed that this entailed a sincere adherence to each piece of the compromise, 
regardless of one’s personal feelings. With respect the Compromise of 1850, he argued, 
this entailed support of the fugitive slave law and other provisions despised by 
northerners. He believed in honoring these concessions to the South “not grudgingly, but 
fully, and fairly.”60 
 To illustrate the widespread national accord with the Missouri Compromise and 
similar agreements between North and South, Lincoln quoted from Stephen Douglas 
himself. In doing so, Lincoln insisted that he did not intend to cast Douglas as a flip-
flopping politician but sought “merely to show the high estimate placed on the Missouri 
Compromise by all parties up to so late as the year 1849.” In light of his repeal of the 
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Missouri Compromise line, however, the Little Giant’s previous statements appeared 
quite damaging. In 1849 he had gone so far as to say: “All the evidences of public 
opinion at that day, seemed to indicate that this Compromise had been canonized in the 
hearts of the American people, as a sacred thing which no ruthless hand would ever be 
reckless enough to disturb.'' Although Lincoln knew releasing such statements couldn’t 
hurt his own crusade against Douglas, he truly did seek to account for the vast change 
that seemed to usher in the Kansas-Nebraska Act—for the people’s sudden willingness to 
discard a compromise, and therefore all future compromises, it seemed, in favor of 
popular sovereignty.61 
 Lincoln’s answer to his own question ultimately shaped itself into the beginning 
of a Slave Power argument. The reason why compromise had established itself early in 
our nation’s founding and continued to resonate so forcefully today, Lincoln asserted, 
was because slavery was an exception to the Constitution that statesmen had agreed to 
protect until it died out or a plan of emancipation could be approved. “The theory of our 
government is Universal Freedom,” he stated. Whereas the clause “‘All men are created 
free and equal’” was enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, “[t]he world 
‘Slavery’ is not found in the Constitution.”  The only “legislation that has recognized or 
tolerated its extension, has been associated with a compensation—a Compromise—
showing that it was something that moved forward, not by its own right, but by its 
wrong.” The Missouri Compromise had allowed slavery into the state of Missouri and 
every other territory that then belonged to the U.S. below 36 degrees 30’. Slavery would 
meanwhile be barred from all existing territories above the line, including the large area 
that would become the states of Kansas and Nebraska. Upholding Henry Clay as “the 
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leading spirit in the making the Missouri compromise,” Lincoln refuted Douglas’s charge 
that Clay and Daniel Webster would lend their support to the Kansas-Nebraska Act if 
they had lived to see it.62 
 Lincoln was convinced that most Americans in both 1776 and 1854 believed 
slavery immoral. Before the crowd at Peoria, Illinois, he confidently asserted: “it is very 
certain that the great mass of mankind…consider slavery a great moral wrong.” Lincoln 
therefore invoked Jefferson and the Founding Fathers in the same way congressional 
colleagues had done so throughout the 30th Congress. Mirroring their statements, he 
called forth “the fathers of our republic, the vindicators of our liberty, and the framers of 
our government,” and pointed to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 “as the best exposition 
of their views of slavery as an institution.” Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of 
Independence, “the most distinguished politician of our history; a Virginian by birth and 
continued residence, and withal, a slave-holder,” had personally urged his state to cede 
the Northwest Territory to the U.S. and for the new nation to prohibit slavery within its 
bounds. Realizing the dangerous moral ground on which the Kansas-Nebraska Act rested, 
with its refusal to determine slavery immoral, Lincoln explained that the fathers had 
never wavered in their recognition of its immorality. “Necessity”—not “Right”—had 
been “the only argument [the Founders] ever admitted in favor of slavery.” For this 
reason, any mention of the horrible institution was “hid[den] away, in the constitution, 
just as an afflicted man hides away a wen or a cancer, which he dares not cut out at once, 
lest he bleed to death.”63 
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 This retelling of America’s early history cast the Kansas-Nebraska principle in 
bold relief, depicting popular sovereignty and its appraisal of slavery as a “sacred right,” 
as a recent development that directly contradicted the intentions of the Founding Fathers. 
“Let no one be deceived,” he cried. “The spirit of seventy-six and the spirit of Nebraska, 
are utter antagonisms; and the former is being rapidly displaced by the latter.” He called 
upon his fellow countrymen to “turn slavery from its claims of ‘moral right,’ back upon 
its existing legal rights, and its arguments of ‘necessity.’”64 One newspaper paraphrased 
Lincoln’s Springfield address on October 4, which explained how different the Founders’ 
convictions were to “the new-fangled doctrines of popular rights, invented in these 
degenerate latter days to cloak the spread of slavery.” Most importantly, Lincoln saw that 
policy as a reversal of an antislavery trend begun with the Ordinance of 1787 but carried 
forward by Clay and his Missouri Compromise. “[A]s a glance at the map will show, the 
Missouri line is a long way farther South than the Ohio,” Lincoln explained. A clear 
“principle of jogging southward” had kept the nation on a path of eventually preventing 
slavery’s extension ever since 1776.65 
 Lincoln recalled his northwestern roots in support of these arguments against the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which gained an incredible amount of support from his section of 
the country. He described himself at Peoria as “no less than National in all the positions I 
may take,” and willing to prove his reverence for the Union first and foremost to all who 
considered his convictions “narrow, sectional and dangerous to the Union.” Keenly aware 
of the anti-abolitionist sentiment that threatened the success of any anti-Nebraska man, 
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whether Democrat or Whig, he urged his fellow Illinoisans to “Stand with anybody that 
stands RIGHT. Stand with him while he is right and PART with him when he goes 
wrong. Stand WITH the abolitionist in restoring the Missouri Compromise; and stand 
AGAINST him when he attempts to repeal the fugitive slave law.”66 Perceiving this 
position as the moderate northwestern one, Lincoln believed the Wilmot Proviso was an 
essentially northwestern document that should appeal to the masses of white migrants 
who had entered that free territory seeking great opportunities for advancement. Likely 
drawing upon the statements his fellow congressmen had made from 1847 to 1849, he put 
forward the successes of the northwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin as solid proof that the Ordinance of 1787 had been wise policy. Standing on 
the northwestern ground of his state in 1854, he asked: “If the ordinance of ’87 did not 
keep slavery out of the north west territory, how happens it that the north west shore of 
the Ohio river is entirely free from it; while the south east shore, less than a mile 
distant…is entirely covered with it?” He declared that the Northwest “is now what 
Jefferson foresaw and intended—the happy home of teeming millions of free, white, 
prosperous people, and no slave amongst them.” In Illinois’s capital of Springfield, he 
asserted: “No States in the world have ever advanced as rapidly in population, wealth, the 
arts and appliances of life, and now have such promise of prospective greatness, as the 
very States that were born under the ordinance of ’87.” The prosperity of this land, freed 
from slavery, was precisely what had inspired him to vote for the Wilmot Proviso “at 
least forty times.”67  
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 The proviso, he argued, was meant not for the benefit of the black man but for the 
success of the white man. “Slave States are places for poor white people to remove 
FROM; not to remove TO,” he urged. “New free States are the places for poor people to 
go to and better their condition,” as proven by the immense prosperity of the Northwest. 
Lincoln thus thought the Wilmot Proviso represented a truly national piece of legislation. 
He continued to believe that “human nature” informed men of the immorality of slavery, 
and that most men would oppose the extension of slavery. To support his arguments, 
Lincoln was careful to qualify for his fellow Illinoisans that the Wilmot Proviso only 
prevented the extension of slavery, and did not pertain to the institution as it existed in 
the slave states.68 In further explication of the Proviso’s nationality, Lincoln intoned that 
unlike the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Wilmot’s legislation had not “abandoned the Missouri 
Compromise and authorised its destruction.” It left all lands covered by previous 
compromises alone and merely applied itself to additional territories acquired after the 
Mexican-American War. While popular sovereignty advocates had trampled across 
Clay’s beloved compromise, proponents of the Wilmot Proviso “have held the Missouri 
Compromise as a sacred thing.”69 
 Lincoln therefore castigated Douglas and his Act for not only contradicting the 
convictions and legacy of the Founders but also for failing to provide the freedoms it had 
promised. The legislation did not truly allow the people to decide whether slavery should 
or should not inhabit those lands, Lincoln argued. Rather, it made them “as open to 
slavery as Mississippi or Arkansas were when they were territories.”70 Lincoln frequently 
restated his contention that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise embedded with the 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act did not promote greater democratic freedom for white men but 
actually limited it by “practically” acting on behalf of slavery, “recognising it, endorsing 
it, propagating, it, extending it.” As proof, Lincoln pointed to all those states that had not 
been subject to federal legislation outlawing slavery. Of these slave states, five were 
above the Missouri compromise line, and in none of these rather mountainous, northern-
lying areas had “popular sovereignty” or natural climate kept slavery out. He urged his 
listeners to support a measure that would keep the institution out of all future U.S. states 
until 40,000 inhabitants had settled therein. Otherwise, slavery would inevitably lay claim 
to all U.S. territories, and division and bloodshed would reign as settlers fought one 
another over slavery and freedom. The intended effects of Douglas’s Act—ensuring the 
“sacred right of self-government”—would never be realized; instead, “the grossest 
violation of it” would inevitably result.71 
 Ultimately, Lincoln concluded, the only way he should ever consent to vote for or 
support the Kansas-Nebraska Act was if it truly represented “a great Union-saving 
measure.” At the end of 1854, as he pondered the dire developments that occurred in the 
wake of the Great Triumvirate’s death, Lincoln admitted that “[m]uch as I hate slavery, I 
would consent to the extension of it rather than see the Union dissolved, just as I would 
consent to any GREAT evil, to avoid a GREATER one.” He concluded, however, that the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act was the very opposite of a Union-saving measure, producing only 
discord and violence when it should provide unity and peace. Its ultimate origination, he 
believed, lay rooted in the growing shoots of a dangerous proslavery movement that had 
captured the southern elite. The proslavery contingent, “having exhausted its share of the 
[Missouri Compromise] bargain, demands an abrogation of the Compromise and a re-
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division of the property,” he warned. The “declared indifference” voiced by Douglas 
merely hid a “covert real zeal for the spread of slavery.”72  
 Perceiving Douglas as a mere lackey for southern slaveholders, Lincoln believed 
his Kansas-Nebraska Act utilized demagoguery to convince non-slaveholding southerners 
and northwesterners that popular sovereignty, rather than the anti-slavery extension 
pledge of the Wilmot Proviso, most naturally protected their interests. His perception of 
Douglas as a designing demagogue stemmed directly from his conversations and 
familiarity with northwesterners in Illinois, and with southern slaveholders in Congress. 
From these sets of experiences, Lincoln understood that many white southerners fled 
from the South for the opportunity to settle in the free Northwest. He remained convinced 
that the southern slaveholding congressmen of even his own Whig Party did not 
accurately represent the majority of the white South, and he believed that most white men 
in America, North or South, East or West, preferred free territory to slave. After the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Lincoln sprang into action in an attempt to disabuse 
his fellow non-slaveholders of the notion that popular sovereignty granted them greater 
democratic freedoms. Those efforts would continue until his election as president in 
1860. 
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Chapter Six 
 The Battle against Popular Sovereignty, 1855–1860 
 
 The divisions between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas drawn out in the 
Lincoln-Douglas Debates loomed larger than the two individuals who stood on the stages 
of Illinois, each hurling accusations while shielding himself from glancing blows from 
the other. Both men believed the Northwest would be crucial to deciding the presidential 
contest of 1860, and each man approached the other as his single major opponent. Both 
Lincoln and Douglas believed their respective stances on the slavery issue reached out to 
all parts of the nation and represented the two camps into which the people would 
ultimately fall into. Though Douglas knew a portion of the Democratic Party would never 
support him, he nevertheless believed he would win the nomination in 1860, with much 
of the South behind him. Lincoln, meanwhile, derided Douglas’s grand designs and 
perceived the Little Giant as little more than a puppet used by the South but then to be 
thrown away when no longer needed. Lincoln never thought the South would succeed in 
a secession movement.  
 Indeed, Lincoln did not really see one South. He saw a South divided, its 
population split not only by race but by class. The majority of the South’s white 
population, he knew, did not own slaves. When he considered them, he thought of the 
southerners he knew—those who had migrated to Illinois. Whereas droves of southerners 
had entered into free territory, few northerners, it seemed, had chosen to settle 
permanently in slave territory. He feared that time could change this, and that Douglas, 
after years of attracting northerners to popular sovereignty, could convince them that 
slavery was not a moral question. Long into the future, if Douglas was successful enough, 
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this doctrine would deliver a majority into the hands of the proslavery southern radicals 
who would capitalize on Douglas’s successes by opening all U.S. territories and states to 
slavery. Lincoln envisioned this treacherous scenario as early as 1854. It prompted him to 
directly involve himself in politics again, to make two unsuccessful runs for the U.S. 
Senate, and to engage in a series of debates with Stephen Douglas that gained national 
attention in late 1858. Throughout this time, Lincoln received further information about 
the South that convinced him the proslavery element was gaining ground but that non-
slaveholders would never gather behind purely proslavery expansionist agenda, let alone 
a secessionist movement. He therefore focused almost exclusively on defeating Douglas, 
whom he continued to consider, through 1860, the most dangerous agent of proslavery 
radicalism that existed in the Union. 
 Although some Illinoisans shared in Lincoln’s antipathy to the Little Giant, vast 
numbers shared Stephen Douglas’s conviction that his course on the slavery issue would 
whisk the nation away from impending warfare and secure her safely upon a set of 
eternal principles that had existed since the earliest days of the nation. Douglas’s 
confidence rested upon his understanding both of migrants to the Northwest and of 
nonslaveholding southerners. He provided a history of the Northwest Ordinance that 
struck at the core of many migrants, reverberating the sentiments of settlers in 1824, and 
their descendants in the 1850s.1 “It is a curious fact,” Douglas remarked in Congress in 
1854, “that so long as Congress said the territory of Illinois should not have slavery, she 
actually had it,” and then when the settlers formed a Constitution and had the right to act 
as they pleased, “the people of Illinois, of their own free will and accord, provided for a 
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system of emancipation.” Though naturally antislavery, Douglas explained, “the people 
there regard[ed] [the Ordinance] as an invasion of their rights.”2 In addition to witnessing 
his doctrines win the sympathies of southern-born residents of the Northwest, Douglas 
also won the explicit support of men in the South. He received the endorsement of those 
such as T. M. Rogers, who wrote to an Illinoisan in 1851 that “If your man Douglas is 
nominated for the Presidency” and supports the acquisition of Cuba, nonintervention of 
the federal government in the slave states, and the 1850 compromise, “I think he will 
carry every southern state except S. Carolina.” Drawing upon the sentiments of his fellow 
southerners, Rogers sincerely believed popular sovereignty resonated with the South.3 As 
a resident of Shawneetown, Illinois, explained, Illinois had always held a close 
relationship with the South, “laboring to put down the bad men in our part of the state,” 
to keep “the abolitionists off Tennessee & the South generally.”4 Later, when Douglas 
fought against the “fusion” of various antislavery northerners in the wake of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, he and many of his cohorts genuinely believed that “Abolitionism and 
Nationality” were “the political sentiments that will influence all—there is no middle 
ground for ‘fence-men’ to ride—a choice of one or the other must be made.”5 
 The bright optimism Douglas and his Democrats expressed, however, did not 
outshine that of Lincoln and the “anti-Nebraskans” who opposed the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act. While Douglasites pressed onward in full confidence that popular sovereignty rested 
on great principles that would carry the Union safely through any crisis, even one 
revolving around slavery, Lincoln supporters grew equally certain that a pledge against 
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3 T. M. Rogers to August Riggin, September 5, 1851, Riggin Family Papers, ALPL. 
4 Sam Marshall to John A. McClernand, April 24, 1850, John A. McClernand Collection, ALPL. 
5 W. D. Latham to Charles Lanphier, Nov. 9, 1855, Lanphier Box 1-1/2, ALPL. 
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the extension of slavery would guarantee the preservation of the nation. The 
correspondence to and from Lincoln during this period, though filled with typical 
political maneuverings, indicated that whereas the Whig Party had always held a very 
small place in Illinois politics, the new campaign against the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
promised a new era of anti-Democratic feeling in the state. Isaac Bailey expressed the 
outrage many, both Whig and Democrat, felt when Douglas declared the Missouri 
Compromise repealed. “He was onse heard loudely to exclaim that no ruthless hand 
would ever be base enough to desturb that compact,” Bailey informed a relative. “And lo 
his ruthless hand performed the act,” allowing slavery’s spread to free territories and 
disturbing the national peace.6 E. W Downer similarly revealed to Trumbull that although 
he had long been “an old friend & admirer” of Douglas, and still remained a Democrat, 
his political support for the party leader fell away “after Douglass turned Traitor to 
freedom,” and “I plainly saw that either Slavery or Freedom had to become National.”7 
Once Lincoln began making speeches against the Act in mid-1854, he received numerous 
invitations to speak across the state, alerting him to the realization that the anti-
Nebraskans needed a vocal leader who could articulate the opposition’s views. Many of 
these invitations came from Whigs who, like Lincoln, sought to fuse with other anti-
Nebraska groups while maintaining the integrity and structure of the Whig Party.8 
 The positive feedback Lincoln received after delivering his 1854 speeches led to a 
general enthusiasm among many anti-Nebraskans for his possible election to the U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Isaac Bailey to Josiah Bailey, May 22, 1855, Bailey Family Papers, UIUC. 
7 E. W. Downer to Trumbull, Mar. 17, 1856, Trumbull Correspondence, ALPL. 
8 Abraham Jonas to Lincoln, September 16, 1854, William H. Randolph to Lincoln, September 29, 1854, 
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Senate.9 Lincoln knew his popularity stemmed from his firm yet moderate stance on 
slavery within the anti-Nebraska coalition. Kentucky-born Hugh Lamaster considered 
Richard Yates and Abraham Lincoln two main contenders for the Senate who could 
“harmonize” the anti-Nebraskans, and since “we want some one that can stand up to the 
little Giant,” Lincoln appeared the more favorable of the two. Albert Jones, meanwhile, 
pointed out that his “strongly Whig—strongly anti Douglass” district was even “more 
strongly anti-abolition” and thus required a moderate candidate. These expressions of 
deep regard for Lincoln spurred him to run for U.S. Senate in November 1854.10 
Significantly, Lincoln decided against throwing his lot with the newly organized 
Republican Party, which at the time appeared to be managed by abolitionists, and ran 
instead as an anti-Nebraska Whig. As Lincoln informed Ichabod Codding, an abolitionist 
Republican who had written to him on November 13, 1854, requesting his presence at the 
Republican State Central Committee, he did not believe himself radical enough for that 
organization. Lincoln intimated that though “I suppose my opposition to the principle of 
slavery is as strong as that of any member of the Republican party….I had also supposed 
that the extent to which I feel authorized to carry that opposition, practically, was not at 
all satisfactory to that party.” Throughout the 1850s, Lincoln persisted in the belief that a 
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moderate antislavery stance most adequately represented both his opinions and the course 
that the nation should take.11  
 Lincoln steadfastly held to this position because he believed it adequately 
characterized central Illinois, which was a melting pot of southerners, northerners, and 
foreigners who had all settled there and now lived among one another. By holding this 
center position he hoped he could convince both the northern and southern portions of the 
state to support him. Throughout his efforts to win the Senate race in late 1854 and early 
1855, he often applied to central Illinoisans and especially southern-born Illinoisans for 
support.12 Though Lincoln had political connections in northern Illinois, he became 
worried that “there must be something wrong” in Chicago, where he had expected to 
receive much support. Writing to Whig ally Elihu B. Washburne in mid-December 1854 
during his U.S. Senate campaign, Lincoln requested Washburne to contact John 
Wentworth about anti-Nebraska sentiments in that part of the state.13 Supporters in 
northern Illinois frequently reminded Lincoln that he was no abolitionist and stood on 
ground that disturbed antislavery purists. Thomas B. Talcott, for example, intimated that 
his brother was an “abolitionist of the Lovejoy stamp and has been for several years,” and 
that he and men of his principles sought to elect Owen Lovejoy or Ichabod Codding 
rather than a moderate like Lincoln or Yates. Previously, in October 1854, Chicagoan 
Richard L. Wilson had pointed to the gulf that separated a southern-born central 
Illinoisan like Lincoln from northern Illinoisans, chiding Lincoln that he should travel to 
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Chicago “to learn a little of the Northern Light.”14 As Washburne explained, northern 
Illinoisans objected to Lincoln because “it is alleged that the Springfield influence has 
always been against us in the north, and that if you should be elected the north would be 
overlooked for the center and south part of the State.” Lincoln, “astonishe[d]” by this 
news, explained that as a state representative of Sangamon County for eight years, he had 
never known the central and northern counties to disagree on major policy concerns. He 
assured Washburne that as a U.S. Senator he would never grant preference to a particular 
part of the state over the rest. Nevertheless, when prompted by northern Illinoisans to 
rescind his commitment to upholding the fugitive slave law, Lincoln continually refused, 
citing his allegiance to all compromises between North and South.15 
 Although Washburne and other committed antislavery Illinoisans pled with 
Lincoln to make concessions to the “free soil element,” he refused to alter his position. 
From 1854 to 1860, his antislavery stance remained largely the same, though he 
developed a more mature and effective defense of that platform over time, and he 
continued to assert the non-extension of slavery, as well as adherence to all previous 
compromises and the Constitution.16 Thus, when Jesse O. Norton queried: “Are you 
bound to stand by every thing in the Compromise measures of 1850? Couldn’t you 
concede the [the free soilers] a modification of the Fugitive Slave Act?” Lincoln refused 
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to follow through on such advice that he must extend his antislavery principles to 
contradict the nation’s sacred compromises.17  
 By 1854 Lincoln had formed the foundation of a political platform that he would 
advocate for the rest of the decade. Though certainly disappointed by his failure to win 
the Senate seat that year, he contented himself with the knowledge that his defeat had 
been brought about less from lack of genuine support than by political machination. 
Indeed, after receiving the most votes of any candidate on the first ballot, Lincoln well 
understood that his position had resonated among Illinoisans.18 Furthermore, as Davis 
ardently asserted to F. W. Rockwell that March, nobody had met and matched Stephen 
Douglas on the stump but Lincoln, “and Lincoln discussed the subject with Douglass 
everywhere.” No matter who represented Illinois’s interests in the national legislature, it 
was Lincoln who had proven himself capable of combatting—perhaps even defeating—
the Little Giant.19 
 As “Anti-Nebraska” Democrats, Whigs, Free-Soilers and Know-Nothings 
struggled to determine their future course on the slavery issue, the waning days of 1854 
turned into the year 1855, and the very term “anti-Nebraska” began to seem like an 
anachronism.20 It persisted in political culture for the next several years, despite the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854, and continued to define the broad 
outlines of a group dominated by northerners who despised the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise and its replacement with popular sovereignty in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 
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1854. “So far as [it] relates to the atrocious wrong, the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise,” Augustus Adams admitted to Lincoln, “the act has been perpetrated.” Its 
anti-Nebraska enemies therefore sought now to “undo the wrong that has already been 
perpetrated and guard against the recurrence of similar acts in the future.” Despite his 
comforting recognition that the U.S. Senate battle amounted to just the first skirmish in a 
prolonged war with the Democrats, and his reluctance to join a radical Republican Party, 
Lincoln knew that the “anti-Nebraskans” must fuse themselves together into a more 
permanent party organization in order to defeat popular sovereignty and prevent the 
extension of slavery. He had keenly recognized the problems of keeping together a 
loosely bound coalition of anti-Nebraskans when he had run his Senate race.21 Surely, as 
he pondered the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and remembered Henry Clay’s 
course on the slavery issue, he considered his own statement, voiced in his eulogy of 
Henry Clay, that “the man who is of neither party, is not—cannot be, of any 
consequence.”22 
 In August 1855 the Illinoisan expressed his sense of displacement. By that time, 
he sensed that the anti-Nebraskans would not become absorbed by a growing Whig Party 
but would form a new organization of their own. Yet at that time, the two new 
organizations—the Republicans and the Know Nothings—did not appear to fit Lincoln’s 
agenda. He confided to Speed, “I think I am a whig; but others say there are no whigs, 
and that I am an abolitionist.” He admitted that as a congressmen he had frequently voted 
for the Wilmot Proviso, but “I never heard of any one attempting to unwhig me for that,” 
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and “I now do no more than oppose the extension of slavery.” Summarizing his moderate 
antislavery sentiments to his closest friend, Lincoln declared that he was not a Know-
Nothing. “How could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in 
favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to 
be pretty rapid. As a nation, we began by declaring that ‘all men are created equal.’ We 
now practically read it ‘all men are created equal, except negroes.’ When the Know-
Nothings get control, it wil read ‘all men are created equal, except negroes, and 
foreigners, and catholics.’”23 
 By May 1856, as the Republican Party gained increasing strength and 
incorporated more moderate antislavery members, Lincoln replaced his hesitancy with 
confidence that the organization could assert a moderate doctrine that should appeal to a 
large portion of the Union. Therefore, when law partner William Herndon signed 
Lincoln’s name to a “Call for Republican Convention” in Sangamon County, Lincoln 
consented and pledged his support for the new party. The call to which his name had 
been signed, far from outlining abolitionist intentions, rather appealed to all those 
“opposed to the Repeal of the Missouri Compromise…opposed to the present 
Administration [of James Buchanan]…and who are in favor of restoring the 
administration of the General Government to the Policy of Washington and Jefferson.” A 
crucial reason why Lincoln waited until the Republican Party seemed to bear, or at least 
held the potential to endorse, a more conservative antislavery platform than its early 
reputation had indicated, was his belief that as an antislavery southern-born central 
Illinoisan, he was able to influence both southerners and northerners. Throughout the 
1850s he maintained this confidence not only because of his popularity in Illinois, but 
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also because the information he gathered about the South buttressed it. What he learned 
of the South supported his conception of the region as a slave-based society in which the 
white nonslaveholder’s natural self-interest and desire to rise was stifled by a 
slaveholding class bearing an oligarchic tendency to amass wealth in slaves and land as it 
achieved total political control. This information reached Lincoln from a variety of 
sources: the continued migration of southerners to the Northwest, literature produced by 
southerners during this period, and correspondence with southerners he knew.24 
Though the period of heaviest in-migration to Illinois had passed by 1850, new 
settlers still arrived in the state from the North and the South. The northwestern state was 
filled with people on the move, from new settlers arriving, to old ones moving on to other 
western states, and others simply passing through on their way to further destinations. 
This migration, ever-present around Lincoln while he resided in Illinois, was not simply 
the story of others, but a personal story of his and his family’s own travails. Reminders of 
his family’s migratory course occasionally sprang from his kin. Following his father’s 
death in 1851, Lincoln’s stepbrother informed him that he was considering moving to 
Missouri. Lincoln’s indignant reply, resplendent with frustration at John Johnston’s 
constant attempts to live as idle a life as possible, revealed his own resolute conviction 
that free states offered the most and best opportunities to any man genuinely seeking to 
improve his economic circumstances. “What can you do in Missouri, better than here?” 
he asked. “Will any body there, any more than here, do your work for you?”25 With this 
question Lincoln betrayed his understanding of white nonslaveholders.  Though a 
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slave state might technically offer to its white inhabitants the prospect of less toil, it 
remained exceedingly difficult for any poor white man to rise to the status of slaveholder. 
Perhaps in addition to the sentiments of southern-born migrants, Lincoln had heard of 
those who, like J. H. Riggin, had attempted a living in the South only to return to 
“Suckerdom” with a new appreciation of “the advantages all have in the North over the 
South.” The non-slaveholder gained nothing, and lost greater opportunity, by removing to 
a slave state. “If you intend to go to work,” Lincoln assured his stepbrother, “there is no 
better place than right where you are,” and “if you do not intend to go to work, you 
cannot get along anywhere.” After reprimanding Johnston for his apparent unwillingness 
to work at a better life for himself, Lincoln explained that he wrote such harsh words “in 
order, if possible, to get you to face the truth—which truth is, you are destitute because 
you have idled away all your time. Your thousand pretences for not getting along better, 
are all non-sense—they deceive no body but yourself. Go to work is the only cure for 
your case.”26 
 The ghost of his family’s own migration continued to follow Lincoln through 
these years. On April 1, 1854, he replied to a letter written to him from Jesse Lincoln, 
apparently a second cousin of his, residing in Tennessee. Acknowledging to Jesse 
Lincoln that his family’s genealogy appeared to match all Lincoln knew of his family, 
Abraham Lincoln further explained that while serving in Congress, he had corresponded 
with another relative, David Lincoln, currently living in Virginia. Throughout most of the 
letter, Lincoln retraced his family’s migration story, describing the movement of the 
Lincolns into territories both free and slave. He also mentioned that he had formed 
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acquaintances with two prominent Tennesseans—Colonel Crozier and Andrew 
Johnson—while in Washington, D.C., each of whom had spoken of additional possible 
relatives bearing the last name, “Lincoln.”27  
 Meanwhile, the vast migration of southerners to Illinois, although it had dwindled 
from its previous strength, continued. Droves of southerners simply seeking greater 
opportunity for themselves still arrived, seeking free soil, but others, too—those who 
opposed slavery for moral reasons—continued to give up their antislavery efforts in the 
South and move northwestward. For years, religious leaders from across the United 
States had relocated to various regions of the country to engage in mission work. Those 
who had either moved to, or continued to live in, the South, often experienced the 
difficulty of preaching against slavery in a slave society, but many nonetheless continued 
to do so up to the early 1850s. Until that time, these men remained confident that the 
work of antislavery could continue in the South. Working in Kentucky, John G. Fee 
explained to John Benton as late as 1848 that “I know my being a native of the state had 
given me great advantages” in allowing him to preach antislavery doctrines. 
Nevertheless, “I believe the proposed work can be done by a discrete God fearing man 
from New York.”28 By 1860, however, the status of antislavery ministers in the South 
had undergone a radical change. Though these ministers had always “found it happier to 
move to a free state,” as noted by Rev. Harvey Woods of Kentucky, who saw “the best 
men flying from the South,” the efforts of those who remained behind had become 
significantly more difficult by the early 1850s. John G. Fee struggled to hold his 
congregation together in Kentucky during this time. When he sought out five families he 
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28 John G. Fee to John Benton, Feb. 22, 1848, Edward C. Thurman Collection, FHS. 
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believed held sympathies similar to those of his church, Fee found that “most of them 
were anti-slavery but were selling out and going to free states.” Awake “to the wrongs 
and evils of slavery,” these families “determined that their families should not be 
subjected to the incident Evils.”29 
 Whereas the realization that “advantages for them and their children in a slave 
state are few” had always stirred antislavery southerners to move, by the 1850s 
“persecution” also “visit[ed] heavy upon them and their families.” In North Carolina, 
Rev. Daniel Wilson experienced this firsthand. In his AMA correspondence throughout 
the 1850s, he explained “the exciting circumstances with which we are surrounded in this 
Southern field of labor.” After witnessing the persecution of two fellow ministers by a 
proslavery mob, Wilson understood he must carry on his efforts “in a private way,” that 
would not garner the attention of proslavery southerners.30 In 1855 he expressed a firm 
resolution that “there is so much prejudice” against northerners that none should be sent 
to the South to assist in antislavery efforts, no matter how badly they were needed. One 
of the men who had helped expel other antislavery preachers from the state told a 
member of Wilson’s congregation “that we are determined that no Northern abolitionist 
shall come here and preach that doctrine, but that they had no objection [to] those 
preachers who are Bred and Born here.” Like Fee, however, Whipple struggled to 
maintain a presence when  “a great portion of the more wealthy of our friends have gone 
from this country to seek a more favored clime,” and members constantly fled from the 
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History Documents Collection, UC; John G. Fee to the Youths Missionary Association, Oct. 21, 1850, 
Kentucky, American Missionary Association (AMA) Manuscripts (Microfilm), Amistad Research Center, 
(hereafter abbreviated ARC). 
30 John G. Fee, Aug. 9, 1850, Kentucky, AMA Manuscripts (microfilm); Daniel Wilson to George 
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South. Those who stayed, he explained, were ostracized by the rest of society, and “such 
is the influence of the Slave Power” that all antislavery candidates were repressed and not 
granted printed tickets for people to vote.31  
 Whipple’s correspondence offers a window into the changing South, which 
Lincoln had little contact with throughout the 1850s. Though familiar with the impact of 
southern non-slaveholders on the Northwest, he was not aware of the potentially 
“negative effect of intentional antislavery migration” on the South. As historian Philip 
Schwarz argues, “[i]f those who migrated had stayed in Virginia, they might have worked 
against human bondage” and perhaps convinced a section of the South to embrace 
gradual emancipation.32 Though Lincoln makes no explicit reference to the continuing 
migration of southerners in the 1850s, there is substantial evidence that he read particular 
literature about the South throughout the decade.33 These tracts informed him that the 
region had moved even further from its early commitment to gradual emancipation but 
continued to contain a substantive body of white nonslaveholders who resisted the efforts 
of a proslavery slaveholding aristocracy. Besides southern newspaper articles, Lincoln 
indicated to Judge George Robertson of Lexington, Kentucky, that he had also read part 
of Robertson’s Scrap Book on Law and Politics, Men and Times, which offered Lincoln a 
Kentuckian’s perspective on the subject of slavery. Specifically, Lincoln commented on a 
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speech the elder Robertson had given in Congress during the Missouri crisis. On 
February 18, 1819, he had argued in favor of admitting Arkansas to the Union and 
described his own opinion that although the Constitution “does not guarantee to the 
people of the territories the right to establish slavery,” leaving it to Congress to decide the 
matter, the best policy would nevertheless be to simply allow each territory to decide the 
matter for itself. Robertson believed this stance matched the Founders’ position, and he 
pleaded with his fellow colleagues to “do as Washington, and Franklin, and Jefferson did, 
and would certainly do again, were they now here.” Yet his opinions were also heavily 
based on his sense in 1819 that “Slavery is Geographical” would never survive in 
northern latitudes.34 
 Lincoln’s 1855 response to Robertson’s reprinted 1819 speech mingled praise 
with careful remonstrance. Pleased that Robertson revealed himself as “not a friend of 
slavery in the abstract,” Lincoln pointed favorably to the former congressman’s reference 
to “‘the peaceful extinction of slavery’” at some point in the country’s future. This 
opinion, of course, Lincoln was glad to see expressed by a Kentuckian. However, Lincoln 
also firmly urged that since Robertson had given his speech in 1819, “we have had thirty 
years of experience; and this experience has demonstrated, I think, that there is not 
peaceful extinction of slavery in prospect for us.” Popular sovereignty had proven itself 
beneficial not to the advocates of antislavery but to those who sought the spread of the 
destructive institution. “The signal failure of Henry Clay, and other good and great men, 
in 1849, to effect any thing in favor of gradual emancipation in Kentucky, together with a 
thousand other signs” indicated that antislavery sentiment had waned under the lack of a 
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clear and direct policy to prevent the further spread of slavery. Clearly disturbed by this 
sociopolitical development, Lincoln admitted that the “problem is to[o] mighty for me.”35 
 North Carolinian Benjamin S. Hedrick’s pamphlet, which asked, “Are North 
Carolinians Freemen?” offered Lincoln a more comprehensive assessment of southern 
society that largely corroborated the views he had garnered up to 1856. Hedrick’s 
pamphlet contained, first, a reprinted section of the North Carolina Standard from 
September 1856 that demanded all Fremont supporters in southern “schools and 
seminaries of learning” be fired from their positions. The issue referenced Hedrick, 
arguing that he should be removed from his position as college professor at the State 
University. “Upon what ground can a Southern instructor,” the paper asked, “selected to 
impart healthy instruction to the sons of Southern slave owners, and indebted for his 
situation to a Southern State, excuse his support of Fremont?” Hedrick responded directly 
to these accusations by writing the editors of the Standard in explanation of his support 
for presidential nominee John C. Fremont. Fremont, he explained, “was born and 
educated at the South,” then “lived at the North and the West,” and thus was a truly 
national man. Furthermore, he was “on the right side of the great question which now 
disturbs the public peace. Opposition to slavery extension,” Hedrick insisted, “is neither a 
Northern nor a sectional ism,” but “originated with the great Southern statesmen of the 
Revolution.” The tradition of limiting slavery’s extension extended from the Founders of 
1776 to the Great Compromiser. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, 
James Madison, and John Randolph “were all opposed to slavery in the abstract,” and 
sealed antislavery as national policy with their passage of the Ordinance of 1787. The 
nation then carried their tradition forward under the leadership of Daniel Webster and 
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Henry Clay, who had publicly declared: “’I never can, and never will vote, and no earthly 
power ever will make me vote to spread slavery over territory where it does not exist.’”36 
 Hedrick then joined to these intellectual statements of leading Americans his own 
experiences with “the majority of the people among whom I was born and educated.” 
These arguments recalled the same points that had been voiced by Virginians in 1831, 
when legislators debated the merits of a slave system that seemed to expel white laborers 
from its midst.37 Hedrick explained: “Of my neighbors, friends, and kindred, nearly one-
half have left the State since I was old enough to remember. Many is the time I have 
stood by the loaded emigrant wagon, and given the parting hand to those whose face I 
was never to look upon again.” These families “were going to seek homes in the free 
West,” he asserted, “knowing, as they did, that free and slave labor could not both exist 
and prosper in the same community.” To further support these declarations, Hedrick 
offered the statistics of the 1850 census, which had recorded “fifty-eight thousand native 
North Carolinians living in the free States of the West. Thirty-three thousand in Indiana 
alone. There were, at the same time, one hundred and eighty thousand Virginians living 
in the free States. Now, if these people were so much in love with the ‘institution,’ why 
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did they not remain where they could enjoy its blessings?” Hedrick used these statistics 
against southerners who argued that slavery required more territory, pointing out that 
“here in North Carolina,” as in Virginia, “we need more men, rather than more land.” 
Since the northeastern slave states had sold much of their slave population further 
Southwest and white nonslaveholders had fled from slavery, he argued, states like North 
Carolina and Virginia now needed more men—not more land. Yet white nonslaveholders 
would not willingly relocate to a place “which degrades white labor.”38 
 Hedrick’s pamphlet, though containing assertions peculiar to his own experiences 
as a North Carolinian academic, echoed the arguments Lincoln had begun to make by 
1854 and would refine in his later speeches and debates. This southerner revealed to the 
Kentucky-born northwesterner exactly what he had suspected and confirmed for him 
what he had always believed—that the self-interest of southern nonslaveholders was 
directly opposed to slavery and the class of slaveholders it created. Hedrick’s exposition 
of the Founders’ antislavery policy originating in the Northwest Ordinance, combined 
with his witnessing of vast migrations to the Northwest, confirmed that the 
nonslaveholding southerner understood the implications of the Ordinance and made a 
clear and firm decision to move to free soil rather than slave.39 Although Lincoln had 
heard these arguments before, during his term in Congress, Hedrick more effectively 
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presented the benefits of free labor over slave and depicted the detrimental effects of 
slavery than any northerner could. His forced removal from the university and from the 
South only further showed that the slaveholding aristocracy had taken control of the 
region, snuffing out antislavery sentiments and expelling those who proclaimed them.40  
 Hinton Helper’s The Impending Crisis of the South, which sent shock waves 
reverberating across the Union after its publication in 1857, presented Lincoln with a 
politicized, comprehensive indictment of the slave system by a white nonslaveholder. 
Rather than emphasizing the lofty antislavery statements of long-dead Founding Fathers 
and offering personal migration stories to appeal to “the better angels of our nature,” 
Helper lambasted an oligarchical slave power for crippling their fellow white 
nonslaveholders and stripping them of their rights and power. Dedicating the book, in 
part, to the “Non-Slaveholding Whites of the South,” he urged them to “cast aside the 
great obstacle that impedes their progress, and bring into action a new policy which will 
lead them from poverty and ignorance to wealth and intellectual greatness.” As David 
Brown presciently notes, “Historians remain divided over the question of whether non-
slaveholders were fundamentally exploited by a slave-holding elite, as Helper argued, or 
whether slavery actually served their interests in certain ways.” Lincoln, however, had 
little doubt that nonslaveholders’ freedoms and progress withered in the face of an 
overbearing slaveholding elite. Born in Kentucky to Virginian parents who moved their 
family to the free soil of the Northwest, Lincoln was raised to consider slavery a moral 
and social evil. Over the course of his life up to 1860, his interactions with southerners 
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were almost exclusively with either those who had chosen to leave the South for free soil, 
or slaveholders who enjoyed not only economic power but political power in Congress as 
well. Thus, to Lincoln, Helper’s arguments simply confirmed what he had long believed 
he well knew: that the natural interests of the white non-slaveholding southerner were 
opposed to the proslavery interests of the white southern slaveholder.41 
 Although Helper’s tract, with its unapologetic disregard for the moral aspects of 
the slavery question, provided a stunningly different argument, in style and tone, from 
Hedrick’s statements and those of many antislavery northerners, it nonetheless became a 
significant weapon wielded by Republicans for the election of 1860.42 Antislavery and 
abolitionist leaders in both the North and South worked to give Helper’s book as wide a 
distribution as possible, and many leading Republicans signed and/or assisted in issuing 
the Compendium to the Impending Crisis, a condensed edition of Helper’s work intended 
to garner the support for the Republican Party.43 Although Lincoln never publicly 
endorsed the book, neither did he denounce it; and in his Cooper Union address, he did 
explicitly reference it.44 Thus, once he began articulating statements about slavery that 
revealed his particular perception of the South in 1854, Lincoln’s generalizations about 
the South and his conception of southern slave society actually changed very little. The 
one crucial development he foresaw was the reversal of the nation’s antislavery tradition, 
spurred by a slaveholding minority that had become more politically and economically 
powerful over time. Even up through 1860, however, Lincoln believed this development 
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would not occur in a few years but rather over decades, in a slow dissipation of moral 
conviction incurred by an adoption of popular sovereignty as the official national policy 
on the slavery issue. 
 In a long, frank letter to friend Joshua F. Speed in August 24, 1855, Lincoln 
provided a general summary of his conception of the South, his animosity toward 
Douglas’s popular sovereignty, and his plan for the Union’s future course on the slavery 
issue. Lincoln understood, first and foremost, that Speed, like many southerners, admitted 
“the abstract wrong” of slavery. He was also aware that his deeper sense of slavery’s 
immorality separated him from the sentiments of many Americans, both North and South. 
“[E]very time I touch the Ohio, or any other slave-border,” he explained, he was 
reminded of the shackled slaves he had once seen on a trip to Kentucky with Speed in 
1841. The scene devastated him each time he thought of it, and he admonished Speed that 
“the great body of the Northern people” were forced to “crucify their feelings” for the 
sake of Union. Although Speed and other antislavery southerners feared that fusionists or 
Republicans would attempt to steal away the rights of slaveholders, Lincoln assured him 
that to the contrary, they would protect those rights and even uphold the Fugitive Slave 
Act. While “I confess I hate to see the poor creatures hunted down, and caught, and 
carried back to their stripes, and unrewarded toils,” he explained, “I also acknowledge 
your rights and my obligations, under the constitution, in regard to your slaves.” 
Displaying for Speed how important he believed the bonds between North and South to 
be, Lincoln further asserted that the sections were not so different. Even in the South, he 
pointed out, “slave-breeders and slave traders” were looked down upon as “a small, 
odious and detested class.” He ruefully noted that despite their denigrated position, “in 
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politics they dictate the course of all of you, and are as completely your masters as you 
are the masters of your own negroes.”45  
 The admonishing tone Lincoln adopted in his letter to longtime Kentucky friend 
Joshua Speed would be the one Lincoln continued to use as he gave speeches in Illinois 
from 1854 to 1860. Lincoln continued to evoke his belief that a relatively small but 
assertive proslavery group of slaveholders sought to either make slavery synonymous 
with Union or otherwise force a division of the Union. For this contingent, Lincoln 
displayed nothing less than total abhorrence. Yet for the rest of the South—for the vast 
majority of slaveholders and non-slaveholders whom he believed did not uphold the 
spread of slavery over the perpetuation of the Union—Lincoln reserved the same chiding 
but coaxing tone that he had imparted to Speed. His expressions mixed confident self-
assurance that he understood the position and sentiments of most white southerners with 
a cautious hope that these same southerners would listen to him and come to understand 
that he would protect the South, not seek to destroy it. Further evidence of Lincoln’s 
views of the South up to 1860 can be gleaned from the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, a series 
of seven speaking engagements in which Lincoln and Stephen Douglas sparred for the 
votes of their fellow Illinoisans for the U.S. Senate. Though centered in Illinois, these 
debates in the summer and fall of 1858 received nationwide attention and centered on 
slavery issues that resonated with Americans across the entire Union.46 
 Lincoln frequently repeated his firm belief “that the Southern slaveholders were 
neither better, nor worse than we of the North, and that we of the North were no better 
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than they. If we were situated as they are, we should act and feel as they do; and if they 
were situated as we are, they should act and feel as we do; and we never ought to lose 
sight of this fact in discussing the subject.”47 Lincoln clarified this further at Peoria in 
1854, explaining that “I have no prejudice against the Southern people,” and that if 
“slavery did not now exist amongst them, they would not introduce it. If it did now exist 
amongst us, we should not instantly give it up.” In his first scheduled debate with 
Stephen Douglas at Ottawa on August 21, 1858, Lincoln repeated these statements.48 He 
also complicated the otherwise clear distinction between North and South he and other 
politicians frequently resorted to, noting that “there are individuals, on both sides, who 
would not hold slaves under any circumstances; and others who would gladly introduce 
slavery anew, if it were out of existence.” At Kalamazoo, Michigan, in 1856, Lincoln 
placed the blame for slavery on “the mother Government of Great Britain,” explaining 
that Americans, North and South, “have ever deplored it. Our forefathers did.”49 
 Resurrecting his knowledge of white migrations, Lincoln asserted: “We know that 
southern men do free their slaves, go north, and become tip-top abolitionists; while some 
northern ones go south, and become most cruel slave-masters.” Most likely, he was aware 
of several specific cases in which southern slaveholders freed their slaves, including 
Virginian Edward Coles’s (in)famous removal to Illinois, and of his ceremonious freeing 
of his own slaves as they sailed down the Ohio River.50 Hailing from a well-connected 
Virginia family, Coles had served as governor of Illinois and played a crucial role in the 
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50 It is also probable that Lincoln knew of Judge Theophilus Dickey, a friend of David Davis’s who had 
freed the slaves he inherited in Kentucky and moved to Illinois. Excerpt from Isabel Wallace, The Life and 
Letters of General W. H. L. Wallace, David Davis Letters and Papers, ALPL. 
255	  
	  
	  
Illinois debates over slavery in 1824. In 1856 he gave an address entitled History of the 
Ordinance of 1787 to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania that was printed and 
released that same year as a pamphlet.51 Whether or not Lincoln read this particular tract, 
it is likely that he knew Coles’s general opinion that the Ordinance had exhibited Thomas 
Jefferson’s desire to rid the country of slavery, received the sanction of North and South, 
and preserved the Northwest as prosperous free territory. Coles asserted the Ordinance 
“was the offspring of the greatest statesman of our country; and no one can fail to see in it 
the kindred political features of its elder brother, the Declaration of American 
Independence.” He explained that in return for incorporating a fugitive slave law into the 
Constitution to protect slaveholders, the South passed the antislavery provision with 
“extraordinary unanimity.” Looking back upon the events of the past few years, Coles 
lamented that “men professing to be of the Jefferson school of politics” had turned away 
from the principles of the Ordinance of 1787 and precipitated “contention, riots, and 
threats, if not the awful realities of civil war.”52 
 The views Lincoln expressed regarding the Northwest Ordinance certainly 
mirrored those of Edward Coles. From 1856 to 1860, Lincoln continued presenting the 
Ordinance as the clearest exhibition of the Founding Fathers’ views on the extension of 
slavery.53 Like Coles, he also continued to pledge his full support for a constitutional 
fugitive slave law because the North had made a promise with the South in 1787 that it 
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intended to keep.54 On the other hand, Lincoln emphasized the racial arguments that 
Hinton Helper and Illinoisans had so frequently expressed, declaring himself “in favor of 
our new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home—may find 
some spot where they can better their condition—where they can settle upon new soil and 
better their condition in life.”55 
 Lincoln believed the “great majority, south as well as north, have human 
sympathies, of which they can no more divest themselves than they can of their 
sensibility to physical pain. These sympathies in the bosoms of the southern people, 
manifest in many ways, their sense of the wrong of slavery, and their consciousness that, 
after all, there is humanity in the negro.” This vast majority, Lincoln asserted, did not 
seek to unconditionally extend slavery and disrupt the peace of the Union, for “of all 
those who come into the world, only a small percentage are natural tyrants. That 
percentage is no larger in the slave States than in the free.” Lincoln placed himself in 
common with this perceived majority when he admitted that “[i]f all earthly power were 
given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution [of slavery.]” 
Playing upon his belief that colonization was a viable scheme that attracted multitudes in 
both sections of the Union, he claimed that his “first impulse would be to free all the 
slaves, and send them to Liberia.” Since this was a nearly impossible feat, he asked: 
“What next? Free them, and make them politically and socially, our equals? My own 
feelings will not admit of this; and if mind would, we well know that those of the great 
mass of white people will not.” With this statement, Lincoln clearly drew upon the deep 
aversion to African Americans he had so often seen exhibited by southern migrants in 
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Illinois, assuming this sentiment prevailed among southerners as well as northwesterners. 
In a further appeal to whites in both areas, Lincoln explicated that he believed “systems 
of gradual emancipation might be adopted; but for their tardiness in this, I will not 
undertake to judge our brethren of the South”56  
 He perceived that white southerners generally hated blacks, as did many 
northwesterners, and believed many of them looked upon the institution of slavery with 
feelings ranging from dislike to extreme animosity. In his seventh debate with Douglas, 
Lincoln asked: “How many Democrats are there about here who have left slave States 
and come into the free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution of slavery?” When 
someone from the audience yelled “’A thousand and one,’” Lincoln replied: “I reckon 
there are a thousand and one. I will ask you, if the policy [of popular sovereignty] you are 
now advocating had prevailed when this country was in a Territorial condition, where 
would you have gone to get rid of it?” Lincoln’s response echoed his long-held sense that 
white southerner nonslaveholders sought free territory. His assumption that southern 
whites continued an anti–slave system attitude similar to their northwestern brethren 
stemmed partly from his recognition that the “tyrants” of southern society, slave traders, 
seemed so universally despised in the South. Speaking especially to white slaveholders, 
he depicted the “SLAVE-DEALER” as a despicable person who “watches your 
necessities, and crawls up to buy your slave, at a speculating price. If you cannot help it, 
you sell to him; but if you can help it, you drive him from your door. You despise him 
utterly.” An outcast banished to the edges of society, the slave trader suffered from a 
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“ban of non-intercourse,” and he and his family never gained acceptance by their 
neighbors.57 
  Although Lincoln dramatically altered his political future by committing himself 
to the Republican Party and its moderated platform in 1856, his conception of the South 
changed little after his Peoria address in 1854, and the sentiments he evoked in the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates largely reflected the views of the South he had maintained since 
1854.58 Though many scholars contextualize Lincoln and Douglas’s statements about the 
Northwest Ordinance within the debates themselves, and within the politics of the 1850s, 
historians have largely missed the greater significance of the Northwest Ordinance to 
Lincoln—from its direct impact on his family’s migration, to the consequent migration of 
so many southerners with whom Lincoln became acquainted, to the Ordinance’s frequent 
resurrections in congressional debates of the 30th Congress and beyond.59  
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 The arguments Lincoln made resembling the “slave power” assertions of other 
northern colleagues had deep roots in his northwestern experiences. Lincoln had long 
believed that beside the malignant slave dealer, there existed a minority of proslavery 
whites like John C. Calhoun who sought to extend the institution and its evils even if 
their actions threatened the Union, and that these men also qualified as “tyrants” seeking 
to establish their control over the white nonslaveholder and, ultimately, the Union. 
Although he knew such men had always existed in the South, by 1858 he perceived a 
significant new development in national politics that sincerely bothered him. Lincoln had 
likely been long aware of the fact that by the 3/5 Compromise, the South held a voting 
power disproportionate to its number of white citizens. As he characterized the results of 
this arrangement in 1854: “The citizens of Slave States have a political power in the 
general government beyond their single votes and this violates the equality between 
American Citizens.” Despite resurrecting this argument, so often launched as a charge 
against the South by antislavery northerners who feared a growing “slave power,” 
Lincoln did not seek to alter the arrangement itself. “It was ‘in the bond’ and he would 
live faithfully by it,” in allegiance to the Constitution and all its provisions.60 From 1854 
to 1860, although Lincoln perceived that the South had begun to move away from its 
former commitment to eventually ending slavery, he nevertheless did not see the greatest 
fundamental change—and, thus, the greatest danger—occurring within the South, but 
rather within the North. Awakened to Douglas’s attempt to make popular sovereignty, 
which purposely avoided the question of slavery’s immorality, the Union’s official course 
in deciding the status of slavery in the territories, Lincoln believed that, for the first time, 
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the always-present southern proslavery contingent had succeeded in forcing northerners 
to redefine America’s commitment in regard to slavery. 
 Lincoln certainly feared that the proslavery group had grown larger within the 
South. Looking back upon the nation’s recent history during the seventh debate at Alton, 
he claimed that until recently, only John C. Calhoun, John Pettit, and a group of southern 
followers of Calhoun had believed the Declaration of Independence excluded blacks from 
its assertion that “all men” were created equal. Nevertheless, even in 1858 Lincoln did 
not believe a majority of Americans—North or South—adhered to that conviction. 
Rather, he believed a proslavery aristocracy had slowly strangled out the voices of white 
slaveholders and nonslaveholders opposed to slavery and increased its political and social 
power to the point of coercing northern Democrats into a new arrangement, whereby 
Douglas “ventured to assail [the Declaration] in the sneaking way of pretending to 
believe it and then asserting it did not include the negro.” By 1858, after hearing about 
southerners like Benjamin S. Hedrick, who was persecuted for simply expressing his 
antislavery principles, Lincoln recognized that severe limits had been placed on free 
speech in the South, and “in the Southern portion of the Union the people did not let the 
Republicans proclaim their doctrine amongst them.”61 This restriction appeared to him to 
be the symptom of an elite slaveholding aristocracy gaining greater control of the region 
and suppressing the natural interests of white nonslaveholders, rather than evidence that a 
majority of southern society had begun to embrace unconditional proslavery doctrines. 
The reason why the South felt more emboldened in the past few years, Lincoln believed, 
was because Stephen Douglas, James Buchanan, and other northern Democrats had 
delivered the northern Democracy to them. Lincoln’s former fears that the South would 
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“claim the constitutional right to take to and hold slaves in the free states” had been 
partially realized by the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Dred Scott decision of 1857.62 
Although he saw Buchanan as one of the conspirators involved in bringing about that 
decision, Lincoln’s asserted in the debates “that there was a tendency, if not a conspiracy 
among those who have engineered this slavery question for the last four or five years, to 
make slavery perpetual and universal in this nation.” At the head of this vast conspiracy 
stood Douglas, whose popular sovereignty platform made slavery palatable to a section 
of white nonslaveholders, North and South, whose anti–slave system ethos gave way to 
sympathies with white slaveholding family and friends and thus paved the way for a 
future Union replete with slavery.63 
 Lincoln believed Douglas had wielded his national influence, much of which had 
been won from his successful efforts to pass the Compromise of 1850, to convince 
Democrats they needed to support his brand of popular sovereignty for the sake of the 
Union. Lincoln pointed to two instances of Democratic opposition to the principles of 
popular sovereignty, one occurring in 1850 and the other in 1854. During the 1858 
debates with Douglas, Lincoln cited the assembly of an 1850 Congressional Convention 
in Joliet, Illinois, in which the largely Democratic members of the convention adopted a 
resolution declaring themselves “uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of slavery” 
because the principles of non-extension “were recognized by the Ordinance of 1787, 
which received the sanction of Thomas Jefferson, who is acknowledged by all to be the 
great oracle and expounder of our faith.” In his August 1855 letter to Speed, meanwhile, 
Lincoln had described the course of the Illinois legislature in the winter of 1854. He 
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claimed the Democrats had held a caucus in February, in which only a few party 
members pledged their support for the Kansas-Nebraska Act. But when “Douglas’ orders 
came on to have resolutions passed approving the bill,” the Democrats suddenly endorsed 
it and passed it by a great majority. Thus it was Douglas who, by making the Kansas-
Nebraska Act “a democratic party necessity,” convinced the multitudes to embrace a 
position on the slavery issue that contradicted the Founders. In his own notes on 
“Sectionalism” Lincoln repeated this charge. “When the repeal of the Missouri 
compromise was first proposed,” he remembered, “at the North there was litterally [sic] 
‘nobody’ in favor of it. In February 1854 our Legislature met in call, or extra, session. 
From them Douglas sought an indorsement [sic] of his then pending measure of Repeal.” 
The Democrats held a caucus and ultimately decided to support Douglas and his bill, but 
those Democrats who bolted, Lincoln explained, later claimed “that the caucus fairly 
confessed that the Repeal was wrong.”64 
 In his retelling of recent events, Lincoln perceived a sinister design to shift public 
sentiment to either indifference or outright support of slavery. Douglas’s “much vaunted 
doctrine of self-government for the territories,” Lincoln insisted, “was a mere deceitful 
pretense for the benefit of slavery.” In his last debate at Alton, he further asserted that 
“Judge Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in changing the position of the 
institution of slavery which the fathers of the Government expected to come to an end,” 
and “placing it where he [Douglas] openly confesses he has no desire there shall ever be 
an end of it.” Lincoln continued to believe much of Douglas’s support came from white 
nonslaveholders of both sections of the Union who felt they had to lay their anti–slave 
system sentiments aside in order to pacify the South and preserve the Union. During the 
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sixth debate at Quincy, Lincoln alluded to his fellow Illinoisans’ disbelief that the 
Democratic Party’s “central idea” rested on the conviction “that slavery is not wrong.” 
Lincoln believed he had to convince swaths of Democrats who personally opposed 
slavery that their allegiance to the Democratic Party would actually destroy, rather than 
save, the Union. He insisted these Douglas supporters simply did not realize the outcome 
of their own political doctrine, especially after the Dred Scott decision upheld the right of 
any slaveowner to bring his slaves into a territory.65 
 Lincoln pointed to the repercussions of Douglas’s doctrine across the Union, 
emphasizing not only the complete reversal of the Founders’ antislavery tradition, begun 
with the 1787 Ordinance and continued onward by Henry Clay, but also the gulf that now 
separated North from South. Although Douglas had intended his policy to unite 
northerners and southerners, Lincoln thought it had the exact opposite effect. In a speech 
at Kalamazoo, Michigan, in 1856, he noted that southern newspapers now frequently 
expressed an erroneous view of the free states. Defending the right of slavery to spread, 
these southerners “insist that their slaves are far better off than Northern freemen,” and 
that “men are always to remain laborers here.” Lincoln hinted that these southerners had 
acquired a mistaken view of the free states from free state men like Douglas, who assured 
them that living in a slave state was no better or worse than living on free soil. “These 
men don’t understand when they think in this manner of Northern free labor,” Lincoln 
explained, but “[w]hen these reasons can be introduced, tell me not that we have no 
interest in keeping the Territories free for the settlement of free laborers.” Lincoln thus 
continued to believe that if northern Democrats understood the true nature of popular 
sovereignty, and if southerners were made aware of the benefits of the free states, they 
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would turn away from Douglas’s demagoguery and many would realize the sincere 
efforts of the Republican Party to perpetuate the Union and its founding principles. 
Lincoln therefore particularly resented Douglas’s insistence on launching one accusation 
after another against Lincoln and the Republican Party, rather than addressing the flaws 
of his own doctrine.66  
 Douglas, of course, utilized his national clout against Lincoln and his party. 
Throughout the debates, he cast Lincoln as a secret abolitionist who altered his doctrines 
to fit the different sections of Illinois and sought a war between the sections that would 
fulfill his true intentions of ending slavery immediately.67 Although there was a 
semblance of truth behind Douglas’s assertions, Lincoln resented what be perceived as 
gross mischaracterizations of his intentions as well as those of his party. He did his best 
to counter Douglas’s charges and to fully explicate his own position on the slavery issue, 
seeking to prove that he did not mislead his constituents by proclaiming different 
doctrines in different sections of the state. In large part, Lincoln’s dismay and frustration 
stemmed from a realization that Douglas presented a convincing argument to whites in 
the North and South. He knew that men like Elijah P. Lovejoy had often denied 
accusations of abolitionism, only to turn around and exhibit an unrelenting demand to end 
slavery with or without the South’s consent. He also recognized the alluring nature of 
Douglas’s assurance that popular sovereignty upheld “the great principles upon which 
our government rests.”68 
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 Most importantly, Lincoln believed that Douglas and his constituents had walked 
into a trap, ignorantly succumbing to the demands of the South’s minority of proslavery 
expansionists. Although a pang of jealousy may have led him to ponder his own apparent 
“flat failure” compared to Douglas’s success in “the race of ambition,” Lincoln truly 
believed that despite Douglas’s popularity, the Little Giant’s success was little more than 
a mirage that would disappear when the South tactfully dropped its support from 
underneath him and pressed for greater demands. Douglas had simply fallen prey to his 
own blind desires and reached for “the flittering prize of the presidency…held up, on 
Southern terms, to the greedy eyes of Northern ambition.” Perhaps Lincoln reflected on 
his own Lyceum address, given twenty years previous, and viewed Douglas as that man 
who “thirsts and burns for distinction” and will attain it “whether at the expense of 
emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.” Regardless of his exact view of Douglas, 
Lincoln revealed in his debates, speeches, and in his correspondence that he believed he 
understood the South better than Douglas. Though the Vermont-born Illinoisan owned 
slaves, married a southerner, and flirted with proslavery doctrines, Lincoln believed his 
own experiences placed him in a better position to truly understand the South and its 
people. He thought Douglas idealistic in his confidence that popular sovereignty would 
permanently resolve the slavery question; Lincoln was confident that his conception of 
southerners remained more accurate than Douglas’s.69  
 Lincoln displayed this conviction in his charges against, and responses to, 
Douglas. Douglas frequently claimed not only to represent southern interests better than 
Lincoln but to know southern people better than he did. The very pool of migrants to 
which Lincoln belonged, Douglas asserted, were now foreign to this former Kentuckian. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 CW, II: 382–83, 352; I: 114. 
266	  
	  
	  
With the Republican platform, he asserted, Lincoln “cannot cross over the Ohio into 
Kentucky. Lincoln himself cannot visit the land of his fathers, the scenes of his 
childhood, the graves of his ancestors, and carry his Abolition principles, as he declared 
them at Chicago, with him.” Rather than protect the South, Douglas warned white 
southerners and their northwestern kin, Lincoln would “hem them in until the negroes 
will be so plenty that they cannot live on the soil.”70 He further attempted to tear down 
Lincoln’s association with southerners by ridiculing his invocation of his southern 
background. “Mr. Lincoln attempts to cover up and get over his Abolitionism by telling 
you that he was raised a little east of you, beyond the Wabash in Indiana, and he thinks 
that makes a mighty sound and good man of him on all these questions.” Douglas waved 
off Lincoln’s southern roots and declared that a man’s geography did not determine his 
political principles. “The worse Abolitionists I have ever known in Illinois,” he 
explained, “have been men who have sold their slaves in Alabama and Kentucky, and 
have come here and turned Abolitionists while spending the money got for the negroes 
they sold.” He did not think that “an Abolitionist from Indiana or Kentucky ought to have 
any more credit because he was born and raised among slaveholders.”71  
 Lincoln, however, did believe that he had gained crucial insights into southern 
society that Douglas had never been privy to, and Lincoln did invoke his southern 
background to demonstrate that his own doctrines of antislavery and free labor stemmed, 
in part, from what he had experienced, seen, and heard of slavery as a southern-born 
northwesterner. Thus, when Douglas gleefully pledged to “trot” Lincoln down to Egypt 
in expectation that he would soften his “abolitionist” doctrines for the southern-born 
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migrants, Lincoln wondered aloud: “Did the Judge talk of trotting me down to Egypt to 
scare me to death? Why, I know this people better than he does. I was raised just a little 
east of here. I am a part of this people. But the Judge was raised further north, and 
perhaps he has some horrid idea of what this people might be induced to do.”72 Lincoln’s 
confidence that he knew southerners better than Douglas led him to believe that Douglas 
had been deceived by an aggressive proslavery minority in the South. When Douglas 
declared that the entire South was “rallying to the support of the doctrine that if the 
people of a Territory want slavery they have a right to have it, and if they do not want it 
that no power on earth can force it upon them,” Lincoln ridiculed his confidence.73 
Douglas believed that if free states like Illinois could simply “settle the slavery question 
for herself, and mind her own business and let her neighbors alone, we will be at peace 
with Kentucky, and every other Southern State.” Yet Lincoln did not see popular 
sovereignty cloaking the Union in peace. Rather, he perceived the deep divisions within 
the Democratic Party, the escalating demands of the proslavery minority, and the 
cowering resignation of men on both sides of the sectional divide as evidence that the 
“pill of sectionalism” Douglas “has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for 
years past” would soon be “crowded down his own throat.”74 He believed James 
Buchanan had been “duped by [southern] men” who claimed their slaveholding interests 
were being threatened, and now Douglas and his denial of any conspiracy “only show[ed] 
that he was used by conspirators, and was not a leader of them.” Once the South had 
gained the concessions it wanted, these men would be cast aside.75 
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 Lincoln perceived the deception of the Little Giant as a feat accomplished by a 
small yet increasingly powerful group within the South. As his statements in favor of the 
nation’s founding principles and its prohibition against slavery in the territories indicated, 
Lincoln continued to believe the vast majority of Americans held an aversion to slavery. 
The clause of the Declaration of Independence that stated “all men are created equal” he 
believed had been placed there by their ancestors because they “knew the proneness of 
prosperity to breed tyrants” and sought to protect future generations against such men and 
their schemes.76 In the 1850s those tyrants were the proslavery southern slaveholders who 
sought to extend the institution at the expense of the peace and prosperity of the Union. 
Lincoln continued to assume, however, that the people largely favored the extension of 
free soil. He expressed his confidence in the antislavery bent of the American people 
when he urged them to see the obvious benefits of excluding slavery from all territories. 
“[I]f slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one 
given Territory,” he explained, the people would always have the right to introduce 
slavery, if they wished, once the territory became a state. It seemed so unlikely to him, 
however, that the people, “when they come to adopt the Constitution, [would] do such an 
extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence 
of that institution among them.” Lincoln’s imagined a scenario in which ten men entered 
Kansas, nine of them opposing slavery and one bringing with him ten slaves. Over time, 
he explained, the nine would sympathize with their slaveholding neighbor and would 
vote in favor of upholding the institution. Although thinking such laws would simply 
guarantee their single neighbor’s rights, the nonslaveholders would instead find to their 
dismay that they invited hordes of additional slaveholders with their slaves. Lincoln’s 
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example displayed his own keen understanding of the ways white southern non-
slaveholders felt beholden to their slaveowning neighbors and relations, while exhibiting 
a simultaneously idealistic belief that most men felt a moral and/or social repugnance to 
slavery akin to his own.77 
 Lincoln’s perception of Douglas as an ambitious puppet of the South who 
mistakenly believed he understood the people of that section prompted him to see a great 
danger lurking behind Douglas’s stand against the Lecompton Constitution. Douglas had 
rebuked this first constitution Kansas had sent to Congress because he believed the 
proslavery document did not represent the real interests of the settlers but had rather 
resulted from a corrupted, perverted form of the popular sovereignty he upheld as “the 
great principle.” Although Douglas vehemently opposed the Lecompton Constitution in 
1857, the Buchanan administration vowed to uphold it, setting Democratic factions at 
odds with one another. From 1857 to 1860, Douglas presented himself as an embattled 
Union-loving man whose stand against the injustice of the Lecompton crisis cost him the 
support of Republicans and Democrats alike. Many Republicans, finding themselves 
suddenly on the same side of this important issue as the Little Giant, began to consider an 
alliance with popular sovereignty Democrats. As Lyman Trumbull explained to Lincoln, 
Douglas’s “course was so unexpected to many & was looked upon as such a God send 
that they could not refrain from giving him more credit than he deserves.” Many of the 
Republicans, for one reason or another, were content to let Douglas lead the opposition 
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against the Lecompton Constitution. Trumbull assured Lincoln that despite the combined 
efforts of Republicans and Douglas Democrats against Kansas’s admission to the Union 
under that Constitution, they “have no sort of idea of making Douglas our leader either 
here or in Ill[inois].”78 
 Lincoln perceived the entire Lecompton incident as the clearest evidence that an 
ambitious southern slave power was using Douglas and his doctrine as a tool to spread 
slavery further. Because Douglas continued to deny that such a conspiracy existed and 
relentlessly pressed forward with his vision of popular sovereignty as the permanent 
solution to the problem of American slavery, Lincoln urged Republicans not to fall in 
with Douglas.79 The Republicans believe “both the President and Douglas are wrong,” he 
explained to Lyman Trumbull in November 1857, “and they should not espouse the cause 
of either, because they may consider the other a little the farther wrong of the two.” The 
Lecompton struggle, he elaborated in an 1856 speech, “was made on a point—the right of 
a people to make their own constitution—upon which he and the Republicans have never 
differed.”80 
 To Lincoln, the defection of Republicans or potential Republicans to Douglas was 
not merely political but personal, and it impacted his campaign against Douglas for the 
U.S. Senate seat in 1858. After writing to longtime Whig leader John J. Crittenden in the 
summer of that year, Lincoln received an apologetic reply from the Kentuckian that he 
could not pledge his support for Lincoln against Douglas. He and the Little Giant, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Johannsen, Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 207–10; Lyman Trumbull to Lincoln, Jan. 3, 1858, LC. 
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explained, had “acted together in opposing the enforcement of the Lecompton 
Constitution upon the people of Kansas,” and Crittenden had been deeply affected by 
Douglas’s stand, which was “full of sacrifice, & full of hazard, yet he took it, and he 
defended it, like a Man.” Crittenden believed the Buchanan administration posed a much 
greater threat to the Union than Douglas. He therefore considered Douglas’s re-election 
to the Senate “necessary as a rebuke to the Administration, and a vindication of the great 
cause of popular rights & public justice.” Crittenden promised not to go out of his way to 
help Douglas, admitting that he had “no disposition for officious intermeddling,” but 
lamented that he could not now pledge his support for Lincoln. Certainly, Lincoln did not 
lose to Douglas in 1858 simply because of Crittenden’s decision. Douglas’s tactic of 
presenting Lincoln’s platform as abolitionist, and his own doctrine as both antislavery 
and democratic, worked to convince a vast number of Illinoisans to return him to the 
Senate. However, his course displays the dangers Lincoln feared the Republican Party’s 
non-extensionist pledge could fall into if party members sought to align with Democrats.  
 The spotlight that had been thrown upon the debates launched Lincoln into 
national recognition. Democrats’ curiosity had been aroused by the man who dared to 
engage the Little Giant, while Republicans realized Lincoln’s ability to articulate the 
essence of Republicanism in contradistinction to popular sovereignty and proslavery.81 
For the rest of the decade, Lincoln insisted that Republicans hold steady to their platform 
and refuse “the temptation to lower the Republican Standard in order to gather recruits.”82 
Thinking forward to the presidential election of 1860, Lincoln continued to apprehend 
Douglas’s influence more than he feared the possibility of secession. Confident that 
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secession would never gain a majority in the South but that the proslavery minority had 
gained enough political power to take control of the Democratic party, he predicted that 
Douglas’s ambitions would be thwarted in 1860. The Democratic party is going “to let 
him into the convention, beat him then, and give him no plausable [sic] excuse to bolt the 
nomination,” he foresaw. This scenario, however, did not make him fear the South’s 
immediate actions. Instead, Lincoln expressed his worry that Douglas’s rejection from 
the Democratic Party would result in “the Lecompton phase of politics reproduced on a 
larger scale. It will then be a question whether the Republican party of the Nation shall 
make him President, in magnanamous [sic] gratitude for having opposed a Slave code, 
just as it was, last year a question whether the Illinois Republicans should re-elect him 
Senator, in magnanamous [sic] gratitude for having opposed Lecompton.” Lincoln thus 
warned that, even if Douglas found himself without the support of his party, he still 
remained the greatest threat in leading the Union “to the nationalizing and perpetuity of 
slavery.” When Lincoln asserted that “the true magnitude of the slavery element in this 
nation is scarcely appreciated by any one,” he was thinking not of a united South but 
rather of a nation lured into supporting popular sovereignty.83 He explicitly stated this in 
a speech at Columbus, Ohio, which he delivered on September 16, 1859. “The chief 
danger to…the Republican party is not just now the revival of the African slave trade, or 
the passage of a Congressional slave code, or the declaring of a second Dred Scott 
decision,” Lincoln warned. Instead, “the most imminent danger that now threatens [our] 
purpose is that insidious Douglas Popular Sovereignty. This is the miner and sapper. 
While it does not propose to revive the African slave trade, nor to pass a slave code, nor 
to make a second Dred Scott decision, it is preparing us for the onslaught and charge of 
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these ultimate enemies when they shall be ready.” Lincoln’s speech at Cincinnati the next 
day, in which he claimed to address the Kentuckians in the crowd, likewise centered on 
Douglas. Throughout the speech Lincoln purposefully miscast Kentuckians as proslavery 
radicals who “believed Slavery is a good thing; that Slavery is right; that it ought to be 
extended and perpetuated in this Union.”  Playfully assuring them that he would not 
attempt to convince them otherwise, he declared: “I only propose to try to show you that 
you ought to nominate for the Presidency, at Charleston, my distinguished friend Judge 
Douglas.” Far from believing that most Kentuckians were proslavery, Lincoln erected 
this proslavery straw man in order to show that Douglas’s popular sovereignty doctrine 
would bring about the same results as the most proslavery platform the South could 
devise.84 
 Although Lincoln was careful to stand firm upon the Republican Party’s pledge 
against slavery’s extension, he remained equally committed to upholding the fugitive 
slave law, and all other constitutional provisions that appealed to Union-loving men in all 
sections of the country, even if many northern Republicans disagreed with him.85 At the 
end of 1859, Lincoln still believed that the Republican Party, rightly understood, 
appealed to white nonslaveholders across the Union. He thought the hearts and minds of 
southerners and northwesterners naturally resisted Douglas’s representation of slave 
territory as equal to free territory, and that the results of “the old Ordinance of ‘87” 
clearly showed the benefits it had wrought to “happy, prosperous, teeming millions of 
free men.” Nevertheless, he understood the appeal of Douglas’s arguments, especially to 
those anti–slave system northwesterners whose friends and families remained in the 
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South. Popular sovereignty allowed them to be equally opposed to slavery and 
abolitionism, to live on free soil, but to follow the wise maxim: “judge not lest ye shall be 
judged.” As 1860 approached, therefore, Lincoln continued his Republican crusade 
against the Little Giant. He soon learned how rightly he understood the South in some 
ways, and yet how wrongly he had calculated the likelihood of a real secession 
movement.86  
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Conclusion  
Lincoln Views the Secession Crisis, 1860–1861 
 
 
 From Lincoln’s nomination at the May 1860 Republican convention to his 
inauguration on March 4, 1861, his approach to the South and to the secession crisis 
followed a course that stemmed from his northwestern roots. Very early in his 
presidential campaign, he decided that the Republican Party must hold to its pledge 
against the extension of slavery at all costs—even if the South attempted to dissolve the 
Union. Yet as late as March 1861, when he spoke before a depleted Union, the southern-
born northwesterner continued to believe in, as David Potter once termed it, “a peaceful 
‘reconstruction’ of the Union.” Lincoln’s southern connections had endowed him with a 
particular understanding of the white southern nonslaveholder as a committed Unionist. 
By 1860 he recognized that years of living in a society based on slavery had altered the 
politics of nonslaveholders who remained in the South. He suspected that many of them 
had indeed forsaken the truth of slavery’s immorality, and now praised it as a great good. 
Yet Lincoln believed these praises to be the false product of slaveholders’ demagoguery, 
and he therefore persisted in his faith that most southerners would ultimately resist and/or 
overthrow the secessionists.1 
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  Historians of the U.S. South have long been divided over their views of southern society. As William J. 
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society in pre-Civil War works. Hinton Helper’s Impending Crisis depicted the exploitation of white 
nonslaveholders by the slaveowning class, whereas Daniel Hundley’s Social Relations in Our Southern 
States “found unity and harmony in southern society.” Although “most scholars believe that Helper’s basic 
point is correct,” many southerners living in the 1850s appeared to vehemently disagree. Cooper and Terrill 
list five general reasons why social harmony seemed to exist between many white slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders. Cooper and Terrill, The American South: A History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 
276–78. John C. Inscoe, Mountain Masters, Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis in Western North Carolina 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 113, asserts in his study of western North Carolina that 
“the majority of Carolina highlanders, whether they themselves owned slaves or not, had some stake in the 
institution and thus, to varying degrees, accepted it.”  
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 Lincoln’s mistake sprang from his awareness that his northwestern experience had 
equipped him with a particular knowledge of the typical white southern nonslaveholder 
that many other northerners simply did not have. The confidence he derived from these 
connections led him to believe that he understood the South on the eve of war, when in 
fact the southerners with whom he was most acquainted through 1860 were largely anti–
slave system migrants to the Northwest, antislavery activists, slaveholders, and kin. His 
conception of the South relied almost entirely upon the various insights that these 
individuals had imparted to him over the years, in the politically and socially diverse 
climate of central Illinois and in the halls of Congress. Since these individuals 
overwhelmingly displayed a strong commitment to the Union, he convinced himself that 
once his presidential administration had calmly and firmly displayed for the South its 
conservative intentions, droves of Union-loving southerners would return their individual 
states to the Union.2 However, despite the recruitment of Union troops from certain 
pockets of the South, white nonslaveholding southerners overwhelmingly supported the 
Confederacy once the war began, choosing to defend their hearths and homes in a slave-
based society rather than acting in what Lincoln believed to be their natural self-interest.3 
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3	  Eric H. Walther, The Fire-Eaters (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 4, 
portrays the wide variety of arguments that historians, themselves, have offered in attempting to solve “the 
riddle of secession.” Despite the prevalence of secessionist sentiment in the South, a significant number of 
southerners did ultimately fight for the Union. The nonslaveholders of western Virginia, for example, 
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 The arguments Lincoln offered to the public from 1858 to 1860—that the 
Northwest Ordinance proved the Founders’ nearly unanimous commitment to eventually 
ending slavery, that the Republican Party posed no threat to the South, that the 
differences between North and South had been vastly exaggerated, and that popular 
sovereignty remained the most insidious of doctrines to the Union—indicates how little 
his views of the South changed. In his 1860 address before the Cooper Institute, he 
provided his most detailed history of the Northwest Ordinance yet, similar to the 
extended explanation Edward Coles had given in his 1855 speech. Although Lincoln held 
no unrealistic expectation that the Republican Party would win even a significant 
minority of the South in the upcoming election, he did assert that “we shall have votes in 
the South in the glorious year of 1860,” hoping this realization would allay southern fears 
that Republican doctrines were sectional and detrimental to the South. “We mean to leave 
you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution,” he reassured southerners at 
Cincinnati, “to abide by all and every compromise of the constitution….We mean to 
remember that you are as good as we; that there is no difference between us other than 
the difference of circumstances.”4 To correspondents, he explained that he would most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“objected…[so] furiously to slaveholders’ antiegalitarian dominion over whites” that they formed the 
Unionist state of West Virginia. Lincoln’s misunderstanding of the South therefore stemmed not from an 
entirely misplaced faith in southern Unionism, but an overextended one. Link, Roots of Secession, 254; 
William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson, eds., Showdown in Virginia: The 1861 Convention and the 
Fate of the Union (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2010), xviii; Daniel W. Crofts, 
“The Southern Opposition and the Crisis of the Union,” in Gary W. Gallagher and Rachel A. Shelden, eds., 
A Political Nation (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 97–102; and Richard 
Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1992). 
4 CW, III: 551, 453. Lincoln had previously contended, in his Cooper Institute address, that the Republican 
Party would receive southern votes in the election of 1860. CW, III: 536. 
278	  
	  
	  
certainly support southern candidates for the presidency or other high offices, if they 
“place themselves on republican ground.”5 
 After hearing southern threats of secession during his own time in Congress and 
in the years thereafter, Lincoln remained unconvinced that a secession movement would 
actually attract a significant portion of nonslaveholding southerners. In his Cooper 
Institute address, Lincoln spoke to “the Southern people,” admonishing them for making 
the “condemnation of ‘Black Republicanism’” into “an indispensable prerequisite—
license, so to speak—among you to be admitted or permitted to speak at all.” While he 
feared that southerners would continue to misunderstand the Republican Party, he did not 
fathom that after his denunciation of abolitionism and John Brown, and after pledging 
total support of all constitutional laws, a majority of southerners would gather behind a 
powerful secessionist movement. Lincoln therefore retained his focus on defeating 
Stephen Douglas and popular sovereignty, not only until his election as president but also 
as president-elect. He reiterated that popular sovereignty was “the surest way of 
nationalizing the institution” of slavery. “Just as certain,” he said, “but more dangerous 
because more insidious; but is leading us there just as certainly and as surely as Jeff. 
Davis himself would have us go.”6  
 He also incorporated a new argument against popular sovereignty, which 
indicated his acute awareness of the relationship between migration and slavery politics. 
Urging Douglas Democrats to “consider the effects” of their doctrine, he explained: “We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 CW, III: 380. Although historians note Lincoln’s explanation of the Northwest Ordinance at the Cooper 
Institute, they do not search for the roots of his arguments in his northwestern experience. Gary Ecelbarger, 
The Great Comeback: How Abraham Lincoln Beat the Odds to Win the 1860 Republican Nomination (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 139–42; Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln and Douglas: The Debates that Defined 
America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 264; John C. Waugh, One Man Great Enough: Abraham 
Lincoln’s Road to the Civil War (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2007), 297, 302. 
6 CW, III:  536. 
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in the States are not to care whether Freedom or Slavery gets the better, but the people in 
the Territories may care.” This appeared perfectly logical, of course. “But are not the 
people of the Territories detailed from the States? If this feeling of indifference—this 
absence of moral sense about the question—prevails in the States, will it not be carried 
into the Territories?” Drawing upon his intimate knowledge that migrants carried with 
them beliefs that they did not simply discard when they reached their new destination, 
Lincoln recalled his northwestern experiences in denunciation of Douglas’s doctrine.7 
Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1860, Lincoln remained fixated on Douglas, 
constantly gauging his probable strength until in August he concluded that “the success 
of the Republican ticket is inevitable.” Perceiving the split of the Democratic Convention 
in South Carolina and the emergence of two separate candidates, Stephen Douglas and 
John C. Breckinridge, as an event wholly beneficial to the Republican Party, and thus to 
the Union, Lincoln confidently remarked that the Democracy’s “chance appears indeed 
very slim.” Even after his election in November 1860 and the secession of several slave 
states from the Union, Lincoln remained nearly as concerned about the allure of popular 
sovereignty as about the possibility of a permanent dissolution of the Union.8 
 After his nomination on May 19, Lincoln chose not to address the public on the 
slavery issue until his inauguration on March 4. Nominees generally did not give 
speeches on their own behalf, but the Republican Party leader also believed that 
refraining from delivering or publishing speeches or other communications, both before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 CW, IV: 5, 20. 
8 CW, IV: 45–46, 82, 90. As Lincoln explained to George D. Prentice in late October, there were men both 
North and South who were “eager for something new upon which to base new misrepresentations.” CW, 
IV: 134–35. During his Cooper Institute address, Lincoln admonished that a man “has no right to mislead 
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who framed the Government under which we live,’ were of the same opinion—thus substituting falsehood 
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and during the secession crisis, was the best way to respond to threats and fears regarding 
slavery and disunion. For the past few years, the Illinoisan had delivered speech after 
speech, and witnessed Democratic and southern newspapers either ignore or 
mischaracterize his addresses to the detriment of the Republican Party in that region. 
Visibly frustrated at his inability to speak without his statements being turned against 
him, Lincoln wrote to fellow Sangamon County residents in February 1860 that while 
“Douglas attacked me…saying it was a declaration of war between the slave and the free 
states,” he had “said no such thing.” In response to these farmers’ request that Lincoln 
explain to them his statement that the Union “could not stand half slave and half free,” 
Lincoln exasperatedly pointed out that they “misquote, to some material extent, what I 
did say; which induces me to think you have not, very carefully read the speech in which 
the expressions occur.” Rather than grant them a new explanation, Lincoln simply 
reprinted his actual statement, recognizing that the newspapers these men had read either 
misquoted him or provided misleading extracts of his speeches.9  
 Lincoln therefore firmly committed himself to simply remaining silent, as several 
friends had suggested. His sense that his statements would not reach the South 
uncorrupted stemmed from his conception of slave states as areas wherein the 
slaveholding power consolidated its control over resources, power, politics, the presses, 
and the lower classes over time, until men like Benjamin Hedrick or Hinton Helper, and 
all those who disagreed with proslavery, were by intimidation and threats forced to keep 
silent. From Lincoln’s northwestern point of view, the white outcasts of southern society, 
as well as those who morally opposed slavery, either fled from this oppressive system to 
free soil or kept their silence. Meanwhile, the slaveholding power consolidated its hold 
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over southern society, filtering the Republican Party’s messages to the public and 
rendering southern Unionists impotent.  
 That these thoughts remained on Lincoln’s mind as he faced the possibility of 
southern secession in 1860 and 1861 is evident. In short, with proslavery editors and 
slaveholders in control of the southern presses, he believed the true Republican message 
stood little chance of arriving unfiltered to the eyes and ears of the white southern 
masses. His words would only be used against him to convince an undereducated 
majority that the Republican Party meant to destroy the South.10 Therefore, when 
correspondents from across the U.S. wrote Lincoln in Fall 1860 requesting that he deliver 
some address to reassure the South, he firmly responded to them that, “in my judgment, it 
would do no good. I have already done this many—many, times; and it is in print, and 
open to all who will read. Those who will not read, or heed, what I have already publicly 
said, would not read, or heed, a repetition of it.”11  
 He also harbored an especial anger toward newspaper editors that revealed itself 
in his November letter to Nathaniel P. Paschall. Editor Paschall had suggested to one of 
Lincoln’s friends that he assuage the fears of the country through a public statement. 
After restating his opinion that he “could say nothing which I have not already said,” 
Lincoln allowed his resentment against newspaper editors like Paschall to boil over. 
“Please pardon me for suggesting that if the papers, like yours, which heretofore have 
persistently garbled, and misrepresented what I have said, will now fully and fairly place 
it before their readers, there can be no further misunderstanding.” Fearing the dire 
repercussions that resulted from this partisan practice, Lincoln suggested that “the true 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 CW, IV: 93, 91. 
11 CW, IV: 130. Lincoln repeated this sentiment to L. Montgomery Bond, IV: 128, to George T. M. Davis, 
IV: 132–33, to George D. Prentice, IV: 134–35, and to Truman Smith, IV: 138. 
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cure for any real uneasiness in the country” rested with editors like Paschall, rather than 
with the country’s president-elect.12  
 Lincoln only had his suspicions confirmed when, after giving Lyman Trumbull a 
set of points around which to pivot his November speech at Springfield, newspapers gave 
very partisan assessments of the address. Lincoln angrily remarked to Henry J. Raymond: 
“Has a single newspaper, heretofore against us, urged that speech [upon its readers] with 
a purpose to quiet public anxiety?” None, in Lincoln’s opinion, had sought to reassure a 
worried public in a troubled time. “On the contrary the Boston Courier, and its class, hold 
me responsible for the speech, and endeavor to inflame the North with the belief that it 
foreshadows an abandonment of Republican ground by the incoming administration; 
while the Washington Constitution, and its class hold the same speech up to the South as 
an open declaration of war against them.” Lincoln concluded that this was “just as I 
expected, and just what would happen with any declaration I could make. These political 
fiends are not half sick enough yet.” Lincoln perceived this rabid partisanship by both 
northerners and southerners as further proof that his silence was best.13  
  Lincoln did grant private clarifications of his position on slavery and the federal 
government’s powers to individual southerners, and he also helped manage fellow 
Republicans and their addresses to a certain extent.14  Significantly, he tactfully requested 
Cassius M. Clay, a southerner who had gained popularity in the North for his staunch 
antislavery position, to speak on the Republican Party’s behalf in the southernmost 
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13 CW, IV: 141–42, 146. 
14 As Lincoln explained to John A. Gilmer, “I am greatly disinclined to write a letter on the subject 
embraced in yours; and I would not do so, even privately as I do, were it not that I fear you might 
misconstrue my silence.” CW, IV: 151–53. 
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regions of the free states.15 Lincoln’s correspondence with Clay reveals the extent to 
which his own family’s migration remained on his mind throughout 1860 and 1861. “In 
passing, let me say,” Lincoln wrote, “that at Rockport you will be in the country within 
which I was brought up from my eighth year—having left Kentucky at that point of my 
life.”16 His upbringing and his family’s migration had not been forgotten. When he first 
composed a short autobiography for Jesse W. Fell in December 1859, Lincoln described 
his parents’ movement from Virginia to Kentucky, emphasizing their poverty and lack of 
education as well as his own. Though “raised to farm work,” Lincoln described how he 
independently moved to New Salem in 1831, working as a store clerk before rising in 
free society, serving in state politics and practicing law.17 This family migration and 
history clearly continued to influence Lincoln’s perception of southern society. 
Explaining “[o]ne of the reasons why I am opposed to Slavery” in a speech he gave in 
March 1860, he argued that in a slavery-based society the path from poverty and 
indigence was barred against those who wished to improve their condition, whereas the 
free states offered more to both white and black men. “When one starts poor, as most do 
in the race of life, free society is such that he knows he can better his condition,” he 
asserted. “I am not ashamed to confess that twenty five years ago I was a hired laborer, 
mauling rails, at work on a flat-boat—just what might happen to any poor man’s son!” 
His position then as leader of the Republican Party demonstrated the vast opportunity that 
abounded on free soil. This conviction came out in another speech he gave at the Illinois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Knowing that the Republican Party would gain little support from the entire region in the upcoming 
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expressing his thanks for speaking in Indiana, asked for further assistance “along our Wabash and Ohio 
river border.” CW, IV: 54, 94–95; III: 553. 
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Republican State Convention on May 9, when he spoke of his own migration to and 
settlement in the state, after his cousin John Hanks arrived at the convention hall with 
“two rails…bearing the following inscription: ‘ABRAHAM LINCOLN. The Rail 
Candidate FOR PRESIDENT IN 1860.”18 
 When Lincoln composed another, much longer, autobiography in June following 
his presidential nomination, he drew directly upon the correspondence he had engaged in 
with relatives since his 1847-1849 term in Congress.19 In much fuller detail than ever 
before, Lincoln traced his extended family’s migration from Pennsylvania to Virginia, 
then from Virginia westward to Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Illinois, before 
explaining that his father, Thomas, had chosen to remove to Indiana in 1816 “partly on 
account of slavery; but chiefly on account of the difficulty of land titles in K[entuck]y.” 
After describing his upbringing in Indiana as one filled with hard labor and little 
schooling, Lincoln explained that he learned most of what he knew by independently 
reading and studying any books available to him.20 As parts of the Northwest intimately 
connected to the South by migration and trade, central Illinois and southern Indiana had 
offered Lincoln the opportunity to earn money taking supplies down to New Orleans, 
Louisiana. Upon moving to New Salem, Illinois, in July 1831, Lincoln became a store 
clerk, served briefly as captain of a volunteer company in the Black Hawk War, then 
became postmaster of New Salem and a surveyor of Sangamon county before he served 
in the state legislature in 1835. In explanation of his antislavery stance, Lincoln pointed 
out “so far as it goes,” his position on slavery “was then the same that it is now.” He had 
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20 CW, IV: 60–62. 
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only re-entered politics and become a Republican Party leader “when the repeal of the 
Missouri compromise aroused him as he had never been before.”21 
 The information Lincoln chose to include in his biography offers significant 
indication that Lincoln believed he should portray his southern origins, family migration, 
and consistent stance on slavery for the American people, and particularly for the South, 
in 1860.22 By spending pages explaining his family’s migration and his own progress in 
the free Northwest, Lincoln detailed a story of migration and interregional association 
that he believed would resonate among many Americans. As his letter written in June 
1860 to Samuel Galloway proves, Lincoln clearly considered the composition of an 
autobiography a very important task. When a publishing company released its own 
biography claiming that it had received Abraham Lincoln’s endorsement, he countered 
that “I made myself tiresome, if not hoarse, with repeating to Mr. Howard, their only 
agent seen by me, my protest that I authorized nothing—would be responsible for 
nothing. How they could so misunderstand me, passes comprehension.” He “would 
authorize no biography, without time, and opertunity [sic] to carefully examine and 
consider every word of it.” Although there “may be nothing wrong in their proposed 
book,” he refused to even glance at the proof sheets, “determined to maintain the position 
of truly saying I never saw the proof sheets, or any part of their work, before its 
publication.”23 
 After his nomination as the Republican candidate for president, Lincoln’s youth 
and southern connections comprised the subject of several letters. He warmly thanked 
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Caleb B. Smith and the rest of Indiana, where he had spent much of his youth, for 
supporting him in the national convention. In August 1860 he also wrote to cousin John 
Hanks his recollection of relatives in Kentucky and Indiana.24 When another likely 
relative, John Chrisman, contacted him about their mutual family history, Lincoln again 
replied with the general information he had gleaned about their common ancestors. This 
correspondence to friends and relatives that resurrected Lincoln’s past and family history 
occurred during a momentous period in Lincoln’s life and in the country’s history, just 
prior to the election of 1860. In a letter to Nathaniel Grigsby, whose family had moved 
with Lincoln and his family westward from Indiana, the presidential nominee described 
the changes that had occurred since that move nearly thirty years before. Though he 
remained confident that North and South were not as different as they perceived one 
another to be, Lincoln warned Grigsby, then a resident of Missouri, “that you can vote for 
me,” but only “if your neighbors will let you. I would advise you not to get into any 
trouble about it.”25  
 With these relatives, acquaintances, and family friends, Lincoln clearly felt a 
personal connection; and at a time when he communicated with only a select few 
individuals, he seemed particularly responsive to these southerners, granting them 
explanations that he would not give to others. Therefore, when Kentuckian Samuel 
Haycraft contacted him explaining that he had known his father, Thomas, Lincoln 
described own vague recollections of Kentucky. Telling Haycraft that “I do not think I 
ever saw you” but certainly “know who you are,” Lincoln assured him that he was “really 
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very glad of your letter, and shall be pleased to receive another at any time.”26 When 
Haycraft suggested in the summer of 1860 that Lincoln should return to his birthplace in 
Kentucky and deliver a speech there, Lincoln remarked: “You suggest that a visit to the 
place of my nativity might be pleasant to me. Indeed it would. But would it be safe? 
Would not the people Lynch me?” At the time, Lincoln apparently thought nothing of his 
comment. Yet when this statement leaked out to the broader public, he hurriedly wrote 
Haycraft again, assuring him that “I believe no such thing of you, or of Kentuckians 
generally.” This mishap reveals Lincoln’s uniquely northwestern understanding of the 
secession crisis. Familiar with the Lovejoy incident, Lincoln knew the ugly fate that a 
public antislavery figure like himself might encounter at the hands of a mob. His concern 
did not emanate from a fear that most southerners were disunionist; rather, he blamed the 
slaveholding power and its ability to inflame the passions of otherwise calm Unionists. 
The very faith that Lincoln placed in Haycraft and in the other southerners with whom he 
corresponded proves that he did not actually believe a majority of Kentuckians, or of 
southerners generally, would join the secessionist movement if they were given adequate 
time to reflect. In making such a remark to Haycraft, a southerner whom he barely knew, 
Lincoln displayed a disconcertingly naïve faith in his own southern connections and in 
the South’s Unionism. If he gave no further rhetorical fodder for secessionist editors to 
distort into unrecognizable contortions of Republican doctrine, then southern 
nonslaveholders would slowly realize that their best interests were not served by the 
secessionists and the slaveholders.27  
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 The repercussions of Lincoln’s misstep likely played a crucial role in his decision 
to retain complete silence throughout the election and into the winter of 1861. Lincoln 
later stumbled upon correspondence in the New York Herald that claimed Lincoln had 
“on one occasion been invited to go into Kentucky and revisit some of the scenes with 
whose history his father in his life-time had been identified,” but declined after “asking 
by letter whether Judge Lynch would be present.” Fearing the fallout of these remarks 
and their effects on the southern states, Lincoln wrote to George C. Fogg, explaining the 
situation and requesting that he provide a correction to the editor of the Herald. “I dislike, 
exceedingly, for Kentuckians to understand that I am charging them with a purpose to 
inveigle me, and do violence to me,” he informed Fogg. After the correction was made, 
Lincoln wrote several letters to Samuel Haycraft, stating that “I was not guilty of stating, 
or insinuating, a suspicion of any intended violence, deception, or other wrong, against 
me, by you, or any other Kentuckian.”28 His correspondence with Samuel Haycraft 
continued long past this incident, revealing Lincoln’s relentless belief that the majority of 
southerners would never take revolutionary action against the free states. After the 
election of 1860, Lincoln confided to him “that the good people of the South who will put 
themselves in the same temper and mood toward me which you do, will find no cause to 
complain of me.”29 
 When southern states began to secede after his election to the presidency in 1860, 
Lincoln did not alter his course, and his refusal to compromise the Republican Party’s 
pledge regarding slavery demonstrates that his commitment to halting the progress of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
28 CW, IV: 96–97, 99. 
29 CW, IV: 138. 
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proslavery equaled his commitment to the Union.30 Numerous times from his nomination 
to his inauguration, Lincoln denied requests that he yield or compromise his single 
principle that slavery must not be extended.31  His decision to pursue this unyielding 
course, however, was as much a response to the continuing threat of popular sovereignty, 
as it was to the South. He advised Lyman Trumbull in December 1860 that the 
“dangerous ground—that into which some of our friends have a hankering to run—is 
Pop. Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm.”32 In an imaginary scenario Lincoln jotted down in 
September 1860 entitled “Dialogue between Stephen A. Douglas and John C. 
Breckinridge,” he mockingly portrayed Breckenridge asking Douglas: “why did you 
never denounce us as disunionists, till since our refusal to support you for the 
Presidency? Why have you never warned the North against our disunion schemes, till 
since the Charleston and Baltimore sessions of the National convention?” In response, 
Douglas replied: “The condition of my throat will not permit me to carry this 
conversation any further.”33 Knowing that John C. Breckinridge supported the Union, 
Lincoln remained convinced that Douglas posed the greater threat to the Union in 1860. 
Lincoln did not take the idea of secession seriously until it was upon him.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Historians differ on how representative Lincoln’s anti-compromise stance was within the Republican 
Party at the time. David Donald and Eric Foner assert that Lincoln “was out of step with the members of his 
party in Congress” who desired compromise, whereas David Potter, though presenting the secession crisis 
as a time of great flux for the Republican Party, argues that Lincoln’s stance was largely in line with the 
majority of Republicans in 1860 and 1861. David Donald, Lincoln, 269; Foner, The Fiery Trial, 155; 
Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, 13, 185. 
31 CW, III: 388; IV: 149–51, 153, 156–57, 172, 175–76, 183. 
32 CW, IV: 149–50. He reiterated this to William Kellogg, CW, IV: 150, and on Dec. 18 wrote to John D. 
Defrees that “I am sorry any republican inclines to dally with Pop. Sov. Of any sort. It acknowledges that 
slavery has equal rights with liberty, and surrenders all we have contended for.” CW, IV: 155. 
33 CW, IV: 124. 
34 Though “the candidate of the avowed secessionists,” Breckinridge was “himself no secessionist at all.” 
William C. Davis, The Union that Shaped the Confederacy: Robert Toombs and Alexander H. Stephens 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 2. Lincoln was certainly familiar with Breckinridge’s 
position, and had likely read speeches such as the one listed in Charles Lanman’s Dictionary of the United 
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 If Lincoln had believed that most of the slaveholding South would secede from 
the Union, it is not certain that he would have altered his course very much, if at all. 
Nevertheless, his confidence in the latent Unionism of the southern people certainly made 
easier his decision to make no compromises on the extension of slavery. As he explained 
to John B. Fry in August 1860, the Unionist sentiment evoked by Virginian John M. 
Botts “contains one of the many assurances I receive from the South that in no probable 
event will there be any very formidable effort to break up the Union.” He explained to 
Fry that the “people of the South have too much of good sense, and good temper, to 
attempt to the ruin of the government, rather than see it administered as it was 
administered by the men who made it. At least, so I hope and believe.”35  During the 
winter months of 1860 and 1861, as Lincoln considered the cabinet appointments he must 
make, he held onto hopes that a prominent non-Republican southerner would accept a 
post. After asking John D. Defrees about the likelihood of either Winfield Scott or 
Alexander Stephens accepting a cabinet position, Lincoln briefly corresponded with 
Stephens in an attempt to gain a greater sense of the South’s commitment to the Union, 
asking him whether “the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican 
administration would, directly, or indirectly, interfere with their slaves, or with them, 
about their slaves?” In response, Stephens explained to Lincoln that the people of the 
South did not fear the Republicans “would attempt to interfere directly and immediately 
with Slavery in the States,” but that over time, the Republican doctrine would force 
greater concessions from them until eventually, the South was forced to give up its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
States, in which invoked the most prominent politicians of America’s history in praise of the United 
States’s system of government. CW, IV: 74. 
35 CW, IV: 95. Lincoln did not realize that Botts “had become so isolated that his influence extended no 
further than Richmond working-class neighborhoods.” Link, Roots of Secession, 225. 
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institution. Although Stephens firmly insisted that the South must uphold its own right to 
continue to hold slaves, he also implored Lincoln to “understand me as being not a 
personal enemy, but as one who would have you to do what you can to save our common 
country.”36 Although Stephens clearly would not accept a cabinet position in the 
antislavery Republican Party, Lincoln pressed onward in his search of other possible 
southern candidates, and ultimately settled upon Montgomery Blair and Edward Bates.37 
 On his long pre-inaugural trip to Washington, D.C., in February 1861, Lincoln 
made many remarks in several towns and cities along the way but no substantial speeches 
on the slavery issue. Saving his explanations for the day of his inauguration as the 
sixteenth President of the United States, Lincoln carefully and methodically crafted an 
Inaugural Address that he believed would speak to the vast majority of individuals who 
still clung to the Union. His reassurances that the Republican Party pledged only to halt 
the expansion of slavery, never to interfere where it already existed in the states, and that 
as president he would respect the powers and privileges of the states, all reiterated the 
arguments he had made for years. The Republican Party would always uphold the 
Constitution, all national compromises, and provisions such as the fugitive slave law, 
which protected the South as well as the North. With seven states having seceded from 
the Union and the rest of the South considering its future course, Lincoln also took a 
resolute stand against the legality of secession, asserting “that no State, upon its own 
mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union.” He spoke specifically to those “who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 CW, IV: 155, 160; Alexander Hamilton Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the 
States (Philadelphia, Pa. and other cities: National Publishing Co., 1870), II: 267, 270. 
37 Lincoln attempted to persuade John A. Gilmer into the cabinet, but Gilmer, a proslavery North 
Carolinian, declined after serious consideration. CW, IV: 164, 171–72; Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the 
Secession Crisis, 152–53. Several historians detail Lincoln’s failed attempts to acquire additional 
southerners for his cabinet. David Donald, Lincoln, 263; Richard Carwardine, Lincoln: A Life of Power and 
Purpose (New York: Knopf, 2006), 139; White, A. Lincoln, 358. 
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really love the Union,” asking them: “Will you risk the commission of so fearful a 
mistake,” by seceding from the Union and rising up against it? Evoking his understanding 
of how intertwined the people and institutions of the two sections truly were, Lincoln 
reminded the American people that “[P]hysically speaking, we cannot separate. We 
cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall 
between them….[t]hey cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or 
hostile, must continue between them.” Placing his faith in the people, he assured them: 
“We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have 
strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.”  
 These “bonds of affection,” which Lincoln was confident still existed between the 
people of different sections, surely would not dissipate and allow the nation to plunge 
into war. Too many lives were bound up in personal connections on both sides of the 
Union. Echoing the sentiment he had voiced in his Lyceum speech of 1837, Lincoln 
urged Americans to put aside angry passions and give in to “the better angels of our 
nature.” Worried by the extent to which disunion had already spread, Lincoln continued 
to believe in March 1861 that most of the white South—including those states that had 
already seceded—would return to the Union upon seeing the error of their ways. His 
family past, his intimate understanding of the migratory connections that bound up 
northwesterner and southerner, and his firm conviction that slavery was both morally and 
socially wrong convinced him that Unionism would still prevail over secession in the 
1861 South. His ignorance of the attachment of white nonslaveholding southerners to 
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their region and to the institution of slavery reveals his peculiarly northwestern 
conception of the South on the eve of civil war.38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 CW, IV: 263–67, 270. Furthermore, as James G. Randall points out, “[i]t is striking, almost startling, to 
take the Southern or Southward-looking area that remained within the wartime Union and note its immense 
proportions.” If Lincoln exhibited a grave misunderstanding of the average white nonslaveholding 
southerner, he displayed an equally keen understanding of the inhabitants of southern Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois, and of Kentucky, Missouri, West Virginia, and Maryland. James G. Randall, Lincoln and the South 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), 52–53. Of course, a considerable contingent of 
southerners refused to support the Confederacy. For example, many Ozark mountaineers maintained 
Unionist ties with the North throughout the war. Jones County, Mississippi residents separated themselves 
from the rest of their state (whether through the formal formation of an independent free state, or by the 
simple organization of Unionists who fought their Confederate neighbors). Bynum, The Free State of 
Jones. These contingents prove how close some southwestern migrants remained ideologically similar to 
their counterparts in the Northwest, even during the Civil War. These Unionists, however, were 
overwhelmed by a much greater coalition of slaveholders, yeomen, and nonslaveholding whites who chose 
to embrace the Confederate cause in 1861. In James Woods’s estimation, “the perception and the reality of 
a new prosperity based upon a cotton economy,” shared in even by the nonslaveholding majority 
comprising 4/5 of the white population, “caused an overwhelming number of Arkansans to identify with a 
slaveholding Southern Confederacy.” Woods, Rebellion and Realignment, 170.	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